LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY, CITIZENSHIP AND PARTICIPATION IN AFRICA

Ericka A. Albaugh – Working Paper – August 2015

ABSTRACT

African states are known for their linguistic diversity. Few have spread a single official language widely through their education systems. The preservation of many local languages seems a benefit in terms of minority rights, but some fear the fragmentation may inhibit national cohesion and democratic participation. This article examines language competence of individuals in ten states in Africa, highlighting distinctions in types of education systems. It also assesses their attitudes about citizenship and democracy, using *Afrobarometer* surveys. It shows that immersion systems are much more effective in spreading a standard language, but that citizenship attitudes have very little to do with proficiency in this official language. It also reveals that citizens armed with literacy in local languages tend to be more participatory, more demanding of greater accountability in government, and more critical of authoritarian rule.

African states are notorious for their poor education outcomes (UNESCO 2013, "Zimbabwe" 2013, "South Africa" 2014). While virtually all have chosen a European language as the official language of education, proficiency in these languages within states across the continent is only about 20 percent on average. Certainly, there is variation, but very few states have managed to spread a standard language through education. The benefit is that many local languages have been preserved; the question is what this means for citizenship and democracy.

This article will do three things: First, it will investigate the proficiency in European languages across the continent, and it will highlight the factors that make individuals more likely to speak these official languages. Second, it will ask how language proficiency and type of education affect citizens' national sentiments compared to their ethnic attachments. Finally, it will ask how these factors affect individuals' political participation and democratic attitudes.

The findings are, unsurprisingly, that higher levels of education bring greater proficiency in European languages. Assessing different *types* of education, the study finds that individuals schooled in immersion versus initial mother-tongue medium settings are more likely to learn European languages. And yet, proficiency in this official language has ambivalent effects on individuals' sentiments toward their ethnic group and nation. National sentiment is strong within mother tongue systems as well as immersion systems. In mother tongue settings, however, citizens maintain attachments to their ethnic identity while *at the same time* declaring loyalty to the nation, whereas citizens in immersion settings more readily drop the ethnic attachment. Finally, mother tongue settings appear to provide some advantages when it comes to political participation and support for democracy.

Expectations from the Literature

This study engages with two strands of literature: one on ethnic conflict and another on language policy in education. First, the literature on ethnic conflict is concerned centrally with the

dangers of **ethnolinguistic fragmentation**, which has been blamed for poor economic outcomes and for violent conflict.[1]

While casual observers usually equate ethnolinguistic fragmentation with higher violence, careful work has isolated specific configurations that lead to greater conflict. Horowitz attributes greater violence potential to settings with two or three large groups (1985/2000, 37-38). Bates shows that ethnic politics is most volatile when an ethnic bloc is sufficient in size to permanently exclude others from the exercise of power (1999, 26; see also Collier and Hoeffler 1998). Others have focused on institutional arrangements that provoke broader or more exclusive identification (Posner 2005). And what appears to be ethnic violence has been shown instead to depend on land scarcity, interregional inequality, and the provocation or protection provided by the state's security apparatus.[2] Language on its own is not usually treated separately, with the notable exception of Laitin (2000), who found in a global sample that language differentiation (the distance between language families) was *not* in fact related to violence. Language grievances, because they can be accommodated within political bargaining, seem to inspire protest, rather than violence (2000, 108). This kind of testing treats language identities as rather static, however, only expecting differentiation based on size and linguistic distinction among groups.

My question is more specific. I am trying to discover whether the differences in education systems – established by colonizers and largely continued through the independence period to the 90s – have had different effects on identities. Does a particular language *policy* – the use of mother tongues in education – contribute over the long term to the creation of insular groups with rebellious tendencies? The mechanism would be that as groups become more "ideologized," in the

[1] Easterly and Levine 1997; Alesina Baqir, Easterly 1999; Collier and Gunning 1999; Rodrik 1999; Keefer and Knack 2002. Even studies using more nuanced fractionalization measures concur that linguistic fractionalization (Alesina *et al* 2003*:* 167) and politicized ethnic diversity (Posner 2004) harm growth. But see Habyarimana, Humphreys Posner and Weinstein 2007.

[2] Boone 2007; Chauveau and Richards 2008; Berry 2009; Bakke and Wibbels 2006, Wilkinson 2004.

words of Young (1976, 45), they would become more (sub)nationalist, and therefore more likely to rebel against state repression and demand their autonomy. Previous work (Albaugh 2014, Ch. 7) found that violence was *not* in fact more prevalent among communities in which local language education was privileged. Resonating with the work of Horowitz and Bates, violent mobilization over language has to do with the potential permanent inequality that can arise if one group's language is chosen and others are not. Therefore, mother tongue education would only contribute to conflict insofar as it reinforces the privilege of a particular group that enjoyed an early head start. Where this has occurred – Sudan, Malawi, and Uganda to some extent – there have been rumblings from excluded groups. But by in large, mother tongue education has been more inclusive than exclusive, which is why it generally has not been linked to violence.

Even if scholarship has found that violent outcomes are only at risk where there is great intergroup inequality or permanent exclusion, we still want to know how education policies impact citizens' sense of national identity. Ali Mazrui posited that the recognition of chiefdoms and native rulers in Anglophone Africa helped to increase ethnic consciousness within subgroups, reducing the likelihood of an emerging national consciousness. "British approaches to colonial rule, by being culturally relative and ethnically specific, helped to perpetuate and in some cases create the kind of ethnic consciousness which could seriously militate against nation building" (Mazrui 1983, 29). The paper will therefore look at whether this increased attention to ethnic identity through mother tongue education indeed prevents the emergence of national sentiment.

