BOWDOIN COLLEGE

Professor Potholm Government 2580 Government, War and Society Spring 2018

Syllabus

Leon Trotsky, "You may not be interested in war but war is interested in you."

Jason Silva, "Origins," "War has made us who we are."

Christian Potholm, "We are weary of the grand narrations of history, but War is not. The cruel arc from the Tollens River and the <u>Iliad</u> remains."

Amir b. al-Tufayh, "Truly War knows I am her child."

Basil Liddel Hart, <u>Defense of the West</u>, "War is always a matter of doing evil in the hope that good may come of it."

Machiavelli, "War is just when it is necessary."

Sir Henry Maine, "War appears to be as old as mankind but peace is a modern invention."

Somali fighter, "Killing is negotiation."

Robert Gates, <u>Duty</u>, "War is inevitably tragic, inefficient and uncertain."

Department of Government and Legal Studies

John Milton, "To My Lord Fairfax," "For what can War, but Acts of War still breed, Till injur'd Truth from Violence be freed."

Homer, <u>The Iliad</u>, "Very good... This much blood would please even Ares, the god of war."

Thucydides, <u>The Peloponnesian War</u>, "A nation that makes a great distinction between its scholars and its warriors will have its laws made by cowards and its wars fought by fools."

Christian Potholm, "War serves War, it serves itself."

William Tecumseh Sherman, "War is cruelty and you cannot refine it. Every attempt to make war easy and safe will result in humiliation and disaster."

Antoine Jomini, "The greatest tragedy is war, but so long as there is mankind, there will be war."

Jackie Fisher, "The humanizing of war. You might as well talk of humanizing hell."

Mao Zedong, "War is the highest form of struggle for resolving contradictions...between classes, nations, states or political groups."

Joshua Chamberlain, "War is for the participants a test of character; it makes bad men worse and good men better."

Friedrich Nietzsche, <u>Human, All Too Human</u>, "Against war it may be said that it makes the victor stupid and the vanquished revengeful."

Albert Yu-Min Lin, "War is a symptom of our humanity"

Viking Warrior, <u>Viking Fire</u>, "My name is Halldor. And this is Tooth, my war ax. On land I pray to Christ. On the sea I pray to Thor. But however much I ask, Tooth is the only one who answers my prayers."

For a broader range of quotations on war, see C. P. Potholm, <u>War</u> <u>Wisdom</u> (Lanham: University Press of America, 2015).

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Required Reading

Robert Kaplan, <u>Hog Pilots, Blue Water Grunts: The American</u> <u>Military in the Air, at Sea and on the Ground</u> (New York: Random House, 2007).

Christian P. Potholm, <u>Winning At War</u> (Washington: Rowman and Littlefield, 2009).

------, <u>Understanding War</u> 2 vols. (Brunswick: Bowdoin Service Bureau, 2014). This work will be an essential research tool for your major projects. There are three copies on two-hour reserve as well as an electronic version in pdf format. For the electronic version, go to: https://webmail.bowdoin.edu/owa/redir.aspx?C=iR81ohRvkUu8KM

Inttps://webmail.bowdoin.edu/owa/redir.aspx?C=iR81ohRvkUu8KM JMZS2JcI1rnD5P188ICv9lRZ2JmceIpgAnlmDKDCAtTRIhdjv3Bi nVpOslB_w.&URL=http%3a%2f%2fphebe.bowdoin.edu%2frecor d%3db3152459%7eS1

In addition to these works, all articles cited under "Required Reading" should be on two-hour reserve in the library as well as on E-reserves.

Course Schedule

Remember: You don't have to like war in order to understand it and its principles.

Soldiers rarely start wars; they simply have to fight the ones started by politicians.

The adage of the American Special Forces soldier, "Forgive them? Let God forgive them. We'll arrange the meeting."

Monday, January 22 <u>Introduction: "Mars is a Jealous God</u>"

Mars is a most jealous god, rewarding ONLY those who follow his template.

The Template of Mars features:


- 1. Superior technology
- 2. Superior discipline
- 3. Aggressive military tradition (sustained ruthlessness)
- 4. Receptivity to innovation on the part of military and political elites (religious authorities cannot block military innovation)

- **5.** Ability and willingness to finance continual arms races (protect capital from people)
- 6. Will (whether stimulated by religion, nationalism, ethnicity, ideology or any other major motivation)
- 7. Belief that there will always be another war

Recommended Reading:

Andrew Curry, "Slaughter at the Bridge," <u>Science</u>, Vol. 351 #6280 (March, 2016), pp. 1384 ff. A massive Bronze Age battle in northern Europe at the Tollense River 3200 years ago foretells the long arc of Mars.

See Lecture Outline #1: "Introduction – Mars is a Jealous God"



Note: Students should prepare answers to the discussion questions listed directly below the required readings, and should consult the recommended readings and this topic's lecture outline for further study. Note: **Groups assigned today.** (1) Superior Technology, (2) Superior Discipline, (3) Sustained Ruthlessness, (4) Receptivity to Innovation, (5) Protection of Capital, (6) Superior Will, and (7) There Will Always Be Another War.

VERY IMPORTANT: Each time there is a discussion session, different teams will have responsibility for going to the head of the class and asking and answering questions pertaining to the current reading as well as choosing a term or quotation to discuss briefly. This is the key to improving your speaking and thinking ability.

Each team must use all its members in a speaking role. For those of you who think you do not like public speaking, remember that an opportunity is not a punishment.

Note: The purpose of this portion of the class is to stimulate class discussion Each group should present the key findings of the reading, but not simply replicate those readings. Ask questions of the class to make sure they understand the key elements. Also, make sure your group brings up several terms from the glossary to <u>illuminate your talk.</u>

Discussion Leadership 2018

Whenever possible each Company will have a male and a female NCO. The NCOs will be chosen by the companies.

Monday, January 29 - Team #1 Superior Technology

Wednesday, January 31 - Team #2 Superior Discipline

Monday, February 5 - Team #3 Sustained Ruthlessness

Wednesday, February 7 - Team #4 Receptivity to Innovation

Monday, February 12 - Team #5 Protection of Capital

Monday, February 26 - Team #6 Superior Will

Any teams desiring to improve their speaking efforts before the Big Show are encouraged to sign up for one of the four spots below. Otherwise the TA and I will nominate teams we think could use a little more polish. In both cases, please remember:

"An opportunity is not a punishment."

February 28 - Volunteer Teams or Designated by TA as needing more polish

March 5 - Volunteer Teams or Designated by TA as needing more polish

March 28 - Volunteer Teams or Designated by TA as needing more polish

<u>Class Assignment: Create a Recruiting Poster: Student</u> <u>Learning Experience #1:</u>

Regimental Posters

Each group will put together a team recruiting portrait with individual and group photos. Each poster will measure no more than 10" by 13." Photos may be digital only if they are large, clear, sharp and bright (7 mp). If your digital effort produces dark, blurry, back-lit or otherwise

not up to high quality, regular 35 mm must be used or posters will have to be redone. Not all cell phones are good enough for field work during wartime. <u>Plastic lamination is neither necessary nor desirable</u>. Firm backing and clarity of design are critical, however. Make sure the name tags under photos do not fall off when used. <u>Cover name tags with clear</u> <u>tape so they won't fall off</u>. If they do, the entire group, like the Mongol squad, will be punished.

The regimental posters are designed to show small group solidarity and cohesion. They are made in order to integrate existing and future members into the regiment as well as to exemplify its virtues.

Therefore, posters will be graded on: 1. Quality of design 2. Quality of photos, both individual and group 3. Clarity of expression 4. Quality of information imparted 5. Sense of cohesion imparted 6. Durability of regimental poster 7. Care in meeting size requirements

Note: Team posters are due at the next class. They will be graded and it is important for each team to get off on the right foot so take your time and do them properly! Pride in one's regiment is essential for successful warcraft.

Required Reading:

Frederick W. Kagan, "Why Military History Matters," <u>American</u> <u>Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Online</u>, June 27, 2006, pp. 1-5. <u>http://www.aei.org/outlook/24600</u> (on reserve)

Discussion Questions:

Frederick Kagan, "Why Military History Matters"

1. Why does Frederick Kagan say that "Military History Matters"?

2. What does he believe is the relationship between good citizenship and knowledge of military matters?

3. Why has military history been downplayed in American and European academia?

4. Kagan is critical of "face of battle" studies of war. What are his objections?

5. How can Kagan say that the study of military history should not be a partisan or ideological battle?

6. What did you personally learn from the Sheckley short story and the Kagan article?

See Lecture Outline #2: "Eros and Mars"

Monday, January 29 <u>Lecture and Discussion: "The State, War and</u> <u>the Search for Fundamental Truths: The</u> <u>Genius of Clausewitz</u>"

Carl von Clausewitz, "War is not an exercise of the will directed at inanimate matters, as is the case with the mechanical arms, or at matter which is animate but passive and yielding, as is the case with the human mind and emotions in the fine arts. **In war, the will is directed at an animate object that reacts**."

Opening Questions and Insights for the Class from the Terms, Quotes and Readings Provided by:

Team #1 Superior Technology

Note: Presentation instructions can be found on pp. 8-9 of this syllabus.

Required Reading:

Carl von Clausewitz, "Book One: On the Nature of War" in his <u>On War</u> (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1993), pp. 83-140. (on reserve)

For a biting critique of Clausewitz and his theories, see John Keegan, "What is War?" in his <u>A History of Warfare</u> (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993). (on reserve)

Preface," Christian P. Potholm, <u>Winning At War</u> (Washington: Rowman and Littlefield, 2010), Chapter One, pp. ix-xv.

Discussion Questions:

Karl von Clausewitz, On War

1. For Clausewitz, what is the "fog of war" and the "friction of war"?

2. What does he mean by the statement that "defense has a passive purpose: preservation and attack a positive one: conquest"? How are they related?

3. What is the "scope of the means of defense" for Clausewitz, and what elements does it contain?

4. What significance does this have for battle planning and "shaping the battle field" or "prepping the battle field" when things changed on the ground?

5. Use Clausewitz's "fortress" concept as a metaphor.

6. Clausewitz argues that "war is merely a continuation of politics" while at the same time stating as fact that "war is nothing but a duel on a larger scale." How do you reconcile these statements with the theory that we can view war as an ever changing mix of art, science and politics? What is Clausewitz trying to say about the nature of war? What is his synthesis of these contradictory statements?

7. Consider the quote on page 101 and analyze what is commonly known as the "<u>Clausewitzian trinity of 'people,' 'government' and</u> '<u>army</u>." What are the dimensions of these components and how do they interact? How does Clausewitz balance the irrational with the rational in this definition? What is Clausewitz's solution to winning this type of war?

8. Consider the following quotation from Clausewitz:

"Kind-hearted people might of course think there was some ingenious way to disarm or defeat an enemy without too much bloodshed, and might imagine this is the true goal of the art of war. Pleasant as it sounds; it is a fallacy that must be exposed: war is such a dangerous business that the mistakes which come from kindness are the *very* worst. The maximum use of force is in no way incompatible with the simultaneous use of the intellect." What does he mean? 9. Think about the dueling relationships introduced by Clausewitz: the conflict between a weak offense with a positive object (conquest) and a strong defense with a negative object (self-preservation); the tension between soldier morale and the friction of war; the conflict between a general's decisions and the fog of war; culminating points between two adversaries; the back and forth between two conflicting wills. With these relationships in mind, can we view war as a linear process? Does Clausewitz have any preferences towards the treatment of these relationships?

10. What are John Keegan's most important objections to Clausewitz and his portrayal of war? Which objections make sense to you and which do not?

See Lecture Outline #3: "The Genius of Clausewitz"

January 31

Lecture and Discussion: The Template of Mars: Introduction

Opening Questions and Insights for the Class from the Terms, Quotes and Readings provided by:

Team #2 Superior Discipline

Note: Presentation instructions can be found on pp. 8-9 of this syllabus.

Required Reading:

Williamson Murray, "Military Culture Does Matter," in <u>Strategic</u> <u>Review</u> (Spring, 1999), pp. 32-40. (on reserve)

"Introduction," Christian P. Potholm, <u>Winning At War</u> (Washington: Rowman and Littlefield, 2010), Chapter One, pp. 1-30.

Martin Van Creveld, <u>Fighting Power: German and U.S. Army</u> <u>Performance, 1939-1945</u> (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1982), "Conclusion," pp.163-175. (on reserve)

Discussion Questions:

Williamson Murray "Military Culture Does Matter."

1. Why does Williamson Murray argue that "Military Culture Does Matter"? Of what relevance are his arguments, written in 1999, for today's warfare?

2. How can discipline overcome the stress of combat?

3. Why were the military cultures of Greece and Rome so successful?

4. Why was the result of the loss of discipline in military culture so disastrous during the Middle Ages?

5. Why does Murray feel that the utopian military prescription for the future of US arms (standoff, precise strikes, technology) is so faulty?

6. Why does he fear the removal of the American elite, including especially journalists, from the armed forces potentially so damaging?

7. How would you feel about having ROTC programs on the Bowdoin campus? Remind the professor to tell the story, if you are interested, of

the class of 1962 and their use of an M-48 Patton tank to try to intimidate the president of Bowdoin.

Martin van Creveld, "Fighting Power"

1. What was the "secret" to the German Army's fighting power during World War II? How is "fighting power" different from "fire power"?

2. Why does van Creveld say the German Army "probably had no equal among twentieth century armies"?

3. Why were German regulations for its soldiers less onerous than those for Americans and other armies?

4. What were some of the negatives associated with the American way of preparing its soldiers for battle during World War II? (Hint: Do you know the names of the people in your group?)

5. Why does van Creveld feel that "The American officer corps of World War II was less than mediocre" because of its "addiction to information"? What staffing decisions followed that assumption?

6. Comment on van Creveld's notion "That the military worth of an army equals the quantity and quality of its equipment multiplied by its fighting power." Why does he fear over-reliance on technology and technological superiority? Has the fighting in Afghanistan and Iraq supported or undercut his theory?

See Lecture Outline #4: "The Template of Mars: Introduction"

Monday, February 5 <u>Lecture and Discussion: The Template of Mars:</u> "<u>Superior Weapons Technology</u>"

Opening Questions and Insights for the Class from the Terms, Quotes and Readings Provided by:

Team #3 Sustained Ruthlessness

Note: Presentation instructions can be found on pp. 8-9 of this syllabus.

Required Reading:

Kaplan, "The Big Glider and the Jagged Boomerang," in <u>Hog Pilots</u>, <u>Blue Water Geeks</u>, pp. 329-348. (the Predator and the B-2) TA

-----, "Geeks with Tattoos: The Most Driven Men I Have Ever Known," in <u>Hog Pilots, Blue Water Geeks</u>, pp. 138-174. (Nuclear submarines shift targeting to China from Russia.

C.P. Potholm, "Superior Weapons and Technology Entrepreneurship," in C. P. Potholm, <u>Winning At War</u>, Chapter Two, pp. 31-49.

Discussion Questions:

Kaplan, "The Big Glider"

1. Explain the revolution that melded the Predator AND the Hellfire.

2. What are the moral dimensions of killing from the safety and 9-5 world of Nellis AFB? What are the advantages of the Predator over the A-10 Warthogs and AC-130 gunships?

3. How does Kaplan's example of "dudes chilling on a roof" underscore the limitations of drones and drone strikes.

4. Why did drone operators have to be pilots in 2006? Has the expansion of drones by the CIA and U.S. Army diminished the Air Force claims concerning the necessity of pilots?

5. Why are B-2 Spirit crewmembers more likely to be older, calmer, more cerebral and lower key?

6. There are ominous implications – still very valid today – in the last section of this chapter's assertion, the U.S. needs to "narrow the gap" in terms of the "rate of return" achieved by al-Qaeda versus that by the U.S. military. Discuss.

Kaplan, "Geeks with Tattoos"

1. Look at the maps on pages xiii-xvi. Study them from the perspective of the Chinese, the Indians and the Iranians as well as the United States. Be prepared to locate the various key geo-political positions.

2. Kaplan says "the future of war was also the future." Explain.

3. "The entire earth was now a battle space." Discuss the implications of this statement.

4. What is the mission of the fast attack submarines such as the USS Houston? How does it differ from the mission of the larger SSBN's?

5. What are the major implications of Kaplan's observations concerning "the spacious wilderness" in the Pacific?

6. Why would any Chinese undersea buildup be regarded as a plus for the U.S. Navy and a minus for the U. S. Army?

7. What is "the suck" on a nuclear submarine and how does it compare with "the suck" in Afghanistan?

8. Now that female officers have been allowed to serve on submarines, would any of the dynamics of this chapter change? If so how?

9. Describe the Cold War from the perspective of the nuclear attack submarines of that era.

10. What is it like to live on a nuclear submarine? What type of personalities work best in its environment? What type would be the worst (and presumably weeded out before the cruise)?

11. What are the realities of a 4000 mile cruise under water where "The sea is everything"?

12. What aspects of life aboard a submerged nuclear submarine surprised you the most?

See Lecture Outline #5: "Superior Weapons Technology"

Wednesday, February 7 <u>Lecture and Discussion: The Template of Mars:</u> "<u>Superior Discipline</u>"

Russell Crowe, in the film "Master and Commander" gives us a great quote to frame this debate: "Discipline is more important than courage."

Opening Questions and Insights for the Class from the Terms, Quotes and Readings Provided by:

Team #4 Receptivity to Innovation

Note: Presentation instructions can be found on pp. 8-9 of this syllabus.

Required Reading:

Richard Aldington, "At All Costs," in his <u>Roads to Glory</u> (London: Chatto and Windus, 1930), pp. 49-74. (on reserve)

Lisa Hull, "How to Capture a Castle," in <u>MHQ: The Quarterly Journal</u> <u>of Military History</u> (Spring, 2004), pp. 34-45. (on reserve)

"Superior Discipline," Potholm, <u>Winning At War</u>, Chapter Three, pp. 51-67.

Film: Opening scenes from "Saving Private Ryan.

Discussion Questions:

Richard Aldington, "At All Costs"

1. Would you personally find Aldington's world alien if YOU found yourself in it at this hour?

2. "Discipline" is never mentioned in this chapter but what is its role in the story?

3. What axioms and quotations from the course help you understand the world portrayed in "At All Costs."

4. What war is this specifically about and what are the "universals" described which could occur in any war throughout time and space?

5. Imagine you, instead of Captain Hanley, had been given the order to hold "at all costs." What would be your reaction?

6. Would you try to communicate with higher officials in order to get the order changed? Would you disobey that order?

7. Would you fail to deliver it to your men? How likely is it you would sacrifice your life to save the lives of other men farther back in another trench?

8. What does this short chapter teach you about the nature of the role of discipline in war and its centrality?

Lise Hull, "How to Capture a Castle"

1. In the lectures, we spend a great deal of time outlining the importance of horse warfare to Europe, Africa and Asia during this period and certainly the impressive mobility of the Arabs, Mongols and the armies of Mansa Musa and Askia the Great on the savannas of Africa all accent that importance. However, in Lise Hull's "How to Capture a Castle," she makes a strong case for the importance of the castle, particularly after 1066. Why was 1066 so important in the history of warfare?

2. Why did sieges take so much time? Besides the soldiers and specialized men of arms, who was needed for a successful siege?

3. What were some of the ways the besiegers could attack the formidable castles?

4. What were siege engines, rams, sappers, wood towers (belfries) and "the terrible trebuchet" which was the mother of all stone throwing counterweight siege engines? How did it differ from other siege engines and why was it more effective?

