


# Just a big misunderstanding? Evidence on bias and partyism

Daniel F. Stone  
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
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**Figure:** Ideology/demographic-adjusted changes (vs 1980) in party favorability ratings (ANES)


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
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
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- ▶ Polarization of citizen ideologies: unclear
- ▶ Polarization of citizen feelings about political parties: very real
- ▶ 'Affective polarization'/'partyism', could exacerbate gridlock, etc

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- ▶ Perceived (Ahler, JoP, 2014; Mason, APSR, 2015)

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- ▶ Not something this (poli sci) or psych (political/moral) literatures talk about

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- ▶ Empirical analysis of (unmotivated) bias and out-party dislike
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- ▶ Twain (and others?): "It ain't what you don't know that gets you into trouble. It's what you know for sure that just ain't so."
- ▶ Goal: enhance understanding of causes of partyism (and eventual 'solutions'?)

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  - ▶ Bad actions (but can't be case for \*both\* parties)

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- ▶ Use PCA across topics to get  $OC_i$ ; two types of top-coding,  $OC_1$ ,  $OC_2$ ; validation (still implicit assumptions, necessary given data)

Preview of main results (y-axis = out-party favorability - in-party favorability)

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


Figure: OC vs (relative) out-party dislike

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- ▶ *OC/C* standardized (1 unit = 1 SD)



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	Tobit	Tobit	Tobit	IV
$C$	-2.711** (1.171)	-1.607 (1.761)	n/a	-5.683** (2.775)
$C \times \text{Dem}$		-1.898 (2.321)		
$N$	740	740	740	1480

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$OC_1$	-3.747*** (1.256)	-2.941* (1.738)	-3.333* (1.712)	-12.648** (6.366)
$OC_1 \times \text{Dem}$		-1.317 (2.458)		
$C$			-0.285 (0.755)	
$N$	740	740	740	1480

## Indirect effects via party identity

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1st stage: LHS = Party Strength (OLS)						
	Republicans			Democrats		
<i>C</i>	-0.0017 (0.0289)		-0.0394 (0.0315)	0.0436 (0.0288)		-0.0305 (0.0392)
<i>OC</i> <sub>1</sub>		0.0905 (0.0642)	0.1405** (0.0710)		0.1648*** (0.0553)	0.2091*** (0.0793)
<i>N</i>	339	339	339	401	401	401

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2nd stage: LHS = $F_D$ (Tobit)						
	Republicans			Democrats		
P-Str.	-7.53*** (0.333)	-7.12*** (0.335)	-7.12*** (0.335)	-10.80*** (1.83)	-10.30*** (1.80)	-10.29*** (1.81)
C	-0.90*** (0.106)		0.000 (0.111)	-1.292 (0.808)		0.102 (1.058)
OC <sub>1</sub>		-3.35*** (0.332)	-3.35*** (0.338)		-3.859** (1.907)	-4.009 (2.591)
N	339	339	339	401	401	401

## Stronger effects for less educated (LHS = $F_D$ )

	Tobit	Tobit	Tobit	IV
No college				
$OC_1$	-3.449** (1.523)	-4.384** (2.148)	-3.237 (1.964)	-18.906 (19.244)
$OC_1 \times \text{Dem}$		1.515 (3.054)		
$C$			-0.169 (0.967)	
$N$	426	426	426	852

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$OC_1 \times \text{Dem}$		1.515 (3.054)		
$C$			-0.169 (0.967)	
N	426	426	426	852
College+				
$OC_1$	-0.967 (1.747)	-0.096 (2.760)	1.507 (2.772)	-6.231 (10.161)
$OC_1 \times \text{Dem}$		-1.794 (3.691)		
$C$			-1.378 (1.277)	
N	314	314	314	628



# Other explanations

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- ▶ *OC* could be correlated with either of these



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$C$	-1.034 (1.208)	-1.201 (1.754)	n/a	-2.791 (3.116)
Dist	-5.423*** (1.828)	-5.423*** (1.827)	n/a	-5.162*** (1.800)
$C \times \text{Dem}$		0.320 (2.399)		
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N	701	701	701	1402
$OC_1$	-2.931** (1.335)	-2.509 (1.782)	-3.917** (1.755)	-8.390* (4.507)
Dist	-5.438*** (1.830)	-5.439*** (1.834)	-5.392*** (1.829)	-5.295*** (1.884)
$OC_1$ × Dem		-0.741 (2.596)		
C			0.660 (0.758)	
N	701	701	701	1402

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	Tobit	Tobit	Tobit	IV
$C^G$	-2.536** (1.154)	-1.131 (1.706)	n/a	-3.984 (2.744)
$MR$	-0.951 (1.455)	-0.895 (1.428)		-0.771 (1.565)
$C^G \times Dem$		-2.577 (2.264)		
N	742	742	742	738

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N	742	742	742	738
$OC_1^G$	-2.038* (1.172)	-2.394 (1.638)	-0.732 (1.532)	-10.995*** (4.242)
MR	-0.311 (1.482)	-0.301 (1.481)	-0.517 (1.502)	0.354 (1.608)
$OC_1^G \times \text{Dem}$		0.630 (2.439)		
$C^G$			-1.292 (0.899)	
N	742	742	742	738

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- ▶ And let's apply cognitive bias toolbox to this area more generally