A second strand of literature includes normative and practical theories about **language policies in education**. These literatures often overlap, as empirical arguments seem to follow normative predispositions. Normatively, the question is whether the goal should be uniformity or diversity. Those who advocate for uniformity argue that national unity and inclusive participation is best served when all speak the same language (Pogge 2003, Blake 2003, Archibugi 2005). Those

who advocate for diversity argue that inclusivity comes with recognition of minorities, and the imposition of a single language threatens to undermine unity (Phillipson 2008, Ives 2010, May 2012). These latter theorists similarly argue that their chosen method will enhance participation: namely that mother tongue education, by rectifying unchosen inequalities, will allow minority voices to be heard. Practically speaking, those who advocate uniformity argue that immersion is the most efficient way for minorities to learn a common language, while those advocating diversity say that the use of the mother tongue is not only more inclusive, but it is more effective for teaching a second language in the long run (Collier and Thomas 2004, Wong-Filmore 2004).

Of course, there is more nuance to these positions, as the classification by Stephen May (2012, 177-87) demonstrates.[3] May's Six Stages of Language Recognition[4] distinguish between the first four, which perpetuate an 'ideology of contempt' toward minority languages because they aim toward a monolingual nation state, and the last two, which question the superiority of such as state, pressing toward May's preferred alternative of ethnolinguistic democracy (May 2012, 191-192).

This tendency toward polemical terminology and maximalist goals may, however, damage the cause of diversity advocates. As I have argued elsewhere (Albaugh 2014, 96), the message of Anglophone scholars who favor the use of mother tongues in education has merged with that of transnational advocates of human language rights.[5] As language rights advocates urge more expansive and uncompromising priority to minority languages in the curriculum, they make the policy more difficult to adopt. An alternative strategy, and one taken by many Francophone scholars, is to endorse mother tongue education on the basis of its ability to facilitate the transition

[3] Wiley (2014, 1-2) provides a similar categorization: from repression-oriented to promotion-oriented policies.
[4] May's Stages of Language Recognition (drawing on Churchill 1986) are: *Stage 1: Submersion* (rapid transition to the majority language); *Stage 2: Compensatory* (programs such as Head Start in the U.S.), *Stage 3: Multicultural Education* (classes celebrating diversity, but without language components); *Stage 4: Transitional Bilingualism* (teaching early years through the medium of the mother tongue); *Stage 5: Maintenance Bilingual* (teaching both the minority and the majority language), and *Stage 6: Language Equality* (equal status for all recognized languages).
[5] Skutnabb-Kangas and Cummins 1988; Tollefson 2002; Skutnabb-Kangas 2000; Phillipson 1992, 2000; de Varennes 1996; Skutnabb-Kangas and Robert Philippson 1994; Phillipson and Skutnabb-Kangas 1999.

to the majority language. This efficiency argument can easily be reconciled with the nation-state model, but it is often rejected by purists as being "covert linguicide" (May 2012, 181). The "local language light" argument, as I call the transition variant, has gained traction in much of Francophone Africa, while the more demanding late-exit programs have been more difficult to maintain or expand, despite their apparent better results for learning the majority language (Heugh 2006, 69-70).

It may be that the disingenuous practice of "language light" proponents serves to keep more languages in use in the long run, even if they do not achieve what they promise as a bridge to a European language. In any case, this study can only evaluate the general effectiveness of early-exit mother tongue education systems against the effectiveness of immersion programs in learning a European language, the ultimate goal of both models. It is important to note that I cannot evaluate late-exit mother tongue programs, those that linguists say are the most effective method of learning a second language, since these have not been applied consistently in any country.

Even if the jury is still out on the effectiveness of each system in teaching a second language, another argument in favor even of early-exit mother tongue education has to do with its side effects: in particular, its participatory benefits (Kymlicka 2001). My research (Albaugh 2014, 203-208) gave some support to the notion that groups exposed to their languages in written form are just as likely to trust other groups, and more likely to criticize the government. Where mother tongue education is practiced, language committees have facilitated group solidarity, the practice of associations, and opportunities to network. Further, Barbara Trudell finds much evidence that using mother tongue education evokes more interaction in the classroom. Mother tongue classes are "noisier, more participatory and less characterized by strict discipline than the English-only classes" (2005, 10). These types of psychological and behavioral attitudes seem very likely to translate into more confident and active citizens. As Ngugi (1986) argued, learning the colonizers language facilitates

elites' participation, as it allowed them to join national or international conversations. The "masses," however, are still excluded. Alternative visions are not available to the audience that matters. This problem is echoed more recently by Ives (2010), who points out that the apparently "natural" decision to learn a global language may submerge critical consciousness and hinder the struggles of the *marginalized* to recognize their oppression.

This article therefore will look beyond the impact of mother tongue education on language acquisition, assessing its impact on citizens' attitudes and political participation.