5. In addition to throwing 300 lb. rocks, why was the trebuchet able to demoralize opponents (as well as kill them) by throwing corpses over the walls into the castle?

6. Hull does seem to overlook what to me was one of the biggest determinants of whether a particular siege was successful and that was the hygiene of both attackers and defenders. Sanitary conditions were often poor for both, but attackers were more likely to befoul themselves faster and with more devastating effects due to dysentery. Medieval European armies were filthy and had no knowledge of disease and thus were their own worst enemies. It was often a race as to which side would succumb first to disease. The Romans and the Mongols seem to have had "cleaner" camps and thus were able to mount longer sieges.

7. By the 15th century, the cannon had become the great destroyers of castles as centers of gravity; they had become "the tax collectors." Why the term "tax collectors"?

8. What elements of "discipline" are required for the defenders of castles? Those attacking castles?

Film: "Saving Private Ryan"

1. What does the clip from "Saving Private Ryan" tell you about the need for discipline in battle?

2. Which tasks seem the most dangerous to you?

3. Was the shooting of surrendering Germans morally defensible?

- 4. What did you learn about "small group cohesion" in battle?
- 5. How do you think you would behave in a similar situation?

See Lecture Outline #6: "Superior Discipline"

Monday, February 12 <u>Lecture and Discussion: The Template of Mars:</u> "<u>Sustained Ruthlessness</u>"

Opening Questions and Insights for the Class from the Terms, Quotes and Readings Provided by:

Team #5 Protection of Capital

Note: Presentation instructions can be found on pp. 8-9 of this syllabus.

Required Reading:

Erik Hildinger, "Mongol Invasion of Europe," in <u>Military History</u> (June 1997), pp. 38-44. (on reserve)

"Sustained but Controlled Ruthlessness," Potholm, <u>Winning At War</u>, Chapter Three, pp. 69-101.

Recommended Reading:

Peter Jackson, <u>The Mongols and the Islamic World: From Conquest to</u> <u>Conversion</u> (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2017). The Mongol empire spread Islam and inspired the conversion of the Turkic people (Seljuks and Ottomans). This process would enhance, not diminish political and military Islam.

Discussion Questions:

Erik Hildinger, "Mongol Invasion of Europe"

1. Erik Hildinger's "Mongol Invasion of Europe" is filled with irony and historical insights. The first question I have always asked about the Battle of Liegnitz (1241) is why the Poles would ever celebrate their catastrophic defeat for centuries to come? But then, I never understood why the Serbs make so much out of their savage defeat at the hands of the Turks at the Battle of Kosovo in 1389. It would be like making the date of the Battle of the Little Big Horn a national holiday in the United States. What am I missing in their reactions?

2. Who was Batu and who was Ogadei? And most important of all, who was Subotai, the greatest of the Mongol generals if not one of the greatest general of all time? (Who else conquered northern China, Persia, Russia, Poland and Hungary and never lost a battle?)

3. History has told us many times that the Mongol "hordes" overcame their outnumbered opponents but in most battles actually, they were themselves outnumbered. What tactics and weapons did they rely upon to be successful? The term "horde" now means a large mass of people bent on pillage and destruction. With the Mongols it simply meant a grouping of yurts.

4. Why and how did Mongolian "light horse" turn out to be superior to European "heavy horse" warfare?

5. What was the dichotomy between international and national "power centralization" and "power diffusion" which helped the Mongols in their European invasion?

6. Why did the Mongols leave much of Eastern Europe at the end of 1241?

7. Whether one calls it "WestWar" or "the dictates of Mars" or just "smart strategy and tactics," why do the Mongols deserve the accolade "modern" for their armies?

8. Discuss the equation "mass plus velocity equals power." It will appear again in 400 years under Napoleon.

9. Think of the Mongols as "high tech" (composite bow, standoff capability, speed) and the Europeans as "low tech" (heavy lance, need to engage to "shock" and slow speed) and decide which army you would rather fight for. Also who had better discipline and better command and control?

10. Think also as the Mongols as harbingers of true modernity: They allowed the free worship of all religions, they valued free trade and the free exchange of trade and made it possible to promote the dissemination of goods and ideas, the created the largest contiguous empire in the history of the world and created a modern "nation" by integrating many subject peoples into the Mongol nation.

See Lecture Outline #7: "Sustained Ruthlessness"

Wednesday, February 14 <u>Lecture and Discussion: "Gettysburg and the</u> <u>American Civil War</u>"

Class will break up into discussion groups to discuss topics from "Understanding War."

Note: The first portion of the class will consist of a mini-lecture by the professor aimed at putting the film "Gettysburg" in perspective.

Note: Always remember that more than 630,000 Americans were killed in the Civil War. This figure is more than the combined totals for World War I, World War II, Korea, Vietnam and the two Gulf Wars plus Afghanistan. And the three-day battle at Gettysburg itself took more lives than the two Gulf Wars and Afghanistan combined against a much smaller population basis.

Required Reading:

Christian G. Samito, "Lost Opportunity at Gettysburg," <u>America's Civil</u> <u>War</u> (July, 1998), pp. 46 ff. (on reserve)

Discussion Questions:

Christian Samito, "Gettysburg and the American Civil War"

1. Why does Samito say if Lee's bold plan had been followed on Day 2, there might never have been a Day 3 of the Battle of Gettysburg?

2. What would Clausewitz (and Sun Tzu and Kautilya) say about Lee's offensive strategy and Meade's defensive one?

3. Why do some scholars think that the problem for the Confederates at Gettysburg lie with Lee's less than clear orders to such subordinates as Richard Ewell, A. P. Hill and James Longstreet? Is this a fair criticism?

4. Why is it likely that Union General Dan Sickles would have been court-martialed after the battle, if he hadn't lost a leg in combat on the 2^{nd} day?

5. What dimensions of the battle did you learn about from reading Semito as opposed to watching the film "Gettysburg"?

6. Why do some say that the First Minnesota Regiment deserves as much, if not more, credit than the Twentieth Maine for saving the Union line that day?

7. Did Lee lose control of this battle, arguably the most important he was to fight during the entire war? If so why, if not, why not?

See Lecture Outline #8: "Gettysburg and the American Civil War"

Monday, February 19 <u>Film: "Gettysburg</u>" No Class

Film to be shown at night, at 7 pm at a place designated by the TA.

If you are unable to make the 7 pm showing, please view the film on your own before the next class.

Note: We are not just watching this film, we are analyzing it using the terms of the Template and the concepts of Clausewitz.

Note: In the interests of fair play and balanced historical viewpoints, those interested in seeing the American Civil War from a more Southern perspective, students should also view "Gods and Generals" which was produced in part as an antidote to "Gettysburg." The even more powerful film "Andersonville" can be viewed as an anecdote to both.

<u>Application of Terms of Clausewitz and the Template of Mars to the</u> <u>Battle of Gettysburg</u>

1. How were the discipline, technology and sustained ruthlessness dimensions of the North and the South at Gettysburg?

2. How did each dimension of the South stack up RELATIVE to same dimension of the North?

3. Which dimensions showed the need for improvement if either side was to prevail in the future.

<u>Terms to Help Understand the</u> <u>Battle of Gettysburg</u>

1. Assault

2. Auftragstaktik

3. Battle of Encounter

- 4. Close Attack
- 5. Command and Control
- 6. Culminating Point(s) of the Battle (i.e. for South and North)
- 7. Schwernpunct (perceived versus real for North and South)
- 8. En Echelon Attack
- 9. Fog of War (examples)
- **10. Friction of War (examples)**
- **11. Hasty Attacks**
- **12. Interior Lines**
- 13. Maneuver Battle
- 14. Mobility
- **15. Objective**
- 16. OODA Loop (for Lee, Reynolds, Hancock, Meade)
- **17.** Penetration
- 18. Pursuit
- 19. Recognition of Realistic Objectives (by North, by South)
- **20. Risk**

21. Soldier's Battle

22. Tactics at Gettysburg (North and South)

23. Strategies at Gettysburg (North and South)

24. Terrain

25. Timing

Wednesday, February 21 <u>Discussion: "Gettysburg, Fratricide and the</u> <u>American Civil War</u>"

Each group in reverse order (i.e. group 6 goes first) will come to the head of the class and discuss (1) their insights into the battle and (2) what role, if any, their element of the Template played in the outcome of the battle.

Required Reading: None

Discussion Questions:

1. What did you and your group learn about the Battle of Gettysburg from watching the film?

2. What was the most important aspect you learned from the film, the reading or the lecture?

3. How does the Template help explain who won and who lost this particular battle?

4. What principles of Clausewitz were most noticeable in the way the battle played out?

5. What is your and your group's most important take away from the film and your new knowledge about the Battle of Gettysburg?

6. Lee was a Clausewitzian in that he believed in fighting a decisive battle to smash the enemy's army and thus win the war; but in this battle did he miss the *Schwernpunct* and other vital concepts such as culminating points?

7. How does "nothing fails like success" help to explain his failure at Gettysburg after his superb triumphs at Second Bull Run and Chancellorsville?

8. How about his "script writing" which failed to take into account the Union forces behaving differently than he had assumed? Remember the military adage, "The enemy gets a vote."

Monday, February 26 <u>Lecture and Discussion: The Template of Mars:</u> "<u>Receptivity to Military Innovation and the</u> <u>Military Revolution 1500-1700</u>"

Opening Questions and Insights for the Class from the Terms, Quotes and Readings Provided by:

Team #6 Superior Will

Note: Presentation instructions can be found on pp. 8-9 of this syllabus.

Required Reading:

Jeremy Black, "Dynasty Forged by Fire," in <u>MHQ: The Journal of</u> <u>Military History Quarterly</u> (Spring 2006), pp. 34-43. (on reserve)

Robert Kaplan, "A Dependable Blue-Collar Plane, the A-10," in <u>Hog</u> <u>Pilots and Blue Water Geeks</u>, pp. 266-302.

Paul Lockhart, "Guns vs. Pikes," in <u>MHQ: The Quarterly Journal of</u> <u>Military History</u> (Summer 2013), pp.68-73. (on reserve)

Robert Charles Padden, "Cultural Change and Military Resistance in Araucanian Chile, 1550-1730," in <u>Southwestern Journal of</u> <u>Anthropology</u>, Vol. 12, No.1 (Spring 1957), pp. 103-121. (on reserve)

C.P. Potholm, "Receptivity to Military and Integrative Innovation," Potholm, <u>Winning At War</u>, Chapter Five, pp. 103-129.

Recommended Reading:

S. C. Gwynne, Empire of the Summer Moon: Quanah Parker and the Rise and Fall of the Comanches, the Most Powerful Indian Tribe in American History (New York: Scribner, 2010). Gwynne faithfully captures the long sweep of Comanche history and destiny for their history offers a substantial amendment to the notion that the Native Americans were easily or quickly defeated and destroyed. The population of Texas, for example, had to go from 15,000 in 1836 to over 600,000 in 1860 before anyone could challenge their control over the vast territory of Comancheria. The author skillfully tracks the rise of the Comanches from 1625-1750, calling it "one of the great social and military transformations in history" by which the Comanches became supreme, defeating in turn many other Indian tribes (including the Apaches), the Spanish, the Mexicans and American settlers.

Michael McDonnell, <u>Masters of Empire: Great Lakes Indians and the</u> <u>Making of America</u> (New York: Hill and Wang, 2015). The author makes a strong case for the Anishinanbeg peoples, especially the Odawa, who dominated the straits at Michilimackinac (between Lake Michigan and Huron) and fended off the French, British and Americans for a century or more.

Discussion Questions:

Jeremy Black, "Dynasty Forged by Fire"

1. Jeremy Black's article is a very important reading which on the surface may seem tangential to your study of war UNTIL you realize that the revolution in European warfare which enabled the countries of Europe to expand their control over much of the globe BEGAN with military innovations among the Hapsburgs during this period and spread to Spain and France and eventually England, setting the stage for European expansion in the late 15th and 16th centuries.

2. What were the clues and signs of how demanding Mars was of those who wished to modernize their armed forces and relate to the need for new "fiery" weapons and strategy and tactics to go with them! This was also "The Era of the Great Captains," a time of great dynastic rivalry and colorful uniforms (so in the mass battles one could see where one's own troops were). The "Great Captains" of this time include: The Duke of Marlborough, Gustavus Adolphus, Frederick the Great, Charles XII. 3. Also see how the state acquires a capability for sustained conflict under Louis XIV. Follow the challenge and response, and especially the spiral of international war making capabilities.

4. "Dynasty Forged by Fire" captures the confused and shifting state of warfare in the early 16th century, but already there are major shifts in process that would change the nature of warfare. What were some of them?

5. Why were pikemen so important to the emerging use of muskets and other "fiery" weapons? How did the use of iron cannon balls improve over the use of stone ones?

6. Why was the demand of the musket revolution for more men rather than for more accurate men? Why were pikemen as important as the musketeers when battling cavalry?

7. The military revolution in the West would arise out of the rise of the Hapsburg monarchy and that monarchy would gain strength from the Battle of Pavia in 1525. What elements were present in that battle which would shape the future?

8. What role did Swiss pikemen and German musketeers play as mercenaries?

9. Without trying to read too much into one battle, what insights does Pavia offer to explain Hapsburg domination (albeit punctuated with occasional reverses) from 1525 until the 1640's

10. How does Black's article capture the sense of constant warfare that was the hallmark of dynastic warfare in this era?

11. How does "dynastic" warfare differ from medieval or modern warfare? What role did "nationalism" play in the wars of this period?

Robert Kaplan, "A Dependable Blue-Collar Plane"

1. What elements of the Template can be seen in the Kaplan article even though he does not use its terms specifically?

2. What is the mission of the A-10 "Warthog"? Why is it so beloved by its pilots and troops on the ground but so looked down upon by fighter and bomber "jocks"? Why did the Air Force want to scrap the A-10 after the first Gulf War? Do you find it ironic that it only kept the A-10 in service because the Army said it would take it over? Why is the Air Force STILL trying to kill it?

3. What do you make of Kaplan's statement, "The Air Forces is not primarily about flying, but it should be about killing from the air." Why is the Warthog so important in this regard? What are its primary missions?

4. What role is the Warthog supposed to play in Korea? Afghanistan? Kaplan makes the point that the U. S. Air Force was in 182 out of 210 countries while he was writing this book. What are the implications of this fact?

5. Decode Kaplan's conclusion "China was the unstated organizational principle for everything I saw the Air Force do in the Pacific."

Paul Lockard, "Guns vs. Pikes"

1. Lockard makes a strong case that the earlier (1522) Battle of Bicocca in Italy during the same war deserves credit for "calling the turn" of arms innovation.

2. How do Lockard's and Black's conclusions overlap?

3. Who was Prospero Colonna and why should he feature such a prominent role in Machiavelli's <u>The Art of War</u>?

4. How do the Swiss pikemen live up to the adage, "Nothing fails like success"?

5. Explain the subsequent importance of the bayonet and its introduction on the battlefield in the process of reducing and then eliminating the role of pikemen in future warfare.

<u>Robert Charles Padden, "Cultural Change and Military</u> <u>Innovation</u>"

1. When you read Padden, note that the Araucanians were one of the few Native American tribes to successfully hold the European powers at bay, becoming part of Chile only in 1883.

2. Why did they retain their independence when so many other Native Americans failed?

3. Why does Mars think they should have been a model for most Native Americans?

4. What elements of the adaptations of the Araucanians were available to other Native Americans?

5. Why struck you most powerfully about the receptivity to innovation of the Araucanians?

6. How does it conform or oppose your previous thinking about Native American resistance to the European invasions.

See Lecture Outline #9: "Receptivity to Military Innovation and the Military Revolution 1500-1700"

Wednesday, February 28 <u>Lecture and Discussion: The Template of Mars:</u> "<u>Protection of Capital</u>"

Opening Questions and Insights for the Class from the Terms, Quotes and Readings Provided by Volunteer Team/TA

Required Reading:

Kaplan, "America's African Rifles, With a Marine Platoon, African Sahel," in <u>Hog Pilots and Blue Water Geeks</u>, pp. 12-34.

"The Ability and Willingness to Protect Capital from People and Rulers," Potholm, <u>Winning At War</u>, Chapter Six, pp. 131-146.

Discussion Questions:

<u>Kaplan, "America's African Rifles, With a Marine Platoon, African</u> <u>Sahel</u>"

1. Why are US Marines in the Sahel? Had you ever heard of the Sahel before?

2. How does Niger fit into the world order? Have you ever confused Niger with Nigeria?

3. What lessons can be learned from watching training on the rifle range?

4. Why did Lt. Aldrich say "The only place in my life where I have been judged completely on my own merits and mistakes" was the US Marine Corps?

5. Why do "all the Marines" want to go to Iraq?

6. Why was the time many spent there "clearly the most meaningful" of their lives?

7. What aspects of "America's African Rifles" interested you the most?

See Lecture Outline #10: "Protection of Capital"

Monday, March 5 <u>Lecture and Discussion: The Template of Mars:</u> "<u>Superior Will</u>"

"Gods get humans to do many bad things, Mars is no exception." C. P. Potholm

Opening Questions and Insights for the Class from the Terms, Quotes and Readings Provided by Volunteer Team/TA

Required Reading:

Marshall Michel III, "Slaughter of the G's" in his <u>The 11 Days of</u> <u>Christmas</u> (San Francisco: Encounter Books, 2002), pp. 139-163 as well as "Dien Bein Phu of the Air," and "The Eighth Night," pp. 164-180 and 193-203. (on reserve)

Note: In and of itself, <u>The 11 Days of Christmas</u> could also be studied as a microcosm of the Vietnam War and, using the Template, explain why one side won and one side lost that war.

"The Centrality of Superior Will," Potholm, <u>Winning At War</u>, Chapter Seven, pp. 147-165.

J. Howard Roberts, "Passchendaele: Mayhem in the Mud," in <u>Military</u> <u>History</u> (December 1997), pp. 67-72. (on reserve)

Discussion Questions:

Marshall Michel III, "Slaughter of the G's"

1. Could anyone reading this chapter ever call the Vietnam War "a guerilla war" again?

2. What elements of the Template are most helpful in explaining the battle over North Vietnam known as "Line Backer II"?

3. Which side had the better technology? Which side was more receptive to innovation of tactics and strategy?

4. What were the advantages and disadvantages of the B-52's and their SAM opponents?

5. What role did Guam and Thailand play in the 11 Days of Christmas? What role do they continue to play as portrayed in Kaplan?

6. What is the significance of the remarks of Admiral Moorer, The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, saying, "They're setting their God-damned watches by the timing of your bombing runs."

7. How did the walking out of the North Vietnamese on the Paris Peace talks at this juncture signify that they thought they were winning the war in the air over Hanoi?

Marshall Michel III, "Dien Bein Phu of the Air," and "The Eighth <u>Night</u>"

1. Why did the North Vietnamese call this battle the "Dien Bein Phu of the Air?

2. What was the real Battle of Dien Bein Phu and what were the similarities and differences?

3. What impact did Dien Bein Phu have on the future of Indochina when it was fought in 1953-1954?

4. How and why did the Americans miss the opportunity to attack Hanoi when its forces were out of missiles?

5. How did the North Vietnamese interpret the Air Force switching targets from Hanoi to the port of Haiphong? Were they right?

6. What were the tensions between the American Seventh Air Force and the Strategic Air Command? Which side do you believe was correct?