African states are often compared unfavorably with the nation-state that arose in Europe (Herbst 2000). Whether one blames or credits this model, one of its central elements was language standardization. The lack of attention to standardization is evident in the following figure, which plots the European-language proficiency within all states in Africa. These are estimates based on several expert sources.[6]

FIGURE 1

[6] Among the general sources: Adegbija (1994), Graddol (1997), Baker and Jones (1998), OIF (2007), Leclerc (2009-2011). Sources for individual countries are listed in the appendix to Albaugh 2014.

Portion of the Population Speaking a European Language



Aside from two exceptional cases, Gabon, and Algeria,[7] French and English retain a relatively precarious status among African masses, with an average of less than 20 percent proficiency in any European language across the continent.

Certainly, some states are doing better than others, and this has much to do with differences in enrollment, which began in the colonial period (Albaugh 2014, Ch. 2). We would expect that the longer one remains in school, the more likely is one to speak a European language. We want to know, however, how the *type* of education system affects language proficiency. The percentages plotted in the graph are from expert estimates, but they are not based on surveys. Unfortunately, census information that includes language capabilities is not uniformly available for each country. I

[7] Gabon, with population only half a million at independence, began with an unusually high number of missionaries and the highest proportion of children attending school in Francophone Africa. Its high proficiency, then, is simply a reflection of this head start. Algeria also began with a relatively high number of children enrolled, but interestingly, its official policies aimed to spread Arabic at the expense of French. Close proximity to France, frequent emigration and return, and more recent spread through TV programs have increased French proficiency more than deliberate government policy.

therefore turned to the *Afrobarometer* surveys to gauge both proficiency and possible contributing variables. These surveys ask a battery of questions of 1200 to 2400 respondents from each country.

To look at individuals' actual facility in speaking a unifying language, I profited in particular from one open-ended question in the 2008 *Afrobarometer* surveys. This question (Q88E) asked respondents to list the languages they spoke well. By disaggregating the respondents by their exposure to education and their facility in a European language, one can see how effective the education system in the country has been in its stated goal of diffusing the official language. While far from perfect, the biases would be similar across all of the respondents. I coded these free responses into a 0/1 variable, 1 indicating that the respondent listed English, French, or Portuguese among the languages he or she spoke well. Though surveys are available for 20 countries, I restricted my selection to the 10 most representative cases for my purposes: in particular, those that most consistently demonstrated the typical "Francophone" and "Anglophone" approach to education, prior to some shifts in the last decade. I also include Mozambique as a representative of Portuguese policy, more similar to the Francophone cases in its non-use of local languages. Historically, British colonies and the independent states that succeeded them relied on local languages in early education, while French and Portuguese colonies and subsequent states generally used these European languages from the beginning of primary school (Albaugh 2014, Ch. 2). In the last 15 years, many Francophone and Lusophone states have shifted to the use of local languages, but adults surveyed in 2008 would have been schooled in the original systems: typically mother tongue for Anglophone and immersion for Francophone and Lusophone.

The following 10 countries make up the sample: Uganda, Zimbabwe, Nigeria, Kenya, Ghana (Anglophone/mother tongue education); Benin, Burkina Faso, Mali, Senegal (Francophone/ immersion) and Mozambique (Portuguese/immersion).

Findings: European Language Proficiency

While proponents of mother tongue education argue that it is ultimately more effective in transitioning children to a second (European) language, the length of time these languages are used make the mother tongue systems "early exit" programs across the board. I suspect it is more likely that students exposed to a European language earlier will claim some proficiency.

Figure 2 shows that the percentage of the population who included English as one of the languages they spoke well was much higher in the Anglophone sample of countries (53 percent) than those in the Francophone sample who included French among the languages they spoke well (32 percent).[8]

FIGURE 2



[8] Mozambique is an interesting outlier. Its high proficiency may be due to its much longer exposure to Portuguese or, as I argue elsewhere (Albaugh 2015), it could reflect the long-term experience with a civil war, which spread the language more widely than did the school system.

This finding mirrors the continual observation of a low literacy rate in Francophone states, and it has often led to a disparaging assessment of the French system of education – the use of French rather than local languages as medium of instruction. It has probably led to these states' willingness to consider other methods. But this may not be the appropriate interpretation.

The Afrobarometer surveys attempt to include as representative a sample of the population in each country as possible. Because literacy rates in Anglophone Africa are much higher than in Francophone Africa (average rates among these five countries are 76 percent versus 36 percent for the Francophone countries), a random sample will naturally capture a higher percentage of educated respondents in surveys done in Anglophone Africa. In fact, the average percentage of survey respondents with some education was 87 percent in Anglophone Africa versus 43 percent in Francophone Africa – twice as many respondents therefore had exposure to some education in the former as in the latter. We need, then, to account for level of education.

As further controls, we want to include some demographic variables. Considering the diversity of language groups in these states, it would be reasonable to expect that individuals from small language groups would have more incentive to learn a European language to increase their communication potential, compared with individuals from large language groups, who already have more communication partners (de Swaan 2001). I calculated this variable based on language size figures from *Ethnologue*, adjusting the numbers to 2010 estimates. "Size of Respondent's Language Group" is the portion of the country's overall population that speaks the respondent's language as a mother tongue.[9] It is predicted that individuals from larger indigenous groups will be less likely to need to learn a second language. I also include an urban/rural dummy, believing that urbanization

[9] I constructed this measure based on data gleaned from *Ethnologue Languages of the World,* 16th edition (www.ethnologue.com), calculating group language sizes as a proportion of overall population (adjusting to 2010 estimates as necessary). The Afrobarometer languages had to be carefully matched to the Ethnologue languages, which were often named differently (this was possible because alternate names are listed in Ethnologue). I also aggregated languages that were split in Ethnologue, such as Dogon varieties in Mali or languages listed as members of the Oluluyia (Luhya) macrolanguage in Kenya.

should increase one's exposure to a European language, as should the fact of being male. Finally, I expect that young people are more likely to be learning European languages through greater interaction with media. Values for these final three variables are taken from the Afrobarometer 2008 responses.

The following Logit regression results support these expectations. In the first model, I include only education level as an explanatory variable, and it is clear that each additional year of education increases one's odds of speaking a European language by two-and-a-half times.

TABLE 1 – LOGIT Regression[10]

Outcome: Claims to Speak a European Language

Variables	**Model 1**		**Model 2**		**Model 3**	
	Coeff	Exp(B)	Coeff	Exp(B)	Coeff	Exp(B)
Constant	-2.82	.060	-2.58	.076	-2.33	.098
Education Level	.94** (.015)	2.56	1.12** (.018)	3.07	1.10** (.020)	3.011
Mother Tongue Education			-1.29** (.056)	.277	-1.25** (.058)	.288
Size of Respondent's Language Group					-2.22** (.124)	.109
Urban					.359** (.052)	1.431
Male					.542** (.048)	1.719
Age					-.057* (.018)	.944
N	14269		14269		14086	
R^2	.402		.427		.444	

[10] I include the coefficients for information, but the more intuitive figure the Exp(B) – "odds ratio". This gives the increased (or decreased) odds of speaking a European language contributed by every unit change in the variable.

-2 log likelihood:	12438.371	11843.660	11269.881

** Significant at the .001 level

Model 2 adds a dummy for type of education system – 0 for immersion and 1 for mother tongue. It indicates that mother tongue settings are in fact *less* likely to produce individuals who claim proficiency in a European language at any given level of education. The following figure separates respondents by level of education to show the distinction in predicted probabilities:

FIGURE 3

Predicted Probability of Speaking a European Language by Level of Education (0-8) and Education System



Considering only the level of education and the mother tongue or immersion settings, it is clear that at every level, individuals in Francophone or Lusophone states are more likely to speak a European language. After two years of education, for example, individuals in Anglophone states are half as likely (19%) to say they can speak English well than individuals in Francophone states to say they can speak French well (42%). The gap narrows as education increases, particularly after the fourth grade, when Anglophone states would typically make the transition to all English. After five years of education, individuals in Anglophone states have 83 percent probability of saying they speak English well, compared to 97 percent in Francophone or Lusophone states. Finally, with seven years of education, the probability becomes nearly the same, at 98 and 99 percent. This seems to confirm the warning that early-exit programs are the least effective method of imparting a second language. Model 3 adds the demographic controls, confirming that larger-sized groups are less likely

to speak a European language, while males and those in urban areas are more likely to. Age has an almost negligible effect. We can check the marginal effects of education in each setting while assigning the other variables specific values.[11] The following figures graph the likelihood that rural women at different levels of education will speak a European language.

FIGURE 4



With two years of education in immersion settings, the probability of claiming to speak a European language varies with the size of a respondent's language group. The larger the group, the

[11] For each subset, I asked for predicted probabilities, setting the urban/rural variable to 0 (rural) and gender to 0 (female). When these were returned, I sorted by level of education and then by language size, and I took the average predicted probabilities within each language size grouping.

less likely a member will speak a European language. Rural women from very tiny language groups have a 44 percent probability, whereas those from the very largest groups have only 20 percent probability. After four years of education, the gap is narrower, but still pronounced: women from very tiny groups have 88 percent probability, compared to 71 percent for those from the very largest groups. Above six years of schooling, the size of the group does not change the probability, which is about 99 percent across the board.

Comparing these findings to mother tongue education settings, we see the same patterns, but with lower probabilities overall. With two years of education in mother tongue settings, rural women from tiny groups have only 17 percent probability of speaking English, and those from the very largest groups only 4 percent. After four years of education, women from very small groups have 67 percent probability, compared to 31 percent among those in the very largest groups. It is only after seven years of schooling that the gap seems to shrink.

FIGURE 5



It seems evident that immersion does a better job of teaching people to speak a European language. As explained at the outset, the reason proficiency remains so low in Francophone settings

is that a smaller proportion of the population has been enrolled since the colonial period. Literacy rates, therefore, are higher in Anglophone settings. But literacy in a European language may not be the underlying outcome of concern. The main arguments in favor of a single language in education are to promote a national (instead of ethnically divided) citizenry and to enable participation through common communication. We therefore need to look more closely at attitudes and actions within these cases to see if in fact the immersion settings are delivering those benefits. First, does speaking a European language make one more committed to the nation?

Findings: Citizenship Sentiment

What does speaking a former colonial language have to do with citizenship and national identity? *Afrobarometer* 2008 again contributes some insights. Question 83 asked respondents to choose among several options regarding their identities. They could choose to identify 1) only with their ethnic group; 2) mostly with their ethnic group; 3) equally with their ethnic group and the nation; 4) mostly with the nation; 5) only with the nation. Figure 6 graphs the proportion of respondents that chose higher identification with their ethnic identity than national, dividing the cases between those states that used mother tongue education (Anglophone) and those that practiced immersion (Francophone and Lusophone). It shows that there is actually lower ethnic attachment within states that practiced mother tongue education than did not. Contrary to common belief, mother tongue education does not appear to cause greater attachment to one's ethnic group.