J. Howard Roberts, "Passchendaele"

1. In 1916, after the July to November Somme "offensive" in Flanders lost 300,000 men and gained four miles, what did Winston Churchill mean when he asked Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig: "If we lose three or four times as many officers and nearly twice as many men in our attack as the enemy in his defense, how are we wearing him down?"

2. Never forget the British General who has spent the Battle of the Somme well in the rear bursting into tears when he got near the front lines and uttered, "Good God, did we really send men to fight in this?" only to have his driver say, "It's worse further up."

3. Why was this battle fought?

4. Why was it fought in the same place as two previous battles?

5. What were the gains of the battle from the point of view of the Germans? The Allies?

6. What were the most important insights into World War I fighting that you learned from this article?

See Lecture Outline #11: "Superior Will"

Wednesday, March 7 Hour Exam #1

March 9-25: Spring Break

Monday, March 26 Great Topic Bazaar

During the class, all teams will begin the process of choosing a presentation topic by ransacking all of human history.

All students will be expected to bring their copies of <u>Understanding</u> <u>War</u> (hopefully hard copies, but access to electronic version in any case) to class, having already familiarized themselves with its contents and sections.

This topic could involve a seminal battle, or war, preferably non-Eurocentric one, which had a lasting impact on the nature of warfare or the course of the region's history, and preferably one which has not been done before. Or it could involve some aspect of warfare as seen through time and space.

Teams break up into work sessions to discuss progress on "The Big Show." Teams should be prepared to discuss their progress, individual assignments and research results. After satisfying the instructor, teams can pick up their exams and head for the Library.

Exams handed back. Those needing to speak with the professor should remain for consultations as groups depart or return prior to the end of the class period.

Wednesday, March 28 <u>Lecture and Discussion: The Template of Mars:</u> "<u>There Will Always Be Another War</u>" <u>And</u> <u>Film: "Black Hawk Down</u>"

Opening Questions and Insights for the Class from the Terms, Quotes and Readings Provided by Volunteer Team/TA

Required Reading:

Colonel <u>Qiao</u> ("Tse-en") Liang and Colonel <u>Wang</u> (Wong) Xiangsui, "Ten Thousand Methods Combined As One" in their <u>Unrestricted</u> <u>Warfare</u> (New York: Pan American Publishing, 2004), Chapter 7, pp. 153-174. (on reserve)

Note this work was actually written in 1991 after the Gulf War but not published in U.S. until later.

Note: This is one of the most prophetic books calling the turn in the nature of warfare. Read it most carefully.

"The Belief That There Will Always Be Another War," Potholm, <u>Winning At War</u>, Chapter Eight, pp. 167-182.

Discussion Questions:

Qiano Liang and Wang Xiangsui, "Ten Thousand Methods Combined as One"

As you are reading this, remember that when the colonels wrote their very perceptive piece after the Gulf War of 1991, the American Liberal Left was asserting "The End of History" and the rise of world democracies and the American Conservative Right was trumpeting enduring American military hegemony. Both were categorically incorrect. The Chinese colonels saw things very differently.

1. The two colonels say that "The new method is to create a complete military Machiavelli, i.e. achieve objectives by fair means or foul, that is the most important legacy of this Italian political thinker." What is your reaction to this assertion?

2. Qiao and Wang say that the secret to winning future wars is to transcend or break all boundaries. Would Kautilya agree? Why or why not?

3. Why do Qiao and Wang say that supra (and sub) national politics are overcoming "Great Power Politics"?

4. What do they feel Hollywood, Internet pornography and the World Cup all have in common?

5. They assert that "confining warfare to the military domain is old fashioned." Are they correct? They urge future warriors to shake off taboos and enter "an area of free choice of means" with nothing off limits.

6. How would one combine information war, financial war, trade war, cyber war, psychology war and currency speculation into a coherent pattern? Use your imaginations as you discuss this!

7. The authors say, "A hacker and one modem causes an enemy damage and losses almost equal to a war." Are they correct? If so, how does one prevent an opponent from winning?

8. What dimensions of the Template would help in understanding the aspects of <u>Unrestricted Warfare</u>?

9. Is President Donald Trump a perfect president for countering the colonels? Or will he make their job much easier? Or are their prescriptions so widespread as to be un-counter-able?

See Lecture Outline #12: "There Will Always Be Another War"

Film: "Black Hawk Down"

Please watch closely the events depicted because they prompted Osama bin Laden to believe the United States could be driven from the Middle East, a vision he and the other Salafists hold to this day and may in fact, be a correct reading of American will.

Note: Sadam Hussein orders all staff officers to view "Black Hawk Down" for he believes that foretells American defeat in Iraq. He sees Iraq as a "Mass-Scale Mogadishu"! Ironically enough, Sadam accurately predicts U.S. concerns at the "3000 dead" threshold, although even this happens not before Karbala Gap is breached but years later. He was correct.

Note: 1983, Beirut Marine barracks bombed, 200 die, US withdraws from Lebanon, 1993 Somalia completes the cycle.

Note also that today, almost 20 years later, Somalia is still a "failed state" and the CIA, American Special Forces, Kenyan and Ethiopian troops are directly engaged in the situation today.

Remember as well that at the time of the film, the then Secretary of Defense, Les Aspin, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Colin Powell, did not permit the American forces in Somalia to have either tanks or heavy armored vehicles. In the incident, 18 Special Forces died as did hundreds of Somalis. The U.S. forces had, at gunpoint, commandeered Pakistani UN APC's in order to rescue the rest of the force because they did not have any of their own readily available!

Each team should be prepared on Monday to go to front of the room and discuss one of the questions below and each team member should give an example of a new insight into the film SINCE taking this course.

Discussion Questions:

"<u>Black Hawk Down</u>"

1. Why did this incident convince Osama bin Laden that the United States could be defeated militarily?

2. What possible explanation could there be for the US troops to have no tanks or heavy weapons carriers in Somalia?

3. Why did Mars smile on the Somali war lord Adid?

4. How did Adid turn out to be both magnanimous in victory and secure in his post-strike position?

5. What is "mission creep" and how does the film portray its consequences?

6. Why does the US military fear depending on the United Nations peace keeping forces for assistance?

7. What made the Somalis as heroic as their American counterparts?

8. What operational changes would you make in the way Americans conduct peace keeping operations overseas after viewing this film?

9. What were your reactions to the implications of events like this for a country with military forces in 170 countries?

10. What makes this a powerful film as well as a powerful indictment of the way American power can be projected in the world?

11. To what extent can this movie be seen as propaganda on behalf of or opposed to US military intervention in the Third World?

12. To what extent do you see this movie as the military's answer to harsh criticism over our actions in the country?

13. Why do you think the film's director focuses on the delay in UN rescue teams? Were they mad that the US decided to become involved militarily in the politics of Somalia and not tell them? Did they allow American troops to die for petty politics?

14. To what extent does this movie represent the argument that America should stay out of local third world politics?

15. After seeing this movie, do you think it is a good idea to send American troops to this part of the world? Can their political or military objectives ever be achieved or effective?

16. Conversely, what are the costs and dangers of American troops NOT being sent into the world's trouble spots?

Monday, April 2 <u>Film: "Black Hawk Down"</u>

Discussion to follow. See questions above to go along with your reactions.

Wednesday, April 4

Group meetings to determine progress for "The Big Show." Groups #1, #2, #3

Monday, April 9

Group meetings to determine progress for "The Big Show." Groups #4, #5, #6

Wednesday, April 11 <u>Lecture: "The Decision to Drop the Atomic</u> <u>Bomb"</u> <u>Or</u> <u>"Hiroshima as Seen Through the Lens of Mars"</u>

See Lecture Outline #13: "The Decision to Drop the Atomic Bomb"

Weekend: Pickering Room available for group practice for the Big Show. (Logan takes charge to make sure when it will be open)

Monday, April 16 <u>Presentations: Team #1 Superior Technology and</u> <u>Team #2 Superior Discipline. Company essays</u> <u>due at end of next class.</u>

Wednesday, April 18 <u>Presentations: Team #3 Sustained Ruthlessness</u> <u>and Team #4 Receptivity to Innovation.</u> <u>Company essays due at end of next class.</u>

Monday, April 23 <u>Presentations: Team #5 Protection of Capital and</u> <u>Team #6 Superior Will. Company essays due at</u> <u>end of next class.</u>

Wednesday, April 25 <u>Lecture and Discussion: "Mars is a Jealous God</u> <u>II: The Vietnam – Gulf War Continuum</u>"

Including "Iraq II and Afghanistan War I"

Carl von Clausewitz, "Kind-hearted people might, of course, think there was some ingenious way to disarm or defeat an enemy without too much bloodshed, and might imagine this is the true goal of the art of war. Pleasant as it sounds; it is a fallacy that must be exposed: war is such a dangerous business that the mistakes which come from kindness are the very worst."

One important way to understand the war in Afghanistan is to consider the warlord Northern Dostrum who fought with the Soviets, then against the Taliban and then with the Northern Alliance, then with the Americans after 9/11 and then after members of the Obama administration wanted to put him on trial as a war criminal, he was instrumental in getting President Karzai re-elected in 2009. Dostrum, had he lived in Henry VIII's England, would surely have ended up as the largest landowner after the King. In the south, warlord Matiullah Khan was eventually hired by the U.S. to protect NATO convoys in the region: "Oruzgan used to be the worst place in Afghanistan, and now it's the safest" said Matiullah in 2010 – and he meant it – as long as the cash kept coming his way.

Therefore, was the biggest mistake of the U.S. involvement in Afghanistan trying to impose a democracy on a medieval set of societies?

This type of behavior is not new as war always demands flexibility. See Michael Wood, "The Road to Samarkand," in his <u>In the Footsteps of Alexander the Great</u> (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1997), pp. 133-166. On Alexander's dealing the risings and guerilla warfare in Afghanistan 382 BCE: "He had had to fight a war he had not anticipated." (p. 159). And acted accordingly.

"A sect cannot be destroyed by cannonballs." Napoleon

"No war is over until the enemy says it's over. We may think it over, we may declare it over, but in fact, the enemy gets a vote." General James "Mad Dog" Mattis U.S. Secretary of Defense

"This was not World War II, with VE and VJ days. This is more like fighting disease. We eradicate or suppress one pestilence, only to battle another that would somehow mutate and spread." Henry Crumpton, U.S. Coordinator for Counterterrorism

Required Reading:

Rod Paschall, "The 27 Day War," <u>Quarterly Journal of Military History</u> (Spring, 2012), pp. 54-65 (on reserve)

Bing West, "The War Turns," "Washington Turns" and "The Sunnis Change Sides, Winter 2007," in his <u>The Strongest Tribe: War, Politics,</u> <u>and the Endgame in Iraq</u> (New York: Random House, 2008), pp. 208-245. (on reserve)

Recommended Reading:

Major Jim Gant, "<u>One Tribe at a Time: A Strategy for Success in</u> <u>Afghanistan</u>" (Los Angeles: Nine Sisters Imports, 2009). (on reserve)

Robert Jervis, "The Iraq WMD Intelligence Failure: What Everyone Knows is Wrong" in his <u>Why Intelligence Fails</u> (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010), pp. 123-155. The definitive scholarly examination of the run-up to the Second Iraq War.

Leo Tolstoy, "The People's War," in Hemingway, Men at War, pp. 590-609.

Thucydides, "The Corcyran Revolution," <u>The Peloponnesian War</u> (New York: The Modern Library, 1951), p. 184-192. (on reserve)

Note: the elements of revolt, revolution and counter-revolution present in Thucydides' description of the Corcyran Revolution remain central to any of today's discussions of these topics.

Note: When considering counter-insurgency throughout the ages, always keep in mind the telling words of T. E. Lawrence, "Do not try to do too much with your own hands. Better the Arabs do it tolerably than you do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are there to help them, not win it for them."

Kevin M. Woods, <u>The Mother of All Battles: Saddam Hussein's</u> <u>Strategic Plan for the Persian Gulf War</u> (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2008). Woods' account is based on the Defense Intelligence Agency's HARMONY data base and offers a rare set of insights into Saddam Hussein's assumptions as the war unfolded. He believed that by surviving, he had won: "It was an epic duel...the harvest of the Mother of all Battles succeeded." (p.231). The files also show that in the run-up to the first Gulf War, his armed forces had 1,232 bombs and 13,000 artillery shells with chemical weapons and 8,320 Grad rockets (122mm) with nerve gas as well as germ warfare war heads. (p.155). And Saddam ordered their preparation for use. Not everybody was convinced that he destroyed all these weapons after the war. With tragic consequences many argue, because most didn't believe he actually had destroyed them. This latter group included the members of his own Republican Guards! Remember the adage, "if you do a good thing, make sure people know about it, if you do a bad thing, make sure people don't know about it."

Discussion Questions:

1. Why does your professor say that to understand Iraq I one needs to see it on a space-time continuum with the Vietnam War?

2. What are some of the lessons the US military learned from its defeat during the Vietnam War?

3. What positives in war fighting capability came out of its experiences, what negatives?

4. Why do Iraq III and Afghanistan II (insurgent and counter-insurgent warfare) contrast with Iraq I and II and Afghanistan I (conventional, setpiece warfare)?

5. Why should Vietnam be considered as both an insurgency and a conventional war?

Paschall, "The 27 Day War"

1. November 2001 shows a campaign unusual in American military history. Give some examples of it unusualness.

2. What were the elements required/utilized for success against the Taliban?

3. What were General Tommy Franks' concerns about trying to reproduce the 1991 campaign in Iraq?

4. Why was this war "clearer" before imposing a ruler and implementing "democracy" were added to the assignments?

5. Compare and contrast the aspects of medieval warfare and "modern" warfare used during November, 2001.

6. Analyze how the change in mission to "nation building" turned out to be a huge misstep?

Bing West, "The War Turns," "Washington Turns" and "The Sunnis Change Sides, Winter 2007" in The Strongest Tribe

The Triumph of Auftragstaktik!!!

1. These chapters are probably the most important readings of the semester in pointing out key turning points in an insurgency. Whatever the merits – or demerits – of the US decision to begin Iraq War II, there was a potential tipping point when the US was on the verge of losing Iraq III and retroactively, Iraq II.

2. How had the situation in Ramadi changed and what did that suggest to US war leaders?

3. Why did the changes in tactics, strategy and effectiveness come from the junior officers in the field rather than from the Pentagon?

4. What was the "Anbar Awakening" and what prompted it?

5. Why did the war "turn" on the ground in Iraq before it turned in Washington?

6. Why were some of the most influential media such as the <u>New York</u> <u>Times, Boston Globe, Washington Post</u> and many others, most Congressional leaders and people in the Pentagon convinced the war had been "lost" already? Who did Generals Petraeus, Odierno, Mattis and Mansoor have to convince to change their minds?

7. Why was "the surge" so attacked and hated and written off in the U.S.?

8. Why was the surge so critical to the winning of Iraq III and turning around the situation in Baghdad?

9. To what does Bing attribute the decision to get behind the surge?

10. What information surprised you most about Bing's description and conclusions?

11. Why is the success of the surge and its implications for future counter-insurgency efforts so unheralded today?

Recommended Reading Questions:

<u>Major Jim Gant, "One Tribe at a Time: A Strategy for Success in</u> <u>Afghanistan</u>"

Note: When reading this piece it is very important that you think of this strategy as a model for effective counter-insurgency in a number of contexts, not just Afghanistan – Laos, Cambodia, the Philippines, Indonesia, the hill tribes of India, Iraq, Yemen, Libya, many portions of Africa etc. Yet the same strategy does not seem to be as efficacious on a national level. See if you can figure out why not.

1. What are Tribal Engagement Teams and what are they trying to do?

2. What does Gant say about the principles of "search and destroy" versus "clear and hold"?

3. How to interpret the Pashtun saying, "The Pashtun is truly at peace only when he is at war"?

4. How does Gant define "win" in the current Afghani context?

5. How does the Pashtun "code of honor" fit into the equation?

6. How much of the success described in this piece depend on the personalities of "Sitting Bull" and Major Gant?

7. What are the problems of nation-building in "medieval" Afghanistan?

8. What were your most important take a ways from the Gant article?

Tolstoy, "The People's War"

1. Why does Tolstoy feel that the battle of Borodino and the occupation of Moscow and the flight of the French was "one of the most instructive phenomena in history"?

2. What were the elements of "guerilla warfare" which were involved in the destruction of the "Grande Armee"?

3. What role did the Cossacks play?

4. Why did the French fail to employ good counter-insurgency techniques?

5. Why hadn't they learned their lesson from Spain?

6. What does Tolstoy have to teach us about guerrilla warfare today?

Thucydides, "The Corcyran Revolution," in his Peloponnesian War

1. Today there is much talk about insurgencies, revolutions and "war among the people," as if these civic convulsions were a modern phenomenon, but are they?

2. Thucydides is describing a revolution in Corcyra (modern Corfu) during the fifth year of the Peloponnesian War in <u>427 BCE or over 2500</u> <u>years ago</u>.

3. On Corcyra, an uprising of pro Peloponnesian and oligarchic supporters kill pro-Athenian democrats. Corinth and Sparta support them and the revolutionaries declare neutrality in the Peloponnesian war. Pro-Athenian, democrat insurgents attack, a Peloponnesian fleet comes to help suppress them but flees when the Athenian fleet arrives. Does this have parallels in terms of "Great Power" intervention in civil strife around the globe today?

4. The pro-democracy insurgents then begin killing amid great disorder—people are killed for personal as well as ideological reasons. As Thucydides puts it, "The father slew the son, and the suppliants were torn from the temples and slain near them." Is not this the essence of revolutionary violence where belief for or against the revolution transcends all? When "love of power" becomes the fountainhead of evil, who can be safe? 5. Thucydides says "This seemed to be the worst of revolutions because it was the first." Obviously civil strife had previously been known, but perhaps Thucydides called the Corcyran "the first" because he really meant "the epitome"?

6. Thucydides also saw the debasement of language and common sense as wiped out by revolutionary fervor with twisted values. "Reckless daring" became "loyal courage," "moderation" became "unmanly weakness," and the "ties of party" became stronger than "the ties of blood." Words become twisted and lose meaning and black is sold as white and white as black and any atrocity is excused in the name of something called "the greater good." Again, does not this sound like what happens in any revolution throughout time and space?

7. He was horrified, as many are today, by what the "revolutionary passions" unleash, and how ends are believed to justify means. "This revolution gave birth to every form or wickedness in Helles," epitomized when in 425 BCE 600 survivors of the oligarchic party were slaughtered by Corcyran democrats and Athenian troops—with all the men killed and all the women sold into slavery. Could not any of these descriptions be taken from the newswires of today?

8. Discuss the implications for your view of the nature of humankind which flow from your reading of "The Corcyran Revolution."

See Lecture Outline #14: "Mars is a Jealous God II: "The Vietnam – Gulf War Continuum" and "Iraq II and Afghanistan War II"

Monday, April 30 <u>Lecture and Discussion: "Is the Template</u> <u>Obsolete in the Face of Insurgencies?</u>"

Including Iraq War III, Afghanistan II and ISIS

"Rebellions can be made by two percent active in the striking force and 98 percent passively sympathetic." T. E. Lawrence

> "You have the watch but we have the time." Pathan saying

"Korea, Korea, Korea, always remember Korea." C. P. Potholm

Required Reading:

Graeme Wood, "What ISIS Really Wants," <u>The Atlantic</u>, March 2015. (on reserve)

Kaplan, "NATO's Ragged Southern Edge, With the Army Special Forces in Algeria," in <u>Hog Pilots, Blue Water Grunts</u>, pp. 174-207.

Potholm, "Applying the Template: A War," <u>Winning At War</u>, Chapter Ten, p. 195-223.