FIGURE 6



At the same time, as Figure 7 demonstrates, there is also greater *national* attachment in Francophone states.

FIGURE 7



This means that Francophone states have a significantly higher proportion of respondents who identified with national identity *as well as* the higher proportion identifying with ethnic. So how do we explain this? There is a third option: Individuals from states where mother tongue education is used have significantly higher *equal* attachments. This shows that rather than choosing either ethnic or national loyalties, citizens are capable of dividing them equally.

FIGURE 8



Mother tongue education in the Anglophone systems seems to have done a very good job of cultivating greater national sentiment while preserving ethnic ties. When we divide respondents into those with no education exposure and those with some education, we find that respondents who selected greater ethnic attachments were fairly similarly affected by education in Anglophone and Francophone systems: any exposure to education reduced attachment to ethnic identity by about 10 percentage points in either type of schooling. The question is where this attachment was then placed.

Education exposure prompted individuals shift to national identity in the Francophone cases, while it prompted them to shift to equal attachment in the Anglophone cases. Figure 9 (national attachment) shows a greater effect of education in the Francophone cases, and Figure 10 (equal attachment) shows a greater effect of education in the Anglophone cases.

FIGURE 9

Identify with NATIONAL Identity Only + More, by Education Exposure



FIGURE 10

Identify with National & Ethnic Identity Equally, by Education Exposure



These figures show a clearly different effect of education on citizenship sentiments between these sets of countries. Education in Francophone states, while perhaps more effective at teaching French (even if limited in spread), seems to ask individuals to drop ethnic attachments in favor of

national ones. If education in the immersion method were to continue in these cases, we would expect it to result in 'modern' civic citizens, who left their ethnic ties in favor of a national identity. Education in Anglophone Africa has instilled more broadly equal attachments, a very different model of nationhood.

We can analyze the variables concurrently in a straightforward way with an OLS regression. The outcome is ethnic versus national ID, and the possible choices are 1 (ethnic identity only); 2 (ethnic identity more); 3 (ethnic and national equally); 4 (national identity more); or 5 (national identity only). The OLS regression reveals that the Immersion cases "behave" as expected, while the Mother Tongue cases do not:

TABLE 2: Comparison of OLS Regressions

Outcome = Ethnic/National ID

	Model 1		**Model 2**		**Model 3**	
Variables	**Immersion**	**MTongue**	**Immersion**	**MTongue**	**Immersion**	**MTongue**
Constant	3.38 (.025)	3.24 (.027)	3.24 (.058)	3.15 (.044)	3.25 (.058)	3.15 (.044)
Education Level	**.084***** (.009)	**.020**** (.006)	**.068***** (.010)	**.017**** (.007)	**.084***** (.014)	.005 (.008)
Urban			**.086*** (.041)	.017 (.027)	**.087*** (.041)	.010 (.027)
Male			**.187***** (.038)	.008 (.025)	**.196***** (.038)	.003 (.025)
Age			.008 (.013)	.000 (.009)	.006 (.013)	.001 (.009)
Size of Respondent's Language Group			**.206** (.111)	**.498***** (.062)	**.172** (113)	**.521***** (.063)
Speaks European Language					**-.095** (.053)	**.082**** (.032)
N	6032	8088	5724	8088	5724	8088
AdjR^2	.014	.001	.019	.009	.020	.009

***Signif at .001 level; **Signif at .01 level; *Signif at .05 level [Bold=Signif at .1 level]

Looking first at the Immersion cases (not highlighted), in Model 1 education level strongly increases one's tendency to identify more with the nation in both subsets. It continues to matter,

along with urban and male categorization, in the Immersion cases within Models 2 and 3. Age does not seem to play a role, and individuals from larger language groups are weakly more inclined to identify with the nation. Speaking a European langauge, while barely significant, seems correlated with *less* identification with the nation.

The Mother Tongue education cases (highlighted) behave very differently. First, education level has only one quarter the effect in Models 1 and 2 and no effect when all variables are included in Model 3. None of the other variables seem to matter, except for the size of one's language group. If an individual is from one of Nigeria's largest groups – Yoruba, Hausa, Ibo – he or she is much more likely to feel ownership of the nation and indicate a stronger attachment to it. And, unlike the immersion cases, speaking a European language seems to exert a positive impact on one's attachment to the nation.

Because I hypothesize at the outcome in the Anglophone cases is not linear; that is, higher education does not uniformly lead individuals toward 5 (answering "identify only with the nation"), but may instead settle on 3 or 4), a multinomial Logit regression on each sub-group can be more precise than the OLS models. Appendix A reports the numerical results, while Figure 11 shows the findings more graphically.[12] This figure demonstrates the effect of education on the likelihood of respondents choosing options other than "Ethnic ID only." We see that higher levels of education have very different effects in immersion and mother tongue settings. It is particularly evident in the comparison of "National ID Only" that each additional year of education has a strong effect in immersion settings but almost no effect in mother tongue systems.

[12] This family plot was generated in R.

FIGURE 11



These figures and regression results point to a different role for education in each setting. Immersion systems have indeed done a better job of spreading a European language. And these education systems do increase individuals' attachment to the nation over their ethnic identity, but the ability to speak the language itself does not add to their national sentiment. Mother tongue settings – early-exit systems – have not been as effective at spreading European languages. They produce citizens who rarely choose to identify with the nation exclusively, preferring to maintain their ethnic identity at the same time.

Findings: Participation and Attitude toward Democracy

Finally, we want to know what affects individuals' likelihood of participating politically and his or her attitudes toward democracy. Tilly defines democratic government as "broad, relatively

equal citizenship affording citizens considerable protection from arbitrary state action as well as significant collective control over the personnel and decisions of government" (Tilly 1997, 246). In situations where 'big man rule' has become the norm, it is important to identify citizens' ability to question this patrimonialism. I selected five questions from the *Afrobarometer* survey, two pointing toward participation and three indicating democratic attitudes. I discuss each briefly below and then run simple OLS regressions to see what variables correlate with these outcomes.

First, proclivity toward political participation might be seen in individuals' belief that they can get together to make their local assembly member listen to their grievances (Question 24A).[13] The possible responses to this question were 0 (not at all likely), 1 (not very likely), 2 (somewhat likely), and 3 (very likely). Overall, in the total sample of more than 14,000 respondents, 20 percent said that it was not at all likely, 21 percent said it was not very likely, 29 percent said it was somewhat likely, 30 percent said it was very likely, and 5.5 percent said they did not know. More direct participation could be seen in respondents' actually contacting a local government council member (Question 25A).[14] Possible responses were 0 (never), 1 (only once), 2 (a few times), and 3 (often). Overall, nearly 70 percent had never contacted a local council member; 10 percent had done it only once, 14 percent had done it a few times, and 7 percent did it often.

Second, support for democracy was demonstrated in Question 29C,[15] Question 30,[16] and Question 34.[17] The first was essentially rejecting one-man rule, indicated by disapproval that

[13] "In your opinion, how likely is it that you could get together with others and make your elected Assemblyman/ woman listen to your concerns about a matter of importance to the community?"
[14] "During the past year, how often have you contacted your local government councilor about some important problem or to give them your views?"
[15] "There are many ways to govern a country. Would you disapprove or approve of the following alternatives: Elections and Parliament/National Assembly are abolished so that the President/Prime Minister can decide everything."
[16] Which of these three statements is closest to your own opinion? Statement 1: Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government; Statement 2: In some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be preferable; Statement 3: For someone like me, it doesn't matter what kind of government we have.
[17] Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Statement 1: Opposition parties should regularly examine and criticize government policies and actions. Statement 2: Opposition parties should concentrate on cooperating with government and helping it develop the country.

elections and Parliament be abolished so that the president or prime minister could decide everything. I flipped the original numbering so that the signs in the regression would be more intuitive: respondents could choose 1 (strong approval for abolishing elections); 2 (approval), 3 (neither approval nor disapproval), 4 (disapproval), or 5 (strong disapproval). Overall, only 3 percent strongly approved, 7 percent approved, 6 percent neither approved nor disapproved, 31 percent disapproved, and 53 percent strongly disapproved of one-man rule. Question 30 asked respondents to indicate their support for democracy. Again, I flipped the numbers so that the signs in the regression would be intuitive. Choosing the statement "Democracy is preferable to any kind of government" was coded 3, the statement "In some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be preferable" was a 2, and "For someone like me, it doesn't matter what kind of government we have" was a 1. Many respondents responded that they did not know. Overall, 72 percent agreed with the statement that democracy was preferable to any form of government; 10 percent said that in some circumstances, non-democracy is preferable; 10 percent said that it didn't matter; and 7 percent said they did not know. I ran the regression with the "I don't know" cases dropped, but I also ran it with these cases re-coded to a ".5" since it seems this response is a weaker version of "it does not matter." This provided stronger results in the same direction as when responses were dropped and is reported in Table 5.

Finally, Question 34 asked citizens to judge the role of opposition parties by agreeing with one of two statements: 1: opposition parties should regulate and examine government or 2: opposition parties should cooperate with government. Again, I flipped the response numbers: 0 was "agree with neither statement;" 1 was "agree very strongly with statement 2"; 2 was "agree with statement 2", 3 was "agree with statement 1"; and 4 was "agree very strongly with statement 1." Overall, 33 percent said that they agreed strongly with that opposition parties should concentrate on cooperating; 26 percent said they agreed that opposition parties should concentrate on cooperating;

18 percent said they agreed that opposition should regularly examine and criticize government; and 21 percent said they strongly agreed that opposition should examine and criticize.

The following series of OLS regressions shows the association of the outcomes with the variables of interest, particularly the type of system, the ability to speak a European language, and size of one's group.