Discussion Questions:

Remember: "Two things can be true simultaneously."

Graeme Wood, "What ISIS Really Wants"

1. According to Edward Luttwak, "Jihad, the holy struggle against unbelievers is not an essential 'pillar' (*arkan*) in Islam" but "Though not an absolute obligation upon all believers, jihad is a religious duty that all passably orthodox Muslim jurists place immediately after the arkan, because of orders from God himself in the Qur'an, notably II: 193: "Fight them (the unbelievers) until there is no dissension and the religion is entirely Allah's." (Luttwak, <u>The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine</u> <u>Empire, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2090</u>, p. 198). Does this suggest there can be a wide variety of views WITHIN Islam concerning jihad and if so, what are its implications for the future?

2. The average successful counter-insurgency takes 12 years - the Philippine Insurgency, for example, took between 1899 and 1913. What are the implications for a population with a short time horizon and a great deal of impatience when confronting such a war situation?

3. Why does the author of "What Does ISIS Really Want" say that the U.S. civilian and military leadership misread the potential of the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS)?

4. Why does he argue that it is futile to argue with ISIS leaders about the nature of Islam? Or for the U.S. to try to tell who's a "good" Moslem and who isn't?

5. If the key to The Caliphate is its physical territory (now the size of Great Britain, albeit with a lot of desert), its Apoctoliptical epicenter of Dabiq and its emphasis on the end of time, what can and what the U.S. and other opponents do about it?

6. What is Salafism ("the pious forefathers") and what is the difference (and operational significances) between "the quietest Salafis" and the "offensive jihadi Salafis"?

7. Why are crucifixion, beheadings and slavery essential for ISIS and what do these practices mean for Moslems everywhere in terms of the basic tenants of original Islam as practiced by the Prophet and his descendants?

Note: Does saying any of these are wrong make a Moslem an apostate according to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and other jihadi Salafists?

8. Compare Christianity and Islam as Apoctoliptical religions with Hinduism and Buddhism.

9. Why does the author say that an alliance between al Qaeda and ISIS would be a "worse foe than we've yet seen"?

10. Why does your professor insist that defeating any viable insurgency requires special attention to the dictate "Korea, Korea, Korea"?

<u>Robert Kaplan, "NATO's Ragged Southern Edge, With the Army</u> <u>Special Forces in Algeria</u>"

1. What was your biggest surprise in reading about American Special Forces in Algeria?

2. Explain the historical ironies of the U. S. and Algeria cooperating militarily?

3. What is a Special Forces A Team and what are some of its missions?

4. What did the Americans learn from the Algerians and what did the Algerians learn from the Americans during their joint training exercises?

5. What does Major Brahim mean by "The best soldiers have been farmers"?

6. Explain the assertion, "If you win, it is always because of firepower. If you lost it is always because of Comms."

7. What complaints did the A Team have about "Mother Army" and the U. S. Air Force?

Recommended Reading Questions:

Al-Qaeda's Creed and Path

1. What gives this creed its latent power?

2. Why would it appeal to the downtrodden, the frustrated, the powerless, the discriminated against?

3. What does it say about "legislatures" and "laws"?

4. How easy is it to become an "unbeliever" under this creed?

5. How do Arab and other Muslim rulers become "infidel apostates"? What is the role of sharia as a yardstick of measurement?

6. Why is democracy considered to be "the tribulation of this age"?

7. Why are Islamic groups who participate in elections "reprehensible innovators"?

8. Why will jihad "last until judgment day"? What are the implications of this belief for those who would make peace with the jihadi Salafists or who long for the day when conflict will be a thing of the past?

See Lecture Outline #15: "Is the Template Obsolete in the Face of Insurgencies?"

Wednesday, May 2 <u>Lecture and Discussion: "Lessons From</u> <u>Byzantium: The American Empire and The</u> <u>Dangers That Lie Ahead</u>"

"Byzantium was, in a sense, always at war...it always had an enemy or a potential enemy on one front or another." John Haldon, <u>Byzantium at War AD 600-1453</u>

In this context, think about American commitments to South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, the open sea lanes in the South China Sea, protecting Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States, Israel, NATO commitments, the rise of Iran, China and a resurgent Russia as well as American war weariness and see if the lessons from Byzantium are not relevant despite their distance in time, space and ideology.

Note: May is "Military Appreciation Month" in the United States, how many of you knew that before you read it here?

Note: What do the developing ports of Hambantoto in Sri Lanka and Gwadar in Pakistan have in common?

Required Reading:

Mark Bowden, "Can North Korea Be Stopped?" The Atlantic (July/August 2017), pp. 66-77. (on reserve)

Robert Gates, "Reflections," in his <u>Duty</u> (New York: Alfred Knopf, 2014), pp. 566-596. (on reserve)

Kaplan, "A Civilization Unto Itself, Swishing Through the Crushing Void," in <u>Hog Pilots and Blue Water Geeks</u>, pp. 94-136.

"Applying the Template: A Battle," Potholm, <u>Winning At War</u>, Chapter Nine, pp. 183-194.

Recommended Reading:

Imtiaz Gul, <u>The Most Dangerous Place</u> (New York: Viking, 2010). This is an excellent source written by someone who has covered the region for many years. "The Most Dangerous Place" is the FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas) on Pakistan's border with Afghanistan. The author describes in convincing detail all the dangers, problems and difficulties posed by FATA and concludes, "It is not the few thousand armed militants and criminals who make FATA the most dangerous place, but those silent millions who look up to the militants as daring followers of God and Islam, out to challenge the wayward and corrupt Western world" but he believes that "…the state of Pakistan, its military and civil bureaucracy is stronger than most people recognize."

Discussion Questions:

<u>Robert Kaplan, "A Civilization Unto Itself, Swishing Through the</u> <u>Crushing Void</u>"

1. What humanitarian roles does the US Navy play around the world?


2. Why is Singapore so important to American's forward strategy based on nuclear carriers?

3. What roles do destroyers like the Benfold play in wartime? Peacetime?

4. On ships, how is "officers' country" different from "enlisted men's company"? What role to the "chiefs" play on US warships?

5. What are the implications – positive and negative – of Kaplan's final comment, "A day did not go by without a big American naval presence in the Pacific Rim"?

See Lecture Outline #16: "Lessons from Byzantium, the American Empire and The Dangers That Lie Ahead"



Lecture Outlines

The Old Fashioned Power Points!

Lecture #1: Introduction

"Mars is a Jealous God"

"A trope in seven part harmony"

1. We have been taught that peace is the natural state of mankind and that war is an abnormality.

2. Yet statistically, war has been more common than peace for most of human history. "Ubiquitous and in perpetuity" says Donald Kagan.

3. Often tied to religion, as Peter Partner put it: "If people worship gods and fight wars, they expect the former to take an interest in the latter."

Major Themes

1. War is central to "the human condition."

2. Technology and warfare are intertwined.

3. War needs to be studied for war wisdom comes at a high price but is itself seldom studied

4. There is truth in battles.

5. True warriors believe in evil.

6. Small unit cohesion is an eternal constant in the battle against the friction of war.

7. With or without any particular American president, with or without Iraq, it is said America has a global empire to defend. US forces are in 170 countries. As Robert Kaplan says, "The whole world is a battle space." America's military expenses constitute a 5% demand on the GDP. Do not whine or complain about 5%, even if some of it is mis-spent, says Mars.

8. "This is not Mr. Roger's neighborhood." Realism versus idealism, the eternal dichotomy.

9. "Mars is a jealous god," the search for a template in a moral vacuum.

Pictures and Pictograms

- 1. What monuments can teach us.
- 2. What pictograms can teach us.
- 3. Why this syllabus is more than a syllabus.

Remember: Two things can be true simultaneously; you don't like war but war likes you.

Lecture #2:

"<u>Eros and Mars: The Nature of Humankind and</u> <u>Warfare</u>" <u>Or</u> "<u>Making Love and War</u>"

Chinese Classical Military Thought and Warcraft

1. Sun Tzu (Sun Wu) supposedly lived in 6th century BCE but "The Art of War" was actually written down in the 4th century somewhere around 330-320 BCE. Should be termed <u>Master Sun's Military Methods</u> or <u>Sunzi</u> (13 essays still alive and brilliant today).

2. "War is a matter of vital importance to the state. It is the terrain of life and death, the path of survival and ruin, it must be studied."

3. "If does not profit the state, do not use the military." Military action not for vain glory of sovereign or the military class but for the good of the people and the state. "War is not for revenge or for personal glory but for the good of the state."

4. The lessons of the King of Wu and his concubines: the rights of the sovereign and the causal efficacy of small group cohesions. So many things come from this simple story.

First, it is the right of the sovereign to declare war. The sovereign has power of life or death over his subjects, but,

Second, he must turn control over to the military leader. The <u>Sunzi</u> places great, even overburdening, responsibility on the military leader. Centrality of military leader.

Third, Sun Tzu is making a radical attack on the noble warrior classes (chariots, an aristocratic birthright, expensive, life work, but a right) and their replacement by untrained commoners with simple weapons and great discipline (French levee en mass, Americans in World War II).

Fourth, discipline and small group cohesion is more important than elaborate weapons systems. Need obedient soldiers not individually skilled ones (Middle Ages versus gunpowder revolution, the case of the Samurai).

5. "Shaping the battlefield."

6. "Winning without fighting."

7. Great stress on intelligence, "know yourself, know your enemy, know the terrain, know the climate/weather." Confuse your enemy ("Operation Fortitude" during World War II, Enigma, Ultra, doubled agents, fake armies--one for Norway, one for Plais de Calais). 8. "Armies have five names," prepare for all. The collective "Chi" of the army is all important.

9. Sun Tzu's war principle were copied by Mao (but more influenced by Lenin), copied by North Vietnam, ignored by U.S. military during Vietnam War, now the bible for the U.S. Marines!

This is intellectual longevity!

Indian Classical Military Thought and Warcraft

1. Vishnugupta Kautilya and the <u>Arthashastra</u> (4th century BCE). "War is a limitless game that goes on and on."

2. The ultra-realist. "The natural state of affairs is dissension and force."

3. "The ends justify the means."

4. The Mauryan Empire of northern India emerges under Chandragupta Maurya 300 BCE, lasts until 180 BCE, and may have included up to 50 million people under Asoka. After Asoka turns Buddhist and more pacific, does the Empire bleed away?

5. Kautilya and "The Divine Right of Kings."

6. The "delicious chill" of no moral standards by which to judge action except success or failure.

7. A truly perspicacious thinker who foresaw the modern totalitarian state with its centralized, planned economy, and the state's assumption that it should control religion for its own purposes.

8. "Every neighboring state is an enemy and the enemy's enemy is a friend."

9. Only law is "The Law of the Fishes."

Lecture #3:

"<u>The State, War and the Search for Fundamental</u> <u>Truths: The Genius of Clausewitz</u>"

- 1. A child of the Enlightenment.
- 2. War is nothing but a contest of wills.
- 3. An art.
- 4. Genius in war.
- 5. Friction in war.
- 6. The fog of war.
- 7. <u>Schwernpunct</u>.
- 8. Culminating points.
- 9. War a relationship.
- 10. The primacy of defense.
- **11.** The superiority of numbers.
- 12. "Do not take peace for granted."

Lecture #4:

The Template of Mars:

Introduction

"A trop in seven part harmony"

1. A personal search for a cross-cultural or trans-cultural conceptual framework.

2. The ancients and the essence of Mars, the god of war, as an analytic framework.

3. The importance of analysis in a moral vacuum, freeing one up from "my country right or wrong" or "my country is always wrong."

4. Williamson Murray, Victor Hanson and Geoffrey Parker and the concentration on the rise of the West.

5. A true template must work across time and space as well as cultures.

6. The Eight Cautions in creating a template:

(a) Moving beyond one's comfort zone is uncomfortable,

(b) Success in war is not equated with moral superiority,

(c) Courage and warrior-hood are not the same as soldier-hood, Valhalla is not the real battlefield, "We are not going to have a South Asian Valhalla into the indefinite future," says Robert Gates. What is Valhalla? Why was it such a warrior heaven?

(d) Non-western societies have long followed the Template of Mars,

(e) Personal abhorrence of war is not the same thing as societal abhorrence of war,

(f) "Blame," and personal beliefs about the rightness or wrongness of war, have no place in the Template,

(g) European dominance of the world in the 19th century paved the way for multiple European catastrophes in the 20th century, and

(h) There are no fixed places in history.

7. The seven critical elements of the Template of Mars:

Constantly changing, inter-dependent, always redefining themselves and relative to the dedication of others to the cause. Not confined to a time or a place. (a) Superior technological entrepreneurship,

(b) Superior discipline,

(c) Sustained ruthlessness,

(d) Receptivity to military innovation,

(e) Ability and willingness to protect capital from people and rulers, and

(f) Superior will, however generated, and

(g) An ongoing assumption that there will always be another war.

Note: a huge difference between "It's a wrong war, I hope we lose it" and "It's a wrong war, we must still win it."

8. The Mongols: A case study to prove the trans-cultural nature of the Template. Limits of Mongol force projection.

Names of note: Genghis (Chingis) Khan, Chaka the Zulu, Gallipoli, Kublai Khan, yam road and communication system, Tamberlane, Babur the Tiger, Subotai, great hunts.

Lecture # 5:

The Template of Mars:

"Superior Weapons Technology"

1. "Low" versus "high" technology, the bias. Note: not just weapons but their entrepreneurial use by governments and armies.

2. AK-47, Spanish sword, and Chaka the Zulu, a short stabbing spear and a battlefield revolution. Chariots and their demise at the hands of the Sea People.

3. Apparent advantage for the West coming in 15th century (Geoffrey Parker).

4. "Melding the cannon to the ship" and force projection. How was this done?

Note: This is one of the most consequential technological combinations in the history of much of the world. The European ocean borne/gunpowder empires largely replaced the millennium old <u>Silk Roads</u> linking the Oxus (Amu Darya) - Jaxartes - Tarim basins, which connected (albeit with extensive water borne commerce) the great civilizations of the Middle East, India, China and the steppe peoples (with Europe at the very far end of any distribution routes). Today: the Chinese seek to totally replace their failure to meld those technologies on an on-gong basis into the future. See their "Three Island Chains Claim" later in the course. The steps to the future?

5. The failure to keep superior technological entrepreneurship. (Presidents Jefferson and Madison).

6. The failure of tactics to keep up with technological change. American Civil War and 50 yards versus 200 yards versus 2-3000 yards for machine guns.

7. The Maxim gun and "the social history of the machine gun."

8. "No fixed places" - the Ethiopians under Menelik and the Japanese after Commodore Perry's shelling of Yokohama. Russo-Japanese War and Pearl Harbor.

9. Vietnam and the need for "smart bombs," and the Afghani Mujahedeen acquisition of the "Stinger." "The play within the play."

10. The Predator (unarmed – fiber optics to armed – Hellfire missile), now Raptor the load of an F-16, flown from Las Vegas by air force personnel! Real time. Bureaucratic rivalry. Cost effectiveness: one F-22 versus 40 Predators.

11. Vital over time but not the be all and end all as some think.

Lecture #6:

The Template of Mars:

"Superior Discipline"

1. Perhaps the most important ingredient of the Template

2. Williamson Murray, "discipline as glue."

3. Greeks, Romans, Machiavelli, Gustavus Adolphus, Frederick the Great all praise it. Germans in 1930's and 1940's live it. Americans in Gulf Wars and Afghanistan practiced it.

4. Romans executed "their exercises as battles without blood, and their battles as bloody exercises," said Josephus.

5. "Training is never finished." The role of hunting for the Mongols and English.

6. <u>Discipline: following orders, and in the absence of those</u> orders, following what they would have been.

7. Small group solidarity and individual devotion to the units. "An act of love" says William Manchester.

8. Rote memory, muscle memory, the stresses of combat.

9. Clausewitz "Everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult. The difficulties accumulate and end by producing a kind of friction that is inconceivable unless one has experienced war."

10. Hence the ridiculousness of the talking heads on TV today.

11. Europeans versus Native Americans.

12. Europeans versus Africans.

13. Europeans versus Asians.

14. Europeans versus other Europeans (practice on each other).

15. Collective punishment. (Romans, Mongols)

16. Three aspects of superior discipline:

(a) Formation and ability to stand fast in face of enemy,

(b) Withstand losses amid great carnage.

(c) Flexibility and initiative among junior officers "missions tactics." German storm troopers WWI begin the 20th century process, Israelis, American Marines.

Lecture #7:

The Template of Mars:

"Sustained Ruthlessness"

1. Sherman "War is cruelty, you cannot refine it... The crueler it is, the sooner it will be over."

2. Not random violence but purposeful violence.

3. One has to "be cruel in order to be kind."

4. Clausewitz "Kind-hearted people and their fallacy."

5. War is killing. What did Machiavelli mean when he said "Never do your enemy a little hurt"?

6. Willingness to do whatever is necessary to win: Romans, Mongols, North Vietnamese, U.S. against Japan (but not against North Vietnam).

7. Vietnam War from US perspective as a travesty of this principle, from that of the North Vietnamese a vindication of this principle.

8. Case Studies: Native Americans and their patterns of warfare.

9. The Araucanians and Comanches are exceptions who show how Mars can make a difference, and how following Mars can be an independent variable for survival.

10. Brutality, not weapons made the European invaders so dangerous. Cortez had 12 muskets.

11. Native American treachery: to Each Other!

Magwa versus Chingotchkook and Uncas in "The Last of the Mohegans."

The folly of Powhatan.

The folly of the first Thanksgiving, death to the Wampanogs. What if the Pilgrims had meet the Comanches or Blackfeet, would history have been different?

King Philip's (name Metacomet took for himself) War as epitome of European wars (30 Years War, 100 Years War) transported to the New World. Metacomet leads the

Wampanoag and Narragansets against the English colonist, but the Mohegans, Nehantics and Pequots do not join them, instead they fight with whites).

Tecumseh (war) versus Black Hoof (peace) among the Ohio Shawnee.

Navarbona (peace) versus Manuelito (war) among the Navaho.

12. The American Civil War, how the Union was saved. Grant and Sherman save the day with sustained ruthlessness. "The *chevauchee* from Hell." These two are the best generals of the war in terms of their strategic assumptions and actions. 13. The veterans of Shiloh and Cold Harbor meet "Dances with Wolves." "Counting coup" as a military culture death knell.

14. World War II – a fight to the death. Hamburg as precursor for Hiroshima. Albert Speer, "Mein Fuhrer, six of these and the war will be over" to "There are no civilians in Japan." Operation Olympic Coronet and the fear of "A dozen more Okinawas." Japanese plans interrupted.

15. Hating something is the not the same thing as saying it is ineffectual.

Lecture #8:

"Gettysburg and the American Civil War"

1. The myth of historical inevitability. 1861 versus 1865, Democrats could have won the election of 1864. In fact Lincoln wrote that he expected them to!

2. The Bowdoin legacy: The under-praised Oliver Otis Howard as well as the much (and sometimes over) praised Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain. General Hubbard

3. The myth of the "kindly" Lee. Grant a victim of the southern writers who claimed and still claim to own the history of the Civil War. In this case, percentages do not lie.

4. Going North searching for a Schwernpunct, Lee finds only a battle of encounter.

5. The tactics of Napoleonic Wars fifty years before are still in place but the technology has changed dramatically: the rifle versus the musket.