TABLE 4: OLS Regressions - Participation and Support for Democracy

	PARTICIPATION		ATTITUDES		
	Get Together to Make Assembly Member Listen	*Contact Local Govt Council Member*	*Reject One-Man Rule*	*Support For Democracy*	*Opposition Parties Examine / Criticize Govt*
Constant	1.411 (.032)	.086 (.027)	3.881 (.030)	2.230 (.024)	2.090 (.035)
Education Level (1-9)	.009 (.007)	**.019**** (.006)	**.042**** (.006)	**.029**** (.005)	-.004 (.007)
Urban (0/1)	**-.169**** (.021)	**-.253**** (.018)	**.088**** (.019)	**.038*** (.016)	-.007 (.022)
Male (0/1)	**.196**** (.019)	**.263**** (.016)	**.098**** (018)	**.172**** (.015)	**.102**** (.021)
Age (1-7)	**.037**** (.007)	**.089**** (.006)	**.029**** (.007)	**.015*** (.005)	**.014** (.008)
Mother Tongue System (0/1)	**-.056*** (.021)	**.107**** (.018)	**.143**** (.020)	**.095**** (.016)	**.062*** (.023)
Speak a European Language (0/1)	**.090**** (.025)	**.050** (.021)	-.023 (.024)	**.087**** (.019)	**.071*** (.027)
Size of Language Group (.01 - .69)	**.523**** (.051)	**.215**** (.043)	-.007 (.048)	**-.250**** (.038)	**-.132** (.055)
N	13503	14189	13525	14286	13782
AdjR²	.025	.061	.022	.039	.004

Bold=Significant at the .1 level; *Significant at the .01 level; **Significant at the .001 level

In terms of participation, higher levels of education does not have a significant correlation with the confidence that one can get together to make assembly members listen, but it does seem to influence the likelihood of actually contacting a local government council member. Interestingly, rural respondents were *more* likely to engage in both types of participation, perhaps, as Lauren

MacLean (2011) has found, because they have been more negatively affected by reduced government services and work harder to press for their return. Unsurprisingly, older males demonstrate higher participation. Mother tongue systems seem to have an ambivalent effect on participation: individuals in these systems are less likely to *believe* they could get together to make their assemblyperson listen but more likely actually to have *contacted* a local representative. This may reflect greater pragmatism (or cynicism) within the Anglophone systems. The ability to speak a European language increases one's confidence to participate and barely seems correlated with actually contacting representatives, but both show very little substantive impact. Individuals from larger language groups are significantly more likely to think they can join to effect change as well as more likely actually to have contacted their local government council member. Neither is surprising because of the larger pool of fellow language speakers with whom to join and the higher probability that council member is from one's own group.

Attitudes toward democracy are fairly consistent. Higher levels of education and urbanization increase one's disapproval of one-man rule and support for democracy over all other systems, though effects on attitudes toward the role of the opposition are not significant. Male respondents uniformly demonstrate stronger democratic and oppositional attitudes, as do older respondents. Mother tongue systems produce the strongest effect in the "reject one-man rule" question, but they also show a significant influence in support for democracy and critical opposition. The ability to speak a European language does not show any effect on rejecting one-man rule, though it does increase the support for democracy against all other systems as well as support for strong opposition. Finally, larger groups (e.g. Akan, Wolof, Shona, Buganda) show *less* supportive attitudes toward democracy, I would suggest because they may be more likely than smaller groups to benefit from a less-than-democratic system. Except for the confidence that one can get together

with others to make an assemblyman listen, all of these results point to the superiority of mother tongue education settings for participation and democratic attitudes.

Finally, an additional question from *Afrobarometer* probed respondents' sentiments about democracy (Question 40A), asking people to choose what they thought should be the most important national priority among several options. These options were 1: maintaining order in the nation, 2: giving people more say in government decisions, 3: protecting people's right to live freely, and 4: improving economic conditions for the poor. The following figures show the percentage of respondents in each country who chose each option as the highest national priority. The largest proportion of respondents chose "improve the economy" as the most important national priority. One might expect this to correlate with need, though including GDP per capita in the year of the survey did not show a consistent pattern.

Closer to the purpose of the paper, we want to know what proportion selected outcomes associated with democracy. Figure 12 clearly shows that individuals in the mother tongue systems are registering more interest in democracy. The percentage of respondents who want more protection of freedom is highest in Zimbabwe, perhaps not surprising given Zimbabwe's abysmal Freedom House score. Yet even citizens in very democratic Ghana complain about freedom at a higher rate than three of the less democratic Francophone cases.

FIGURE 12



The distinction is even more pronounced when looking at the percentage of citizens who want more say in their government (Fig. 13). The most democratic Anglophone cases – Ghana and Kenya – have more demands for participation than any of the Francophone cases.

FIGURE 13



Conclusion

Scholars have long observed that British colonization left a firmer foundation for democracy (Bernard, Reenock and Nordstrom 2004; Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2002; Woodberry 2012;

all following earlier theorists such as Lipset, Seong and Torres 1993). This has variously been attributed to good institutions, geography, or Protestant missions.

This paper has looked specifically at the type of education and its role in language acquisition, citizenship and democratic attitudes. It has found that immersion settings – elitist and limited as they are – do a better job of instilling foreign language proficiency in school-leavers. And these schools more uniformly create citizens with stronger national versus ethnic sentiment.

Rather than creating the opposite – citizens attached more firmly (and perhaps dangerously) to their ethnic identities – mother tongue systems produce citizens that hold on to their ethnic and national identities in tandem. And as for democracy, mother tongue systems seem to offer an advantage. Citizens are more likely to contact local government officials, reject one-man rule, support democracy over any other system, and believe opposition should criticize rather than cooperate with government. Individuals in these systems also demand more freedoms and more say in their government. Many African states suffer a democratic deficit; governments are suspended above, rather than connected to their population. In this setting, it is confident, active and oppositional citizens who might compel deeper accountability from their leaders.

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Appendix A: Multinomial Logit Regressions

The following table divides respondents into Mother Tongue and Immersion settings, comparing responses to the question that asked respondents to choose among several options regarding their identities. They could choose to identify 1) only with their ethnic group; 2) mostly with their ethnic group; 3) equally with their ethnic group and the nation; 4) mostly with the nation;

5) only with the nation. The table reports comparisons with the base category of 1 (identify only with their ethnic group).

IMMERSION SYSTEMS

Variable	Coeff.	Exp(B)
2 (More Ethnic) Compared with 1		
Intercept	.268 (.227)	
Education Level	.025 (.049)	1.025
Size of Language Group	**-.011** **(.004)**	**.989**
Rural	-.144 (.133)	.866
Female	-.260 (.118)	.771
Do not Speak a Europ. Language	**.584** **(.176)**	**1.793**
Age	**-.001** **(.000)**	**.999**
3 (Equal Ethnic/National) Compared with 1		
Intercept	.949 (.189)	
Education Level	**.220** **(.040)**	**1.246**
Size of Language Group	.000 (.003)	1.00
Rural	-.175 (.113)	.840
Female	**-.363** **(.101)**	**.695**
Do not Speak a Europ. Language	.232 (.144)	1.261
Age	**-.001** **(.000)**	**.999**
4 (More National) Compared with 1		
Intercept	-.508 (.240)	
Education Level	**.278** **(.048)**	**1.321**
Size of Language Group	.004 (.004)	1.004
Rural	**-.302** **(.140)**	**.738**
Female	**-.609** **(.128)**	**.544**
Do not Speak a Europ. Language	**.633** **(.183)**	**1.883**
Age	**-.001** **(.000)**	**.999**
5 (Only National) Compared with 1		
Intercept	1.233 (.184)	

MOTHER TONGUE SYSTEMS

Variable	Coeff.	Exp(B)
2 (More Ethnic) Compared with 1		
Intercept	.640 (.231)	
Education Level	**.115** **(.038)**	**1.122**
Size of Language Group	**-.021** **(.003)**	**.980**
Rural	-.005 (.128)	.995
Female	.204 (.114)	1.226
Do not Speak a Europ. Language	-.264 (.148)	.768
Age	.000 (.001)	1.00
3 (Equal Ethnic/National) Compared with 1		
Intercept	1.961 (.196)	
Education Level	**.125** **(.032)**	**1.133**
Size of Language Group	**-.005** **(.002)**	**.995**
Rural	-.031 (.110)	.970
Female	.091 (.098)	1.096
Do not Speak a Europ. Language	**-.402** **(.127)**	**.606**
Age	-.001 (.001)	.999
4 (More National) Compared with 1		
Intercept	.135 (.235)	
Education Level	**.224** **(.038)**	**1.252**
Size of Language Group	**-.006** **(.003)**	**.994**
Rural	.018 (.128)	1.018
Female	.024 (.115)	1.024
Do not Speak a Europ. Language	**-.500** **(.149)**	**.606**
Age	.000 (.001)	1.000
5 (Only National) Compared with 1		
Intercept	1.176 (.208)	

Education Level	**.228 (.039)**	**1.256**
Size of Language Group	-.001 (.003)	.999
Rural	**-.242 (.110)**	**.785**
Female	**-.521 (.098)**	**.594**
Do not Speak a Europ. Language	**.422 (.141)**	**1.525**
Age	**-.001 (.000)**	**.999**

Education Level	.067 (.034)	1.070
Size of Language Group	**.006 (.002)**	**1.006**
Rural	-.048 (.117)	.953
Female	.101 (.104)	1.106
Do not Speak a Europ. Language	**-.385 (.134)**	**.680**
Age	-.001 (.001)	.999

In Immersion systems, higher levels of education systematically increase the probability of choosing 3, 4, and 5, rather than 1. Females are less likely to choose 3 and much less likely to choose 4 or 5, indicating that women clearly identified more than men with ethnic identities over national. Being rural reduces the likelihood of choosing a national identity more or only. Interestingly, the inability to speak French or Portuguese strongly *increases* the likelihood of choosing 2 or 4, increases somewhat the likelihood of choosing 5 and has no impact on the likelihood of choosing 3. This seems unusual, but it shows proficiency in a common official language may not contribute to stronger feelings of nationhood. Age has a marginally negative impact; younger respondents are slightly more likely to choose 2, 3 or 4. Size of the language group does not appear significant in this subset.

In mother tongue systems, higher education levels slightly increase the likelihood of choosing 2 or 3 and more strongly increase the likelihood of choosing 4, though in none of the cases is this effect as strong as in Immersion systems. Importantly, higher levels of education do *not* increase the likelihood of choosing 5 (only national identity) over only ethnic. This is a significant distinction compared to the immersion cases. Unlike in the Immersion setting, being female does not reduce the likelihood of choosing away from ethnic identity; the coefficients are in fact positive, though not significant. Being rural does not have any effect; nor does age. Larger language groups are just slightly less likely to choose 2, 3, or 4 than 1 but slightly *more* likely to choose 5. One might speculate that large groups such as the Akan in Ghana cluster at either "ethnic identity only" or

"national identity only" because they feel that in a sense they "own" the state's national identity. Finally, the inability to speak English *does* reduce the likelihood of choosing 3, 4, or 5 in these mother tongue settings. Those unable to communicate in English feel less attachment to the nation than their ethnic group.

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