6. "Nothing fails like success." Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia. Fredericksburg. Chancellorsville and the death of Stonewall Jackson. 7. Generals Robert E. Lee, James Longstreet, Richard Ewell, John Bell Hood, Jeb Stuart, George Pickett and Colonel William Oates and the 4th and 15th Alabamians.

8. Generals John Reynolds, Winfield Scott Hancock. "Hancock the Magnificent," Oliver Otis Howard, George Meade, Gouveneur K. Warren, Strong Vincent and Colonel Joshua Chamberlain and the 20th Maine Regiment.

9. Little Round Top as the beginning of the battle on July 2, not the end! Fighting went on until after midnight. The Union 6th Corps as "the stopper" not needed.

10. Seminary Ridge versus Cemetery Ridge. Little Round Top versus Culp's Hill. KNOW THE DIFFERENCE!

11. Meade's failure to follow the Template. Bobby Lee escapes to fight again. Grant comes East with Sheridan and Sherman. Together, they practice the "hard species of war."

Lecture #9:

The Template of Mars:

"<u>Receptivity to Military and Integrative</u> <u>Innovation</u>"

1. Having new weapons is not the same as using them.

2. "Integration" of weapons has strategic, tactical, organizational and management elements related to the ability of a country to utilize "new knowledge."

3. Most militaries are VERY conservative and NOT receptive to change.

4. Most militaries are not geared to fight wars but to keep internal peace, and prevent the overthrow of their governments.

5. Hannibal, Scipio Africanus, Masinissa.

6. The example of the longbow: Crecy (1346), Poitiers (1356) and Agincourt (1415), French fail to react to changed battlefield situation.

7. Longbow against cultural norms as well as military ones.

8. 1591 Moroccan invasion of Songhai. Mongols use some gunpowder weapons in sieges, but it remains for the Europeans to get the idea from the Mongols and then refine it.

9. At the 1885 Battle of Adowa, the Italians were defeated by Menelik and the Ethiopians.

10. US military and machine guns as well as repeating rifles and tanks.

11. General Curtis LeMay as an innovator: Innovation during wartime.

12. Two examples of societies less receptive to military innovation: China and sea-born force projection and Japan and firearms. Zheng He loses to the Mandarin bureaucrats and Nagashino threatens the samurais.

13. "The ambiguity of the Ottomans." The Battle of Lepanto Gulf 1571.

14. Tactics in American Civil War overridden by rifles.

15. Tactics in World War I overridden by machine guns and artillery.

16. The role of intelligence: Korea in the fall of 1950, an American fiasco. (General Peng versus General McArthur).

Note: Readings highlight Araucanian success in innovation, adaptation and proving the validity of the Template. The rise of the Hapsburgs is due to their receptivity to military innovation. The A-10 proves its worth DESPITE the fighter jock mentality of the US Air Force.

Note: Not participating in an arms race is always a choice.

Lecture # 10:

The Template of Mars:

"<u>The Ability and Willingness to Protect Capital</u> <u>From People and Rulers</u>"

1. The Meiji Japan "Rich nation, strong army" concept. Wars are often won by sheer logistics (Allies' Sherman tanks versus German Tiger tanks, 5-1 but produced at 10-1)

2. Riches are not enough (Congo/Zaire, Kuwait).

3. Tradeoffs: Civilian-military, military-military, militaryelites.

4. % of GNP devoted to military. U.S. spends less than 5%. A huge bargain? Much waste, duplication, etc., but a small price to pay? Alternatives?

5. "Where have all the soldiers gone?" Europe and the 21st Century. Most European countries spend less than 2% on their militaries.

6. Severe bifurcation in the US? Should ROTC return to more college campuses?

7. Ghana, Mali, Songhai. "Heavy Horse" in Medieval Europe cost 84 cows for total outfit.

8. "Tooth to tail" costs.

9. Obama and the mantra of "Take Bush out of the equation and nothing changes."

10. The need to expand and upgrade. The need to replace worn out equipment. The need to come up with new weapons.

11. The decline of the Confederacy.

Lecture #11:

The Template of Mars:

"Superior Will"

1. Superior will as power multiplier. Needed to maximize the impact of ALL the other elements.

2. North Vietnamese break will of the American government and people.

3. Clausewitz was right. "I want, you want" the essence of warfare.

4. Religion: Ayatollah Khomeini, Ben Kiernan, <u>Blood and</u> <u>Soil</u>. Hung and the Kingdom of Heavenly Peace (20 million? 1850-1864). "Kill them all, God will know his own."

5. Nationalism as a civic religion. The curse of the French Revolution.

6. Ideology – communism, fascism, capitalism as a transcendent force.

7. Ethnicity/race as primordial attachments – Rwanda, Kosovo, Celtic tribalism in Northern Ireland. Japan during World War II. The role of the <u>issen gorin</u>. "There are no civilians in Japan." "Kill All" order

8. Greed and glory. The conquistadors from all countries.

9. Stern self-righteousness – "Burn old Dixie down" and "Free the slaves."

10. Love of battle – lost in political correctness and the myth of the world's benign love.

11. Inspirational leadership – from Chaka to Asoka to Hannibal to Napoleon to Suleiman to Crazy Horse to Genghis Khan to Amina of Hausaland.

12. Revenge as a motivator.

13. Freedom from class, foreign, racial dominance.

14. One or more of the above multiplies the power of any army or any people.

Lecture #12:

The Template of Mars:

"There Will Always Be Another War"

1. Helmut von Moltke, "Eternal peace is a dream."

2. "Make love and war": back to Sheckley's "Pilgrimage to Earth."

3. Ill-preparedness costs lives, often tens of thousands of lives.

4. "Remember Task Force Smith" (and "Task Force Faith").

5. Thomas Jefferson and the gun boats ("mothball the frigates!"). Result? The White House is burned down!

6. Qiao Ling and Wang Xiangsui take the pulse of the god of war, 1999. "Unrestricted Warfare" tells how to wage it and how not to fear the hegemon. Prophetic and Sino-centric both. "The weapons speak." Osama Bin Laden as contemporary seer.

7. The lesson of "Black Hawk Down." The day the Earth stood still!

8. Islam and Christianity, the Middle East and Europe, "The Clash of Civilizations" and the dangers of nuclear proliferation.

9. The lure of biological warfare.

10. Where will the next war come from?

11. That is the question, not "are we done with wars." The answer to that question is "we are not."

Lecture #13:

"<u>The Decision to Drop the Atomic Bomb</u>" <u>Or</u> "<u>Hiroshima As Seen Through the Lens of Mars</u>"

1. Operation "Olympic-Coronet": "The greatest battle never fought."

2. Sustained ruthlessness in the Pacific.

3. Force projection.

4. The odd, but understandable, case of Japanese's nonguilt.

5. Nanking. *Issen gorin*. 20 million Chinese civilians killed. Chinese as *Murata*.

6. 1939 Khalkin Gol/Nomonhan, the battle that changed history. Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto and "the firecracker attack."

7. Strategic poverty, the "octopus traps."

8. Death by island. Bushido/samurai code.

9. "Set Japan on fire." Curtis LeMay and the 21st Bomber Command. Firebombing of Tokyo mirrors the firebombing of Hamburg, more die in Tokyo raid than Hiroshima or Nagasaki.

10. Iwo Jima and Okinawa as trauma. "<u>Ketsu Go</u>" decoded as "the Service of Death" is personified. The Japanese army leaders believed the real battle had not yet been fought and would be fought by tens of millions of soldiers and civilians WHEN the Americans landed. The "decisive battle" was yet to come! And the American naval, Marine and army losses on Okinawa gave them hope by changing the ratio of 1 for 6 to 1 for 1 (one attacking American causality per Japanese defender causality on Okinawa.

11. The atomic bombs saved hundreds of thousands of American lives and many more Japanese lives but should such hypotheticals be included in discussions about dropping the bomb per se?

<u>12. Consider that by July of 1945, the war in the Pacific</u> <u>theatre was costing 250,000 lives per month – Burma to Java</u> <u>to China to Manchuria to Philippines to Japan home islands</u>. This statistic is virtually NEVER mentioned in discussions about the decision to drop the atomic bomb. Should it be?

Note: 115,000 tons of liquid fire PER MONTH were scheduled to be dropped on Japan during the fall of 1945, causalities would certainly have been considerably larger than those caused by the dropping of the atomic bombs. 13. Hiroshima and Nagasaki are destroyed and the Emperor sees the future, but an attempted army coup almost reverses course. 1.5 million men still in Manchuria, Burma, Vietnam, the Philippines, Korea, China, Formosa, and Indonesia.

14. How could anyone – especially American decision makers – be expected to make the assumption that invading the Japanese home islands would be less bloody than invading Okinawa?

Lecture #14:

"Mars Is A Jealous God:

Iraq Wars I and II and Afghanistan I"

1. Vietnam as prologue in reverse. "Instant Thunder" versus "Rolling Thunder," the tragedy of escalation.

2. The triumph of blitzkrieg (in three dimensions). KARI dies so that others might live. U.S. re-fights WWII by copying German strategy "right down to the helmets" while Sadam Hussein refights WWII. "The Mother of All Battles" fails to match the Somme or even the Iran/Iraq war.

3. The sweet spot of history. The mistakes of Sadam Hussein blend into the mistakes of General Powell and President George Bush.

4. HARM's and M1A1's, the battle on the plains of Germany refought. The miracle of logistics. How Big Macs and chocolate shakes greeted the troops when they arrived in Saudi Arabia.

5. Clausewitz totally vindicated. For the last time?

6. The "perfect war"? U.S. military death rate in 1991 lower than the year before!!!

7. CENTCOM and King Faud. Buying a coalition. "We know how to run the hajj." Kuwaitis as guests. General Khaleid bin Sultan and the need for B-52's at Al-Khafji. The battle at Al Qurnain (night of February 26-27, 1991), the biggest tank battle never known. Not Kursk nor Dobya which are quite well known to followers of World War II.

8. General Fred Franks VII Corps and General Storming Norman Swartzkopf.

9. SCUD's and Israelis.

10. Bomb Damage Assessment and the Republican Guards. The 100 hour war stops too soon. "You have to be cruel in order to be kind."

Lecture # 15:

"<u>Is the Template Obsolete in the Face of</u> <u>Insurgencies?</u>"

Plus a look at Iraq III and Afghanistan II

1. 1991 as watershed – but is it a new era in warfare?

2. Osama Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda bleed into ISIS.

3. General Rupert Smith and his "war among the people."

4. Insurgency and Counter-insurgency, the yin and the yang, a relationship.

5. Concepts to learn: "Search and Destroy" versus "Clear and hold," "Ink spots," and "eating soup with a knife" says Lawrence of Arabia.

6. Insurgency in Kautilya, Thucydides (the "Corcyran Revolution") and Clausewitz.

7. The American Revolution (East model versus West model).

8. The numerical advantage of counter-insurgency.

9. Vietnam lessons.

10. The true radical jihadist Salafists and the cosmology which sustains them.

11. Applying the Template to insurgencies.

12. Institutional memory within the US and other militaries. "We'll never fight another insurgency, throw away the manual."

13. John Boyd and the enduring OODA Loop for small scale actions and real time warcraft.

Lecture #16:

"<u>Lessons From Byzantium, The American</u> <u>Empire and the Dangers that Lie Ahead</u>" <u>Integrated with</u> "<u>The Weapons Speak" Power Point</u>

"The Twin Dangers of Over-reach and Under-reach"

1. "Freedom is not Free."

2. Donald Kagan, "Peace does not keep itself." The global significance of General Vance's statement "I don't know if security is 10% or 90% of the solution but I know it is the FIRST 10% or the FIRST 90%.

Note: question for class, when is an "empire" not an empire or when is a non-empire called an "empire?

3. The Trident deterrent, shifting seas.

4. Playing chess on four levels: Main force opponents, regional conflicts, international peacekeeping (failed states) and international terrorism.

5. The military today, "tooth to tail" ratios.

6. Refurbishing a worn out inventory.

7. The Nimitz Class carrier, top weapons system of the last 60 years on the Military Channel. "The Weapons Speak."

8. Nuclear deterrent and the need to modernize and reduce.

9. 6000 nuclear weapons detonate and "Now here's what we do."

10. The dangers (real and imagined) that lurk in the Straits of Taiwan.

11. Qiao Liang and Wang Ziangsui, <u>Unrestricted Warfare</u>. Published on the 10th anniversary of the Gulf War of 1991.

12. "10,000 methods combine as one."

13. "The U.S. falsely looks at zero causalities and that makes it vulnerable to any causalities."

The Overarching Themes of the Course

1. War as an ever changing mix of art, science and politics

2. The centrality of learning in warfare

3. The centrality of will

4. The ubiquitous nature of friction and fog in war and politics

5. The crucial component of training and small unit cohesion; the centrality of <u>*Auftragstaktik*</u> for success in warfare.

6. The importance of Mars as a driver of interstate activity

7. The relationship between "carnage and culture," real and imagined

8. The primacy of Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, Kautilya and Thucydides

9. The hypertrophy of war in the modern world

10. The brilliance and danger of blitzkrieg

11. The endurance of the notion that Mars is a most jealous god

12. War's lack of interest in your wishes

13. The tragic validity of "there will always be another war"

14. Asymmetrical warfare is still warfare

15. The persistence of the adage "Nothing fails like success"

16. The historical efficacy of the idea that "in the end of the war is the beginning of the next for those who can but observe"

17. The insightful notion that losers in wars almost always learn more than winners about the nature of the next war

18. The continuing validity of the notion that "two things can be true simultaneously"

19. In the future will be the past when it comes to war and the dictates of Mars

20. The ability of the worship of Mars - if not checked - to devour itself

Battle Assessments

For some, "battles never solve anything," for others "battles decide everything." For students in this course, battles can decide a lot of things but not all battles have much relevance for future processes, trends and outcomes.

But battles can be portals through which, by using the Template of Mars, one can examine the why's and the impact on subsequent histories of the entities involved.

Here is the mental checklist you and your group need to explore as you prepare your report:

Who fought in the battle or the war or what are the important patterns of the element you chose?

Why?

When was it?

What type(s) of government was (were) involved?

What was the role of the government in the battle/war operations?

Why study this battle? This war?

What did it prove?

What were its long-term significances?

Were there important innovations in statecraft or warcraft?

Did it have an important national or international impact?

Flow of the battle?

What were the "Schwernpunkts"?

What were the "Culminating points"?

Aspects of the "Fog" of war?

Aspects of the "Friction" of war?

What concepts and principles help us understand the battle?

What "War Wisdom" does it reinforce?

What "War Wisdom" does it contradict?

What aspects of the lectures does it reinforce?

What aspects of the lectures does it contradict?

What terms and principles help us understand how this particular battle fits into the history of warfare?

What terms and principles help us understand the long term significance of this particular battle?

Which of the overarching themes of the course does the battle support?

Which of the overarching themes of the course does the battle oppose or question?

Which dimensions of the Template of Mars best explain the victory by one side and the loss by another?

Battle Assessment Reports

Each team will be responsible for a major battle, war or element of war presentation during the semester. Each team will be allotted 30 minutes of class time for the presentation and ten minutes of questions. Every member of the group is expected to speak.

<u>The battle, war or element presentation will be accompanied</u> by a 15 page written description (in 16 point font, one side of paper) of the actual battle and 3 pages of bibliographical notes (indicating the sources used and an assessment of their usefulness).

Total length paper and bibliography: 18 pages combined.

<u>Thus the permitted length of the combined elements is 18 pages.</u>

It is also important that the professor and other readers learn where you got your information and how different sources stacked up in providing the material you eventually used. This is a most important dimension of your paper.

It is imperative that each report show a familiarity with the new terms and concepts learned in the course and not simply be a historical descriptive which could have been provided a year or so ago.

<u>Teams</u>

Each team has the responsibility for researching their chosen topic.

Note: With all of human history to ransack, do not ask the professor "What battle should we study?" He will think you didn't even bother to read this Syllabook.

Teams are responsible for organizing reports and providing any audio/visual aids (giving the AV department at least a week in advance if special personnel or equipment are required).

Each team member must be part of the oral presentations.

Each team member will be graded by the team leaders as to participation outside of class.

Each team member is responsible for helping the team but it is up to the team and the team leaders to decide what and when that help is needed and wanted.

Each team can choose any battle, war or element which makes sense to them and fits the parameters of the course.

Each team should provide the class with an outline of the main points of their presentation.

Each team should provide the class with a "program" or "playbill" as to who is speaking on what aspect of their presentation. This "program" should include a map of the battle.

Each team needs to justify why they are presenting their particular battle – why study this particular one?

Outlined below are some battles which are places to start looking in the sense of some that are important to the ebb and flow of history as we know it.

This short list is simply for illustrative purposes and is in no way conclusive, comprehensive or self-contained.

Each group has responsibility for moving to questions from the class without prompting from the professor.

Each group has the responsibility for organizing the time so there are questions from the audience.

Each group not presenting has the responsibility to ask at least one important question.

Each group will be graded on the quality of their questions, i.e. no random thoughts!

Team leaders are responsible for grading each team member's performance, especially for the actions not visible to the professor and the class.

Team leaders will be judged on their ability to distinguish between good member performance and bad member performance.

Housekeeping Details

Office Hours: Monday and Wednesday 12:15 – 1:00 pm and 4:00 – 4:30 pm and by appointment.

Call 725-3539 (O) or 729-0649 (H). E-mail at cpotholm@bowdoin.edu

Check with the professor or his door for extra office hours which are available, often weekly.

There will be two hour exams plus a major group presentation so budget your semester's time accordingly. Here are the <u>approximate</u> weights of each grade you will receive:

Hour Exam #1 25% (individual grade) Hour Exam #2 25% (individual grade) Group Presentation 25% (grade of group) Individual Presentations 25% (individual grade)

Also, class participation will be factored into the assessment of your grade for the course and can add a + or subtract a – for your final grade.

All papers must be written in the following format:

- 1. 16 point type, Times New Roman preferred
- 2. Double spacing
- 3. Single-sided printing

4. Page numbers in the top right hand corner (and not on the front page, if possible)

5. Stapled, not held with paper clip or outlandish plastic folder

6. Two hard copies (one to be returned, one for records) to be collected at the class following a presentation. Presentation done in once class, paper collected at the following class.

7. No paper sent by e-mail will be accepted.

Note: Papers are projects, self-contained and represent a total accomplishment in and of themselves. In addition to using spell check, always read over carefully after you have used spell check because spell check can confuse words which are spelled correctly but which are not appropriate in a given context. For example, spell check can be mistaken as in the use of "bear" for "bare" or "there" for "their."

Also, it is always a good idea to read your paper over out loud to yourself in front of a mirror. If the words flow in this context, the professor will find it a smoothly written piece of work. If the narrative seems disjoined, confusing or confused, rewrite.

Rewriting is the key to good writing. Remember, your professor might post your paper on the Internet and therefore it will have a life of its own – forever.

Remember: Failure to abide any and all of these rules will be very

costly to you and your team's final grade.

Footnotes and Bibliographical Citations

For ALL written work in this course

Many entering students either have no idea about footnote and bibliographical citations or simply come up with their own idea of what constitutes them. It thus becomes increasingly necessary to set and stick to some MINIMUM standards for the practice of citation in this course.

Footnotes should conform to the style illustrated in this Syllabook and used in any of my books, especially <u>Winning at War</u>, <u>War Wisdom and Understanding War</u>, all of which are available in the library.

No other footnote styles will be accepted.

Note: <u>A minimum of 20 points</u> will be deducted from any paper using any other form.

1. When you have a quote or wish to make a footnote, <u>put that</u> <u>footnote at the bottom of the page or at the end of the paper</u>. For this course, you MUST use Arabic numerals for footnotes. Any attempt to use Roman numerals will result in individual and group failure. 1. is a proper footnote, i is not! 2. is a proper footnote, ii is not!

2. For this course, do not put the footnote in the text itself (as is quite acceptable in the sciences or sociology and anthropology). Put it at the bottom of the page or at the end of the paper.

3. The first time you cite a book, put the author, the title of the book (underlined or italicized), a parenthesis, the city where it was published, a colon, then the publisher's name, then a comma, then the date it was published, then another parenthesis followed by a comma,

the letter p. (or pp. if more than one) followed by a period. Thus: Richard E. Morgan, <u>Duck Hunting along the Atlantic Flyway</u> (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), p. 11.

4. If the <u>very next</u> footnote refers to the same book and the same page, put <u>Ibid</u>. Always underline or italicize <u>Ibid</u>. to show you are well educated and know it is a Latin phrase! Also, always put a period after it and every other footnote citation you use.

5. If the very next footnote refers to the same book but uses a different page, put <u>Ibid.</u> and then the page number. Thus: <u>Ibid.</u> p.16.

6. If, however, you make reference to another work in an intervening footnote, you should re-cite the first book as follows: Morgan, <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 131.

7. Use basically the same citation for an article but present it as follows: author's name, the title of the article (in quotation marks), "in" then the editor's name (if there is one), followed by the volume (vol.), number (# in Roman numerals), date (in parenthesis) and page numbers. Thus: Allen Springer, "Canada at the Crossroads," in <u>Orbis</u> Vol. XXX, No. 6 (2000), pp. 16-45.

8. For bibliographies, use the same citations as above but with the author names in alphabetical order by last name and without page numbers. Thus: Morgan, Richard, <u>Duck Hunting Along the Atlantic Flyway</u> (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999).

9. For Internet citations, use the website and page numbers (if any). Thus: <u>www.warlovers.com</u>.

10. For interview citations, use the following: person interviewed, by whom, date. Thus: Ralph Nader, interview with Professor John Rensenbrink, August 23, 2003.

11. A bibliographical essay can be thought of as an annotated bibliography albeit with more extensive analysis.

12. Remember, if you, or any member of your team, has ANY question about footnote forms, copy the style I used in <u>Winning at</u> <u>War</u>, <u>War Wisdom</u> and <u>Understanding War</u>.

Battles As Portals

While it is true that historians in the past greatly overemphasized the importance of various battles and ascribed to them impacts all out of proportion to their actual repercussions, nevertheless in the 1980's and 1990's, historians veered (and many continue to do so) wildly in the other direction, deriding the study of battles and even wars as "battlehistory."

We believe that a balance of the two positions is warranted. Not only do battles themselves underpin some important changes in history, but also, battles are windows or portals into not only battle and war, but also into the contemporary societies and the hinges of history. By applying the Template of Mars to important battles, one gets the clearest perspective on the broader historical changes as well as the reasons for one side winning and another side losing a particular battle or war.

Below are a few which Bowdoin students over the years have chosen and explored with considerable intellectual profit. In studying battles as portals, always try to look behind the day and process of the battle to see how and why the weapons, organization and motivations appeared that day or days and what they signified about the society and political system which provided them.

Note: In this process, try to apply the 7 elements from the Template of Mars to help illuminate who won, and why, and what were the longer term implications of one side or one technology triumphing. But do not try to "over-read" the data and make everything "fit" the Template. When its elements don't explain something, or the outcomes are counter-intuitive, say so. Also, try to remember that battles are portals which look forward as well as backward. Try to see the future they foretell for the nature of warfare. Look at the weapons, the equipment, the supplies, the societies and governmental structures which enable one people to confront another in a particular spot in time and place.

Of course, sometimes a battle is just a battle without long term import or even significance to the wider history of warfare. But even these battles remain of great significance for those who fought and died in them. For overviews of the battles as battles, see works such as Brian Todd Carey, Joshua Allfree and John Cairns, <u>Warfare in the Ancient</u> <u>World</u> (Barnsley: Pen and Sword, 2005) and Brian Todd Carey, Joshua Allfree and John Cairns, <u>Warfare in the Medieval World</u> (Barnsley: Pen and Sword, 2006) if your battle falls into these periods.

Note: Here are two quick framework examinations of the Vietnam War and the First Gulf War using the Template of Mars:

The Vietnam War

The 1962-1975 Portion

	<u>Side A</u>	<u>Side B</u>
Superior Technology	A 40%	B 60%
Superior Discipline	Α	
Sustained Ruthlessness	Α	
Receptivity to Innovation	A 40%	B 60%
Protection of Capital	A	
Superior Will	Α	
There Will Always Be Another War	Α	

The Template of Mars Looks At:

The Gulf War

1991

	<u>Side A</u>	<u>Side B</u>
Superior Technology	Α	
Superior Discipline	A	
Sustained Ruthlessness	A 40%	B 60%
Receptivity to Innovation	Α	
Protection of Capital	Α	
Superior Will	A 40%	B 60%
There Will Always Be Another War	A 40%	B 60%

Some Important Battles of Note

Actium (Western Greece) 31 BCE

An important battle in the history of Rome because the victor, Octavian, became emperor after he defeated the forces of Marc Anthony and his Egyptian wife, Cleopatra. Octavian, with a fleet of 400 ships, bottled up those of both (about 230) and when they came out to do battle, and were defeated, both fled back to Egypt, later committing suicide. Rather swinishly, Anthony abandoned his legions on land and left them behind. Later, not surprisingly, they switched sides and were happy to be in on his subsequent capture. Octavian would thus start a line of Roman emperors who ruled for the better part of 500 years. The unanswered question is why Anthony, who had proven himself to be a fine general on land, would turn to the sea to decide his destiny. Marks the effective end of the Roman Republic and the beginning of the Roman Empire. Last done in 2008.

Adowa (Aduwa)(Adwa) (Ethiopia) 1896

Stinging defeat of 20,000 man Italian colonial army by Ethiopian forces under Menelik II. Resulted in the treaty of Addis Ababa in which Italy recognized Ethiopian independence, a status it enjoyed until finally overrun by Italy in 1936, forty years later. Showed what African armies could do when they took advantage of their European opponents' weaknesses and how following the Template of Mars can transcend existing local cultural military norms. Also, Menelik had a grand strategy of moving north and threatening the Italians and goading them into battle.

Adrianople (Thrace, now modern Turkey) 378

Major defeat of the Romans by the East Goths (originally from southern Scandinavia who adopted the warfare techniques of the steppe nomads), a battle which took the life of the Emperor Flavius Julius Valens. This battle also showed the considerable underlying weaknesses in the Roman way of dealing with the increasing stream of in-migrants. Gothic heavy cavalry defeated Roman infantry, presaging some important dimensions of medieval warfare. Also, the continuing stream of Germanic peoples into the Roman west eventually undermined the Rome Empire's ability to control its borders and its own destiny. However, the Byzantine Empire learned from its mistakes and lasted for many more centuries. In fact, while some have drawn the conclusion one should never have allowed armed outsiders into your political system, others have concluded that you can do that as long as you don't treat them badly once you do.

Aegospotami (Hellespont, Turkey) 405 BCE

Smashing victory for the Spartans under their commander Lysander who was backed by the Persian king Cyrus as their 180 ships crushed the 170 ships of the Athenians and their allies to end the 27 year long Peloponnesian War. With Athens tightly under siege, their fleet had been their only hope to get grain from the Black Sea region. Athens would surrender the following year, ending its imperial overreach.

Agincourt (France) 1515

A perennial favorite since the outnumbered English under Henry V defeat the pride of the French nation (with insane Charles VI back in Paris) by using longbows and picking a perfect place to fight a defensive battle. Shows the importance of discipline and the beginning of the end of some dimensions of the medieval way of war. The French prove to be slow learners after Crecy (1346 and only 20 miles from Agincourt!) and Poitiers (1356). Mars took them to task for this failure. Note: Overshadowed is the subsequent battle of Formigny in 1450 which was an Agincourt in reverse (with 3700 English losing their lives compared with a handful of French), a battle which effectively ended English rule in Normandy. Done 2002.

Ain Jalut (Palestine) 1260

Mongols suffer their first major defeat in the west at the hands of Qutuz the Sultan of Egypt and the Mamluks (initially slave warriors purchased from steppe peoples and later a warrior class par excellence) at the Spring of Goliath (or Ain Jalut). After capturing much of what is now Iraq and Syria, the Mongols under Hulegu think they will sweep into Egypt (although Hulegu doesn't lead the attack, the Mongol general is Kebugha). Oddly enough, the Moslems get help from the Crusaders. But when the battle is over, one of the Mamluk generals, Baibars, assassinates Qutuz and becomes the greatest of Mamluk warriors, eventual destroying the Crusader states. Think of the irony of the Mongols letting the Italian traders to sell their captive Slavs to the various Moslem rulers including the Sultans of Egypt earlier. Done 2004 and 2014.

al-Qadisiya (Southern Iraq) 636

Four day battle featuring Rashidun Moslems under new Caliph Umar versus Sassanid Persia. Despite technological advantage of war elephants and cataphracts, the Sassanids are defeated. Big regional impact as the Zoroastrian religion was superseded by Islam and Arabs replaced Persian rulers. Persians exhausted by 20 years of war with Byzantium. Muslim will and new weapons (bows called *majra* which could fire heavier darts to target Persian war elephants) and better, more supple, fluid tactics. A very important battle. Done in 2017.

Note chronology for early Muslim battles: Muhammad receives revelations, dies 632 Caliph Abu Bakr (632-634) Caliph Umar (634-644)

An Loc (South Vietnam) 1972

One of the most important battles to study if one is interested in truly learning about the Vietnam War as opposed to the myths about that war. Fought for 66 days when the U.S. force levels were only 20% of what they had been a few years earlier, this defense of this city astride Highway 13 to Saigon, was a smashing victory for the ARVN and U.S. air power and completely surprised and demoralized the NVA. Yet the very victory served to rationalize the prevailing strategy of Vietnamazation and led to the premature withdrawal of both U.S. advisors AND its air power. Still, it took the North Vietnamese until 1975 to finally win the war and as almost always, in the end of wars are to be found the innovations for the next. By comparison, also always remember there are still 20,000 front line American troops in Korea over 60 years after that war began. Done 2008.

Assaye (India) 1803

Arthur Wellesley led the British and Indian sepoys of the British East India Company to victory over the Maratha Confederacy, partially by guile and partially by cold steel. The Maratha Confederacy actually not only had many more men but many more cannon and had modernized to meet European innovation so this was not a normal "war on the periphery" situation. Superior tactics and generalship plus discipline probably made the difference in this battle which secured much of India for the British. Done 2009.

Ayacucho (Peru) 1825

Battle between Spanish and revolutionary army commanded by General Antonio Jose de Sucre, who was appointed by Simon Bolivar. Last battle for independence from Spain. Seldom studied in the United States. Done 2000. Class seemed to find it too straightforward and a bit boring.

Baghdad (Iraq) 1258

Baghdad was the center of learning and trade for the Abbasid Caliphate under Al-Musta'sim and refused to submit to Hulegu Khan who invaded Mesopotamia. The religious toleration of the Mongols (who were assisted by Shiites and Nestorian Christians) aided them as they crushed the Muslim forces. Because Al-Musta'sim had refused to submit initially, but then tried to arrange peace terms as the Mongols were winning the battle, Hulegu ordered the destruction of the city and massacre of all its inhabitants except for the Christians. Estimates of the death toll are between 200,000 and one million, numbers which seem incredibly high. In any case, Baghdad never returned to its former glory. With its capture and the subsequent capitulation of Damascus, the Mongols had driven Islam back farther than ever before. Done 2009.

Blenheim (Germany) 1704

Interesting insight into John Churchill, the Duke of Marlborough, "who never lost a pitched battle he commanded nor failed to complete a siege he launched" according to one of his biographers. A somewhat treacherous swine to those such as James II and William of Orange and Queen Anne who employed him, but a marvelous field general nevertheless. One of the best in the age of the "Great Captains." The English and Duke of Savoy beat the Bavarians and French. Would later defeat the French at Ramillies (1706), Oudenarde (1708) and Malplaquet (1709), bringing to an end the expansionary designs of the Sun King, Louis XIV.

Breitenfeld (Saxony) 1642

Dubbed "the beginning of modern warfare" as Gustavus Adolphus defeats the Habsburgs under Tilly. Much more than Protestant versus Catholic faith was at stake, see why. Some even say the revolution created by Gustavus Adolphus would pave the way for eventually changing the power relationships among the world's civilizations by putting Europe ahead in terms of the military revolution.

The Swedish King Gustavus Adolphus confronts the Holy Roman Empire's Tilly in a battle which would show new tactics such as smaller tactical units, "shock" cavalry (rearmed with pistols and swords), new and more mobile artillery and continue the Thirty Years War. Gustavus Adolphus would also conduct war seeking decisive battles and outcomes using shock tactics and movement as well as more concentrated firepower (rather than medieval sieges and rare battles). Some authors such as Russell Weigley and Paul Davis see it as representing the birth of modern warfare which would enable the West to conquer 80% of the world. Did it all start here?

Interesting sidelight, like Hannibal after the successful double envelopment at Cannae (see below), Gustavus Adolphus fails to follow up his double envelopment with a quick march on Vienna, and by the time he gets around to renewing the offensive months later, Tilly and the Catholics have rallied much like the Romans. Done 2017.

Brooklyn (Long Island) 1776

The British out-general Washington and sweep the rebels from New York. A huge military victory for the British and their General William Howell, but strategically, since the center of gravity of the Patriot cause was the Continental Army, not a place, this huge victory was of little consequence to the outcome of the Revolutionary War. Peace would not come before 1783, however, and by that time 1% of the American population had been killed, making the Revolutionary War the costliest war in US history save for the Civil War in terms of total human lives and that against a smaller population base.

Budapest (Hungary) 1686

Charles of Lorraine takes the Turkish capital of Hungry (Buda) after a long siege--a successful follow up to the his earlier relief of Vienna when it was under siege by the Ottoman Turks of Kara Mustafa in 1683. The Habsburgs are on the ascendency in the war zone between their holdings and those of the Ottomans.

Cannae (Italy) 216 BCE

Hannibal crosses the Alps, picks up support from Cisalpine Gauls and defeats Roman legions in a classic double envelopment in southern Italy. Fabulous battle victory but with no strategic follow-up achieved. Romans begin the tradition (also typified by the British during the 18th and 19th century) of losing a battle but later winning the war. This battle is still studied today at military academies and the double envelopment is still sought on the battlefield as a nonpareil victory. Sometimes lost in historical accounts is that upwards of 50,000 men (mostly Romans) were killed in a single day, making it still one of the most deadly days in the history of human warfare and certainly, by far, the most devastating accomplished by hand weapons. The double envelopment was also used successfully by Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke in the Franco Prussian War of 1870-71 and Gustavus Adolphus at the Battle of Breitenfeld in 1634. Done 2000.

Carrhae (Turkey) 53 BCE

Roman army under Marcus Licinius Crassus seeks a prestige win over Parthia in order for Crassus to surpass the other two members of the First Triumvirate, Julius Caesar and Pompey. Roman legions outnumber the Parthians 40,000+ to 10,000 but the Parthian general, Spabod Surena, uses good generalship and mounted archers to defeat the Roman infantry square which lacked heavy horse cavalry (*cataphracts*) as well as any way to counter the stand-off composite bow armed Parthian light cavalry. Excellent battle to study the role of will as a quest for loot and glory are often overridden by defense of homeland. Highlighted as failure of Rome, although Rome would later sack the Parthian capitol twice. The *cataphract* later became prominent in the Roman army of the 3rd and 4th centuries AD, and this innovation eventually evolved into the heavy horse knight so central to European feudalism. Done in 2010 and again in 2014 in an outstanding presentation.

Chalons (Northwest France) 451

Turning back of Attila and his Huns by Franks (Goths) and Romans under King Theodoric (who was killed). Attila's Huns made Hungary the seat of their empire which stretched from north of Danube and Black Sea and eastward of Caucasus. Battle won by Goths and Romans, but they don't follow up (despite Attila's preparation of his own funeral pier). There follows a brief respite before the collapse of the Roman Empire in the West. While this battle gets great celebration for the defeat of Attila, it is important to note that after Chalons, he was still strong enough to threaten attacks on both Persia AND the Byzantine Empire at the same time, so the battle was not as devastating as some have previously argued. In fact, some assert that Aetius, Theodoric's successor, actually feared his own Visigoth allies even more and wanted the Huns to survive as a counterweight. Done 2000.

Constantinople (Turkey) 1453

Ottoman Turks under Sultan Mohammed II defeat Byzantine Emperor Constantine IX after the city had held out against 16 sieges following the splitting of the Roman Empire into an East and a West. Turks use cannons and revolutionize siege warfare but they lose interest in the new weapons technology and it is left to the countries of Western Europe to take full advantage of artillery in the decades ahead. Note though, that the Byzantine Empire (Eastern Roman Empire) lasted 8 centuries longer than the Western Portion of the Roman Empire which faded away by 475. The Roman Empire had been divided into Western and Eastern Empires in 395 between two sons of Theodosius I. Last done, 2013.

Crecy (France) 1346

First use of gunpowder in a major battle in Europe, forms triad of French defeats (along with Poitiers in 1356 and Agincourt in 1415) by the English which show the beginnings of the end for heavy horse cavalry whether by long bow or gunpowder. But the major pattern of note was the failure of the French for almost a hundred years to adapt to the long bow's strategic implications.

Cuito Cuanavale (Angola) 1987-1988

Four month long struggle in southern Angola between People's Armed Forces of Liberation of Angola (FAPLA) and National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). Former supported by Cuba, latter by South Africa. Eventually, South African offensive blunders and poor strategy plus effective Cuban counterattack see government forces triumphant. Last major South African thrust into Angola which foreran their eventual withdrawal from South West Africa (now Namibia). Last done 2017.

Cynoscephalae (Greece) 197 BCE

An understudied battle of encounter on a ridge known as Dog's Head. Jeremy Black, for example, does not include it in his top 70 battles. Yet it was a marvelous turning point for several reasons. First, the Roman army under Titus Quinctius Flamininus defeated Philip V of Macedon and for the next 600 years, Rome would dominate military history in the Mediterranean basin and beyond. Second, this battle showed the superiority of the Roman sword and shield infantry legion formation over the spear Greek phalanx which had dominated warfare for three centuries. The Greeks lost over 12,000 men and the Romans only a few hundred, showing how terribly wrong things could go when a phalanx was flanked.

Dien Bien Phu (Vietnam) 1953-1954

A classic, set-piece caldron battle with very little "guerilla" warfare involved. The French, under their commander, General Henri Navarre, tried to defeat the Vietminh by deliberately putting their soldiers (including Vietnamese, Thais, French paratroops, Algerians, Moroccans and the French Foreign Legion with its large German component) into a valley with an airstrip, ringed by hills and dared the Vietminh to attack them, believing that their opponents couldn't capture the commanding heights or bring artillery to bear. The Vietminh, under General Vo Nguyen Giap, could and did. Giap, who had studied Clausewitz, stated "We decided to wipe out at all costs the enemy force at Dien Bien Phu" for he recognized a true potential *Schwernpunct* when he saw one. The resulting capture of the entire French force produced the Geneva Accords which recognized an independent North and South Vietnam, thereby setting the stage for the ongoing war between those two entities and their allies.

Elau (Poland) 1807

Napoleon is fought to a draw by the Russian General Leonty Bennigsen and the remnants of the Prussian army previously defeated at Jena and Auerstandt in October, 1806. Russians attacked on "one vast plain of ice" and Napoleon was slow to respond. He carried the field eventually after two days of hard fighting but both sides suffered 25,000 casualties and the French pulled back to winter quarters after the Russians retired in good order. Some historians say this battle shows how Napoleon was beginning to lose his combat edge. Certainly this was the first time one of his major campaigns had been decisively checked.

Gallipoli (Turkey) 1915-1916

A truly monumental failure of a campaign for the British and French who suffered over 350,000 casualties, whole divisions of troops who were needed badly on the Western Front, and a victory for the Turks who lost almost as many. A totally unnecessary campaign because even if it had succeeded would have had no major effect on the German forces whose military formations in France and Belgium defeat was the *sine qua non* for Allied victory in World War I. "Chosen" as the least of many terrible alternatives - such as landing British troops in the Balkans - Gallipoli remains an object lesson for all who believe they can think strategically. Oddly enough, although Churchill was famous for saying beforehand, "German is the foe and it is bad war to seek cheaper victories," he did not listen to his own advice. Remains a classic example, however, of a successful evacuation during wartime.

Gaugamela (sometimes called Arbela) (Iraq) 331 BCE

Village near the city where Alexander the Great defeated Darius of Persia and took his kingdom from him on the broad plains of Kurdistan. Darius and his much larger and more mobile army (especially his cavalry and chariots) should have had a decisive advantage. Darius fled in the middle of this battle after Alexander makes progress against his center with a huge phalanx. 30,000 Greeks versus 80,000 Persians.

Granada (Spain) 1492

Spanish Reconquista lasts from 800 to 1492. Defeat of the Moors under Abu Abd Allah Mohammed XI (Boabdil) King of Granada by forces of King Ferdinand of Aragon and Queen Isabella of Castile is hailed throughout Christendom. After 600 years of bitter fighting, why would the Spanish be kinder to the Native Americans they encountered after having the confidence to pay Columbus for his voyages?

Hastings (England) 1066

A favorite battle for Anglophiles and those who love them. Saxons under Harold beat the Norwegians under Harald Hardrada and in turn the next day lose to the Normans under William, later known as "The Conqueror." Day-long (9am until 3pm) battle has the English in better position but the Normans attack again and again, prevailing when Harold is finally hit in the eye with an arrow. Not very important in the history of warfare, but the English love it to death. Most important lesson? Those defeated Saxon lords who immediately knelt and acknowledged William as their liege lord kept their lands. Those who refused or did so only later lost theirs. Lesson? Know when to hold and know when to fold. Done 2001.

Hattin (Palestine) 1187

Saladin ousts the Christian crusaders from Jerusalem by separating the Christian cavalry from its infantry as they walked into a wellplanned trap. After liberating Jerusalem, Saladin then followed up with victories over the remaining crusader states of Tiberius, Acre and Ascalon until only Tyre remained in Frankish hands. Arabs, sometimes seemingly desperate for heroes, claim him as one of their own although he was in fact, a Kurd. Much more than a pure military leader, Saladin was the epitome of chivalry when few of the crusaders were chivalric in word, thought or deed during their crusades. The Franks were perhaps individually superior fighters but their leadership often left something to be desired. Hattin was definitely one of those times. Done in 2016.

Hsupeng, (also known as the Haihai Campaign) (China) 1948-1949

Decisive cauldron battle of the Chinese Civil War. The Communists, led by the East China Field Army, eventually surrounded 8 Kuomintang armies near Xuzhou, the gateway to Nanking. The huge set-piece battle which followed resulted in a crushing KMT defeat. Also, U.S. lost all faith in Chiang Kai-shek's ability to stave off the communists and withheld American aid. Chiang fled to Formosa (Taiwan) soon thereafter. Done 2010.

Irish Rebellion and Civil War (Ireland) 1916-1923

From the Easter Rising of 1916 through the rebellion, establishment of the Irish Free State and the Irish civil war of 1922-1923, the events provide an excellent examination of insurgency and counter-insurgency as well as the juxtaposition of insurgents who become successful counter-insurgents after attaining independence. Also, an illuminating study of the use of torture and assassination by both sides in both conflicts. Done in 2013.

Isandlwana (Zululand) 1879

One of my all-time favorite battles since the Zulus, using iron discipline and great strategy, brought the British one of their rare and worst colonial defeats. Cetshwayo and the Zulu impis followed on the nation-building and military revolution of Chaka with skill and dispatch. Like the Battle of the Little Big Horn in Montana three years earlier in 1876, Mars smiled upon warriors with less advanced technology. Ironically in both cases, these huge victories were never followed up by the winners. Shows the importance and efficacy of sustained ruthlessness which the British had and the Zulus did not and which the US Army had and the Cheyenne and Sioux did not. Done in 2004 and again in 2006.

Jhelum (Hydaspes) 326 BC

Alexander the Great meets Indian King Porus at the gateway to the Punjab. This battle (named for the river crossed) is still studied at West Point as the basis for the modern design of an attack of a river line. Greeks discovered the solution to highly feared war elephants (letting them rush past), and later adopted them as part of their own forces. Although the Greeks won, Alexander's troops refused to go farther into the Indian subcontinent. Done in 2005.

Kadesh (Levant) 1274 BC

Egyptians under Ramesses II try to expand north into Syria. Hittites under Muwatallis fight them to a standstill. This was therefore a strategic victory for the Hittites although the Egyptian records suggest otherwise. One of the earliest battles with useable historical records. Also useful to show that a draw can also explain the Template of Mars and the malleability of history. In addition, Kadesh shows the large, pitched battles with infantry and chariots aiming at a decisive victory predate by at least 600 years the claims of Victor Hansen and others that Greek 6th century warriors began that tradition. Done in 2007.

Khalkin Gol (also known as Nomonhan) (Mongolia) 1939

Crushing Soviet victory over the Japanese on the border between Manchuria and Outer Mongolia. Biggest defeat ever of a modern Japanese army up to that point in time, and led them to conclude they shouldn't attack Soviet Union during World War II, thus freeing up Soviet divisions for use against Germany where they were decisive in the battle of Stalingrad. Also led Japan to project power south and east into confrontation with the United States. General Georgi Zhukov made his name in this double envelopment. Perhaps one of the most important battles of the 20th century in terms of leading to a different World War II than would probably have taken place without it. Done in 2001, 2004 and 2005.

Leipzig (Saxony) 1813

Four day long "Battle of the Nations" (October 16-19), during which the Prussians are on the northwest, Russians and Austrians on the south, Swedes move in from east, surrounding the French army under Napoleon until the Saxons deserted. Napoleon retreats in the manner of Moscow. He escapes but leaves behind 60,000 causalities and many prisoners. Napoleon then would foolishly refuse the allies' offer of peace with the Rhine as France's frontier. In response the Allies would cross the Rhine and enter Paris in March of 1814 forcing him to abdicate.

Lepanto Gulf (off Greece) 1571

Ottoman Turks on the ascendancy, fight against Holy League of Spain, Venice and the Papacy. Austrian Don John versus Ali Pasha. Huge losses on both sides, Turks lose far more ships however, and it is hard to replace professional archers. As a result Turkish expansion stopped, at least for a time. War galleys of the Venetians had more firepower. Massive Ottoman Turk casualties. Note: in the first battle of Lepanto in 1499, the Ottomans won, driving the Venetians back from this key trading and staging port, but that time the Ottomans projected power by land as well as sea. Last done in 2002.

Leuthen (Silesia) 1757

Often regarded as Frederick the Great's greatest battle. Certainly it shows him at the top of his form with discipline, mobile firepower, deceptions and crucial mid-battle adjustments. Had a lot of help from the ineptness of Prince Charles Alexander however. Significance of the battle was it gave the Prussian state a firm foundation for survival (including the earlier captured Silesia) and going forward. Done in 2013.

Liegnitz (Poland) 1241

Huge Mongol victory over Henry the Pious of Silesia by the Mongols under Subotai. Regarded by Poles as major triumph because the Mongols soon retreated; but in fact their movement back to Asia was simply in response to the death of the Great Khan Ogadei and had nothing to do with the battle whatsoever. Genghis Khan's best general, Subotai, led and planned the attack which was a crushing defeat for the Europeans and showed the vulnerability of European heavy horse formations to lighter, more mobile and agile Mongol formations. B.H. Liddel Hart rightly saw a connection between the subsequent development of blitzkrieg and the much earlier Mongol "fire and movement" strategy. Note: two reasons Mongols never returned to Europe in large numbers were dynastic feuding AND a sense that Europe was impoverished and not a lucrative a target as those in Asia and the Middle East. Last done in 2017.

Little Big Horn (Montana) 1876

The most over-studied and one of the least important battles in the American firmament. A battle utterly without military import and a shining example of how not to fight a battle (by General George Custer and the 7th Cavalry) and how not to follow up on a battlefield success (by the Lakota, Blackfeet, Cheyenne, Ogallala and their allies led by Sitting Bull and Crazy Horse). Allowed as a topic only as a perfect example of the axiom, "Nothing fails like success." As in the later Battle of Isandlwana in 1879 in Zululand, Mars briefly smiled upon the winners who then failed to follow up on their overwhelming victory. Done in 2004.

Manzikert (Turkey) 1071

Note this battle is a contemporary with the Battle of Hastings, 1066. Here the Seljuk Turks under Alp Arsian are on the ascendancy and defeat the Byzantine Empire (which stretched from the head of the Adriatic Sea to the eastern edge of the Black Sea) led by Emperor Romanus with substantial results. First, the Seljuks depopulated much of eastern Anatolia so it could be used for the grazing of their horses and in the process denied the Byzantines not only tax revenues, but important military recruiting opportunities. From this point on, the Seljuks were to form something like a national identity in the region as well as overrunning 30,000 square miles of Asia Minor. The truncated version of Byzantium would, 25 years later, call for help from the West, leading to the first crusade (and later, during the Fourth Crusade, a devastating sack of Constantinople by the crusaders themselves. Last done in 2016.

Marathon (Greece) 490 BCE

Edward Creasy makes his case that this is the most important battle in determining whether Greece, and hence Europe, would remain free from "Oriental despotism." Persians with 60,000 attack the Greeks, 10,000 Athenians and 1000 Plataeans (with Spartans coming). Huge victory 20 miles north of Athens. Done in 2002 and again in 2005.

Marj Dabiq (Syria) 1516

Game changing battle in that 250 years of Mamluk ascendancy in the region was challenged by the Ottoman Turks. Use of firearms by the Ottomans the key turning point as Syria, Arabia and subsequently, Egypt came under their control, the former for 400 years until World War I when the Ottomans allied themselves with the Germans. Ottoman cannons and harquebuses were decisive.

Marne (France) 1914

Holger Herwig goes as far as to declare that this was the most important battle of the 20th century since it prevented a Germanic takeover of France and Europe during the first few months of World War I. As the German armies pressed on toward Paris, General Joseph Joffre rallied the French people and efficiently moved three army corps from his right wing to his left to deny the Germans victory. 980,000 French and 100,000 British with 3,000 guns assaulted 750,000 Germans with 3,300 guns. The resulting stalemate led to the "monotonous mutual mass murder" of trench warfare which all told cost the British 3.5 million casualties, France 6 million and Germany 7 million.

Meuse-Argonne (France) 1918

One of the largest American battles of all time (Battle of the Bulge in World War II is larger in terms of total U.S. troops involved) and one of the most costly with 26,000 killed (compared with 12,000 at Okinawa) and 96,000 wounded as fresh U.S. troops join the French in driving back the Germans and ending the war. Unfortunately the country was not prepared for World War I. It paid a heavy price and then forgot all the lessons of Meuse-Argonne prior to World War II. Good example of a bloody battle whose lessons were disregarded by subsequent strategists.

Mohacs (Hungary) 1526

Battle between Hungarians and Suleiman the Magnificent, the Ottoman Emperor. Turks win a huge victory. But in 1687 after the battle of Lepanto Gulf, Charles of Lorraine and Louis of Baden drive Turks beyond the Danube. Kept the Turks out of central Europe.

Mohi (sometimes Sajo River) (Hungary) 1241

Batu Khan and Sobutai's Mongols versus the Hungarians under Bela IV. Huge victory for the Mongols so far from home. Victorious Subotai had designs on Vienna; but the death of Ogatai, the son and successor of Genghis Khan, required the recall of the Mongol forces. But when Mongols get back and chose a new Khan, they decide Europe is not worth a revisit in terms of loot. "Too little, too far from home." Focus on China and Middle East where riches abound. Europe dodges a bullet but never know why – until now. Done in 2017.

Nagashino (Japan) 1575

First use of extensive use of firearms *and* volley fire (as well a wooden stockades) destroys the army of the powerful Takeda clan and the resulting uproar among the Samurai of Japan eventually outlaws gunpowder weapons. Subject of brilliant film, *Kagemusha* by Japanese filmmaker Akira Kurosawa. Last done in 1996.

Nicopolis (Bulgaria) 1396

Often called the "Last Crusade," but it shows French knights in the same light as Crecy and Poitiers: headstrong, vainglorious and, in the politically incorrect modern parlance, "stupid." Over-proud French and European knights were smashed by the Ottoman Turks, who might have eventually conquered much of Europe had they worshiped Mars more than they did and followed all of his dictates.

Panipat (India) 1526 and 1556

Zahir-ud-Din Mohammed (Babur the Tiger) of the Timurid dynasty (1483-1530) won the first battle of Panipat and Akbar the Great (1556-1605) the second. These two victories led to the Mongol takeover of Delhi sultanate which included much of present day India and would last for three centuries. The Mughal (the Persian word for Mongol) rule of the Delhi sultanate lasted until Bahadur Shah II, the last Mughal emperor, was deposed in 1858, bringing India under the direct rule of the British Crown. First Panipat (1526) was another outstanding example of the double envelopment strategy. Highly mobile Mongol cavalry defeated Sultan Ibrahim's more static Afghani forces (although Babur used artillery and field fortifications to channel Indian attacks and scare their elephants). Mongol cavalry more effective than Indian as well. Major in-thrust of Islam would eventually lead to the bifurcation of the Indian subcontinent. Last done in 2009. Panipat II (1556) and Panipat III (1761) followed with the Marathas being defeated in the latter. Shows how important a gateway to the Indian subcontinent the area was for such a long time.

Pavia (Italy) 1525

One of the first battles to demonstrate the value of massed gunfire when combined with pikemen (to keep the heavy cavalry at bay). Spanish harquebusiers gunned down the French cavalry and captured the French King Francis I and established the Hapsburg dynasty of Charles V as a dominant force in Europe. The "gunpowder revolution" was actually an infantry-discipline-pikemen (later bayonet) revolution.

Philippi (Greece) 42 BCE

Some have seen this as a battle between those favoring a Republic for Rome (Brutus and Cassius) and those favoring an Imperial form of government (Antony and Octavian) while other have seen it as a simple civil war between those who assassinated Julius Caesar and those who wanted to revenge his death. There were actually two battles, one in October and another in November. In the first, Cassius, thinking the Republican army had been defeated, committed suicide, leaving Brutus, who had driven Octavian from the field alone. In the second, Antony led the Triumvirate (which included Lepidus) to victory. Brutus then committed suicide. Did this battle fatally doom the Roman Republic or was it already mortally wounded by the previous actions of Julius Caesar? Inquiring minds may wish to know the answer.

Plassey (India) 1757

The much-celebrated Colonel Robert Clive of the British East India Company, together with his Indian sepoys, defeat the French and forces of the Nawab of Bengal, Siraj-ud-daula, to establish British hegemony during the Seven Years War, a truly global conflict. Failure of the Indians to provide a united front enables Clive to emerge victorious. Done in 2009.

Platea (Greece) 479 BCE

Although less celebrated than the Greek-Persian battles of Marathon, Thermopylae and Salamis, Platea, that great land battle in Boeotia, was the final defeat for the Persians under Xerxes and kept Greece free from Persian domination. Very important. As so often happened in hoplite warfare, once the phalanx broke, slaughter ensued. Of the 100,000 Persians engaged that day (plus 50,000 Greek allies), only 43,000 survived according to Herodotus.

Puebla (Mexico) 1861

This is the battle which is celebrated as "Cinco de Mayo" although many think Cinco de Mayo celebrates Mexican Independence Day (which is actually celebrated September 16). In the battle of Puebla, the Mexicans under General Ignacio Zaragoza defeated the French occupation forces. Done in 2007.

Pydna (Greece) 168 BCE

Important Roman victory over the Macedonians in the Third Macedonian War, one battle which demonstrated the superiority of the maniple legion formation over the older Greek form the phalanx. Huge Macedonian losses show how once the phalanx broke down, its troops were open to massacre. Done 2009.

Red Cliffs (China) 208 CE

Of the thousands and thousands of battles fought by the Chinese over the millennia, why study this one? With the Han dynasty in decline, a three corner struggle among the Shu, the Wu and the Wei saw the rise of the Wei warlord Cao Cao who brought a huge fleet and army down the Yangtze only to be defeated by an alliance of the Wu and the Shu who used surprise and fire boats to defeat Cao Cao. This battle is still studied at various war colleges around the world.

73 Easting (Iraq) 1991

The last great tank battle of the 20th century and one of the most one sided in the first Gulf War, the liberation of Kuwait after the Iraqi invasion of 1990. A 90 minute battle in which the U.S. 2nd Division lost 1 Bradley fighting vehicle and the Iraqi Tawakalna Republican Division and other units lost 1000 men and 150 vehicles of all types. Shows the power of discipline and technology as the M1A1 Abrams tank with superior thermal sights and fire on the run capabilities proved its worth over the Soviet T-72. However, battle was not followed up by the overthrow of Sadam Hussein, so the war was not the last between the U.S. and his regime. Good example of *Auftragstaktik* on a grand scale. Ironically this battle could only have taken place after the end of the Cold War and because Sadam Hussein gave the United States six months to move its heavy armored divisions from Germany to Saudi Arabia. It could only have come out the way it did, however, because the U.S. armored forces had been practicing for 40 years on the plains of Germany. This battle is best viewed as a microcosm of the entire VII Corps maneuver effort. Last done 2013.

Siping (Suh-ping) (Manchuria) 1946

The Second Battle of Siping, April 1946 is often cited as a potentially decisive battle (by both Mao and Chiang and others) in that the Nationalist defeated Lin Bao and the Communists but were prevented by the American brokered cease fire from taking full advantage of it and destroying the Communists in the great northeast province. However, this seems unlikely given the overall superior generalship of Lin Bao and his commitment to abandon mobile warfare whenever pressed. Still, a most interesting debate.

The Somme (France) 1916

One of the most incredible battles of all time. From July 1 to Nov 18, 1916 the British and French attacked German positions "at the walk"

and were slaughtered – day after day after day after day. Total casualties were 1.2 million on both sides. Shows an incredibly inept strategy and WestWar futility. Also illustrates Clausewitz's principle of the "primacy of the defense." In fact during World War I, virtually all the major battles were won by the defense. Done 2001.

Stalingrad (Russia) 1942-1943

The turning point in the war on the Eastern Front between Germany and the Soviet Union. Several million soldiers involved and German Sixth Army destroyed. Done 2014. Because this battle is usually studied every year in Government 3600, its use in this course is discouraged.

Sterling Bridge (Scotland) 1287

A minor battle to all but the Scots and those interested in "heavy horse" defeats. One of the few times in 1000 years "heavy horse" cavalry was defeated by infantry. William Wallace and Andrew Moray defeated a much larger English force under John de Warenne. English knights came two and three abreast across a narrow bridge and were wiped out on the other side. The Scots, true to the savagery of the era, skinned some of the English knights and gave their soldiers pieces of the fallen warriors' flesh to commemorate the battle. As usual, however, England lost the battle but won the war later at the Battle of Falkirk in 1298 when King Edward of England returned from France.

Suomussalmi (Finland) 1939-1940

Classic guerilla-style engagement on the shores of Lake Kiantajarvi in which the outnumbered and outgunned Finns defeated a much larger Soviet force during "The Winter War" destroying the Soviet 163rd Division using tactics which are still studied today. A huge Finnish victory later somewhat subsumed by their alliance with Germany in the subsequent "Continuation War" which the USSR won. Finland was very lucky that Stalin was so interested in Soviet gains in Eastern Europe that he let the Finns off the hook of defeat following World War II. Group pointed out importance of "*motti*" (or chopping) tactic of the Finns and also their "*sisu*" (fortitude or strength of will). Done in 2013.

Syracuse (Sicily) 413 BC

Edward Creasy calls this the most important battle in determining whether Rome would be "stillborn" and Western Europe Greekspeaking. Athenian fleet goes to Sicily and loses in siege of Syracuse. Eventually they lose the Peloponnesian war and even more eventually, Rome rises in Italy to become dominant and eventually subdues all of Greece.

Tannenberg (East Prussia) 1914

Huge victory for Germans during World War I, defeating the Russian First and Second Armies, featuring rapid troop movements by rail (Germans much better at this than Russians). 130 battalions of Germans plus 774 guns defeat *ad seriatim* 480 Russian battalions with 5800 guns. This victory in East Prussia enabled the Germans to shift other armies to the Western Front, contributing to the stalemate there and to follow up by attacking the defeated First Russian army again at Masurian Lakes, driving the Russians off German soil until the end of World War II, thirty years later. One enormous impact of this battle was to give the German military a false sense of their "permanent superiority," a hubris which would cost them dearly during Operation Barbarossa in 1941.

Tet (Vietnam) 1968

A smashing military victory for the Americans and South Vietnamese. The North Vietnamese and Viet Cong suffered their biggest casualties of the war, and the Viet Cong never really recovered from their losses. But at the same time, even more importantly in Clausewitzian terms, Tet was a huge political and strategic victory for the NVA. From then on, U.S. support of the war waned and the U.S. would eventually withdraw in disgrace. The Battle of Hue is perhaps best segment of the Tet Offensive to study. Classic case of tactic of Maskirovka. Mark Bowden says that Hue was the biggest battle of the war (but the campaign for Khe San, see above, probably cost more lives). Last done in 2001. Hard to do in a single presentation, however.

Teutoberg Forest (Germany) 9 AD

Arminius the German defeats three Roman legions (14,000 infantry and 800 horsemen) under Varus. Roman discipline and order break down. "Mercy to a fallen foe had never been a Roman virtue" and now the favor was returned. As a result, Augustus gives up plans to conquer German tribes beyond the Rhine, reversing the previous Roman pattern of sometimes losing a battle, but then returning to crush the enemy and occupy their homeland. Edward Creasy and others believe this victory preserved German independence and kept Rome effectively south of the Rhine until the 5th century when the Germans tribes themselves came south to fight Rome. By failing to subdue the Germans at this point, the Romans would make for divided Europe running through the 20th century if not beyond. The Template would recognize the "receptivity to innovation" portion as represented by Arminius who trained with the Romans and studied their tactics and strategy. Also led to Saxon power in England. Last done in 2010.

Terain I and II (India) 1191-1192

Ongoing clashes between Hindu Rajputs and Muslim Ghaznavids, later Ghurids, in the territory where present day Pakistan, India and Afghanistan meet. The Ghurids are defeated in 1191 and Muhammad Ghauri is captured, but Prithviraj releases him (Template of Mars shudders at this lack of sustained ruthlessness) and he returns with 120,000 warriors (versus 300,000) Indian soldiers. Much better battlefield management by Ghauri in 1192 as mobile archers on horseback defeat both war elephants and spear and pike armed infantry, and he is successful, killing Prithviraj and taking over northern India. Victory precedes the rise of Delhi Sultanate, a forerunner of the Mughal Empire which would last until the arrival of the British in the 19th century. The "Turks" enjoyed an advantage in iron stirrups, composite and cross bows, better discipline and tactics, all of which overcame Rajput big advantages in numbers, quality of swords and personal bravery. Done in 2012.

Tours (France) 732

The turning back of the Arabs under Abden Rahman by Franks under Charles Martel. Europe on the defensive for 700 more years but Moslems never again mount a serious campaign of conquest north of the Pyrenees! Lack of discipline and order among the Saracens was a critical factor as they had brought with them their families, tons of loot and thousands of civilians. Martel's grandson was Charlemagne who consolidates his empire 768 to 814. On his death, France is finally separated from Germany and Italy. Last done in 2002.

The Trench (Saudi Arabia) 627

A small battle (with only 9 confirmed dead), but a battle for survival for Muhammad. Following victory at Badr (624) and defeat at Uhud (624), the death of the Prophet and the destructions of his small army might well have resulted the destruction of Islam itself. The tribes of Mecca come to Medina to destroy the upstart Muhammad and the Moslems, but are thwarted by the reportedly first trench ever used in Arab warfare (an idea taken from the Persians), but are defeated and Muhammad, the warrior prophet, would go on to take Mecca itself and lead his religion to great martial and religious glory. Last done in 2017.

Tricameron (Tunisia) 533

Reassertion of Roman (albeit Eastern or Byzantine) power in North Africa as Justinian sends Belisarius to defeat the Vandals and drive them from North Africa. This enables Constantinople to reengage in Italy and Belisarius eventually takes Sicily and Italy. The Vandals make a poor showing of things and flee from their defeat before it really is a defeat. Byzantium regains grain and taxes as well as territories. Belisarius would go on to reconquer Italy and Dalmatia as well. Done in 2013.

Tsushima Strait (Between Korea and Japan) 1905

During Russo-Japanese War, as Japan is besieging Port Arthur in 1904, the Russians send their Baltic fleet all the way around the world only to have it destroyed by the Japanese in a single day battle in Tsushima Strait. In any case, Port Arthur had fallen before the fleet arrived. Japanese Admiral Togo tries and nearly "caps the t" but with brilliant maneuvering and iron discipline destroys the Russia fleet along with 10,000 of its sailors. Tsushima is the greatest naval battle of annihilation since Trafalgar and sets the stage for further Japanese expansion, first into Manchuria, China and Mongolia and then into the far Pacific against the US, France and Great Britain.

Ironically, nothing fails like success because Admiral Togo, imitating Admiral Mahan, believed that the center of gravity of his opponents ("the principle objective") was the fleet and in the case of the Russo-Japanese war, that notion turned out to be close enough; but when subsequent Japanese strategists made the same assumption about the American Pacific fleet at Pearl Harbor, the opposite turned out to be true proving that sometimes "Nothing fails like success." Done in 2004 and again in 2006.

Yarmouk (Syria) 636

This six day battle marks the beginning of Islam's rise under a second generation Muslim fighters and Caliph Umar. Byzantium under Vahan is defeated by Rashidun Caliphate Arabs under Khalid Ibn al Walid near what is now known as the Golan Heights. Previously al Walid had been successful against the Sassanians in Iraq. Before this battle, the entire area had been Greco-Roman in culture and Christian in religion; after it, it remained Arab and Moslem for over 1000 years. After Yarmouk, the Rashiduns went after the Sassanians in Persia in a big way, winning at the battle of as-Qadisiyyah in the same year. Done in 2017.

Zama (Carthage) 202 BCE

Scipio defeats Hannibal by adopting his tactics and important use of cavalry. Signals the end of Second Punic War and the beginning of Roman domination of the entire Mediterranean basin. This in turn sets the stage for first Roman Empire and then the spread of Christianity after 313. Done in 2000 and again in 2007.

Possible Future Battle Portals:

Some Overlooked Battles and Leaders of Note

This is a place to start but not necessarily to finish. Questions to be asked before selecting a particular battle, war or element:

(1) Did this battle change the course of history by enabling one people to gain control over another for a long period of time?

(2) Did this battle, war or element show great and significant change in the history of warcraft? Did it herald a revolution in the way war was conducted from then on?

(3) Did this battle, war or element have significance beyond the lives of the participants; did it come to symbolize something enduring?

(4) Remember that the professor does not know everything about all battles in history and he is anxious to learn about new battles and their impact on their societies, their governments and the interstate system of their times.

(5) There is a premium placed on analysis of non-Eurocentric battles and their ripple effect.

Note: It is important that all students review the section on "Battles as Portals" in "Understanding War" handout.

Some Possible Choices for This Semester

**** Angora (Ankara) (Turkey) 1402

Temur's (or Tamerlane's) massive victory over the Sultan Bayazid resulted when two huge armies of 200,000 men clashed in this battle of Moslem conquerors in what is now Turkey. One army was Tartar, the other Ottoman Turk. Temur's victory checked and almost destroyed, but ultimately did not reverse the eventual rise of the Ottomans whose empire would later reach its zenith under Suleiman the Magnificent (1520-1566). Temur would die three years later attempting to conquer China. He had been as successful as conqueror as Genghis Khan and Alexander the Great and their equal in ferocity.

**** Badr (Saudi Arabia) 624

An extremely influential battle with reverberations lasting until the present. Muhammad and his few Muslims with their new monotheism come from Medina and face a much larger force of Quraysh polytheists from Mecca. Good tactics, superior will and discipline and good battlefield management provide a victory for Muhammad and his small band of followers. Would Islam have been stillborn if he had been killed in the clash? Most probably. As it was, the victory against such tremendous odds was subsequently viewed as proving divine intervention on the side of the Muslims. One additional dimension to Muhammad's war making genius was the melding of jihad and a reward of eternal life, making it a positive value (and thereby greatly enhancing the will of its adherents) when fighting for Islam. Christianity took over 300 years to go that route. A note of caution, as Tom Holland points out in his In the Shadow of the Sword, "...with a single exception, we have no extant descriptions of the Battle of Badr that date from before the ninth century AD."

**** The Bridge (Iraq) 634

Savage defeat of Muslims (led by Abu Ubaid) and their new Caliph Umar in what is now southern Iraq on the Euphrates. Only major battle won by the Sasanian Persians in their otherwise losing struggle with the rising power of the Muslims.

**** Milvian Bridge (Rome) 312

Constantine finds God just in time. One of the most important battles in the history of Christianity. After Milvian it went from submissive, passive religion to eventually a state sponsored, aggressive one. It is well worth the effort to study this battle, as it has a monumental significance and tremendous ramifications.

**** Sekigahara (Japan) 1600

Tokugawa's army wins and after 1603, runs Japan for 250 years. Many parallels with European Medieval warfare, especially the role of treachery and personal loyalty. Also very relevant for Afghanistan campaign in 2001 and what followed.

****Singapore (Malaya) 1942

What a disaster for the British, what a triumph for the Japanese. The "Gibraltar of the East" fell ignominiously in a matter of weeks. The 85,000 man Commonwealth force surrendered after only a few weeks of fighting. Churchill called it "the greatest disaster in British arms that our history records" and he played no small part in it, reinforcing the garrison with tens of thousands of Australian and other forces right before the debacle. It had a huge impact on much of Asia, as the British never recovered from their defeat postwar. The myth of European supremacy was smashed as well.

**** Stones River (Tennessee) January, 1863

Also known as the Second Battle of Murfreesborough, in terms of percentage of casualties, Stones River was the bloodiest battle of the American Civil War, the three day totals were greater than those at Antietam. A tactical draw--the South, under General Bragg, had to withdraw and the North, under Rosecrans, held the battlefield. **** <u>Talas</u> (Where Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan overlap) 751

Islamic Abbasid Caliphate expands from Baghdad and clashes with aggressive Tang (pronounced "Tong") dynasty from China, defeating them and defining the limits of Chinese power projection into central Asia. But the battle also limited Abbasid force projection even though Zihad ibn Salih defeats Gao Hsien-Chih. Changed the mixed religious area of the current "stans" into a Muslim world. Belongs with Tours and Vienna as de facto culminating points for further Muslim expansion however.

***** Uhud (Arabia) 624

Muhammad and his Arabs were defeated (versus Badr in 624 and The Trench in 627 where they won) by the Meccans. Differences? Why did Muhammad lose in Uhud but not the others? How did he recover? This is thus a very important portal into the then and the now. How did the faithful accept his defeats? How did Muhammed explain the failure of divine intervention? Angels were believed to have helped at Badr, and the Archangel Michael is believed to have helped at the Trench. Look at the triad of Badr (624), Uhud (624) and the Trench (627) for comparisons and contrasts.

Groups Can Also Make a Case For Studying:

Operation Bagration (Baltic through Belorussia) June-September, 1944 Huge struggle between Germany and the Soviet Union. Was this battle more important or as important as the Normandy campaign? The Russians think so. Good insights into Soviet "Fronts" strategy. Note comparative size of armies to those fighting in Normandy to get a hint of the answer.

Cerignola (Italy) 1503

First European battle won by gunpowder small arms. What took so long? Franco Spanish differing military styles are on display. This battle should be studied more than it is.

Cowpens (South Carolina) 1781

Was it a true turning point or even culminating point in the American Revolution? Southerners think it was more important than a lot of battles we New Englanders celebrate.

Dara (Turkey) 539

Byzantine fights off Sassanian Persian Empire during one of its many comebacks. This time under Belisarius. Excellent battle to study the arms and influence of the cataphracts and their similarities to and differences from European knights and their code (often ignored) of chivalry. Hunnic cavalry play major role for Byzantines.

Delhi (India) 1398

Timur and his Mongols defeat Sultan Mahmud Shah Taghlug and decimate Delhi so severely it didn't recover for over 100 years. Interesting example of military adaptation: Timur faced with 120 heavily armored elephants with poison tusks, he puts hay and wood on the backs of camels and sets them on fire driving them toward the Sultan's army. The elephants panic and slaughter ensues.

El Alamein (Egypt) 1942

The turn of the tide in North Africa with Rommel's Afrika Korps suffering 13,500 casualties to 20,000 for the Italians and Germans. There were actually *two battles* of El Alamein, however. What happened in each and what two elements provided the British with their biggest advantages? Let the Template be your guide.

Formigny (France) 1450

An Agincourt in reverse, this battle ended English rule in Normandy. France. What changed? Check out weapons, discipline, cohesion and will as independent variables. Why did the French succeed here after losing so many critical battles in the hundred years before? Answer these questions and you will know the answer.

Huertgen Forest (Germany) September-December 1944

Portal into U.S. dubious and costly "advance on line" strategy. Hemmingway called it "Passchendaele with Trees." The longest battle the U.S. fought during World War II and one of the most needless. An example of how not to fight a useless battle in a most terrible place. Apply the Template to see why it was so unnecessary.

Imphal (India) 1944

The largest defeat ever suffered by the Japanese army which suffered 55,000 casualties compared with 12,900 for the British and Commonwealth forces--running from March to July of 1944. Note the year when Japan was still on the offensive. Very little known in the U. S. about this battle. It was, according to Geoffrey Evans and Antony Brett-James, "The greatest defeat on land ever suffered by the Japanese in the course of their history" and an oddly inconsequential strategic effort by the Japanese.

Lechfield (Bavaria) 955

The Germans under Otto I The Great defeat the Hungarians under their military leader (*harka*) Bulscu and begin the process of holding the Hungarians out of the rest of Europe. Interesting note would be to fast forward as to how the Hungarians became co-rulers of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire in the 19th century, with disastrous consequences for that empire in World War I (although the Austrian rulers themselves were largely to blame). The Hungarians were from a long line of steppe nomads who spilled out of the Eurasian grasslands into Europe, the Middle East, Persia, India and China over thousands of years of history.

Mycale (Turkey) 429 BCE

Two Persian armies destroyed by the Greeks and a third has to return to its home base. Is it more important than Platea? Are the differences and outcomes due to more than poor generalship/leadership?

The Peasant Revolt of 1381 (England)

A fascinating study of an almost spontaneous insurgency and its quick suppression after nearly succeeding.

Sadowa (Austria) 1866

Prussia versus Austria 1866. Would World War I have been avoided if Prussia had been defeated? Or would it have been triggered by Russian expansion into the Balkans (and the Ottoman and Austrian empires) anyway? Why didn't Austria learn the important military lessons from the battle? These unlearned lessons would come back and haunt them during World War I in their battles against Serbia and Russia. This battle led to the unification of Germany which was not necessarily a good thing for European peace.

Shiloh (Mississippi) 1862

Was this the battle that made General Grant the type of general whose strategy won the war for the North, and therefore made this battle as important as Vicksburg and Gettysburg? You investigate, you decide. Great portal into how battles decide leaders and leadership as well as vice versa. Shiloh was a huge battle by any measure. Over 100,000 troops fought and over 24,000 would eventually be killed or wounded. This level of casualties exceeded the American totals for the Revolutionary War, the War of 1812 and the Mexican War (<u>With Lincoln in the White House</u>, p.69) and showed that over time, the Civil War would be decided by attrition and in that regard, the Union would have an advantage if it maintained its will.

Tianjin (China) 1905

A critical Chinese "Boxer" Rebellion turning point. Put the Boxer Rebellion in historical perspective with other rebellions. Why did it fail? Have the Template tell you.

Tsaritsyn (Russia) 1919-1920

Climatic battle of the Russian Civil War on the Southern (White Generals Wrangle and Denikin) front as the Whites are marching on Moscow. Red Generals Stalin and Trotsky play important roles in this struggle on the Volga. The British Air Force supports Whites, albeit ineffectively. Major battle deciding the eventual success of the Reds in the war.

Yarmouk (Syria) 636

The Arab forces of the Rashidun Caliphate under Khalid ibn al-Walid defeat forces of Byzantium after driving the Sanassan Persians out of Iraq. Huge "out of theatre" victory for Arabs. Strong small unit cohesion and zeal triumph. Last done 2017.

War Terms

Listed here are a number of terms and phrases which help us to understand both the lexicon of war and its concomitant applications in various situations. Obviously there are many more terms which could be included, but these represent a good starting place for one's examination of the phenomena associated with war.

<u>Anabasis</u> – A difficult inland advance or retreat by an army. Sherman's march to the sea was an anabasis as was the retreat of the Eighth Army in Korea during November and December of 1950. Xenophon, a commander of "The Ten Thousand" wrote an epic narrative about his army's anabasis into and from the heart of Persia in the 4th century BCE.

Note: Parallels between this action so long ago and the American thrust to Baghdad in 2003 are quite amazing and show the persistence of military forms and processes.

<u>Assault</u> – A combination of fire and movement, culminating in an attempt to capture a position by troops pressing to close quarters.

<u>Assassin's Mace</u> (*Shashou Jiang*) – Any weapon which is very cost effective and can be used suddenly to render an opponent (and his or her more expensive weapons or advantage) helpless. The Chinese believe that their Dong 21 ram jet cruise missile, for example, which costs a few hundred thousand dollars apiece, could destroy a half billion dollar aircraft carrier.

<u>Auftragstaktik</u> (Auf Traags Tak Teek) – German term referring to the philosophy of allowing junior officers independence and scope in action after they have been given assignments. Copied by US in early years of the 21st century and manifest most clearly in the 2003 drive on Baghdad. Hard to say, but priceless as an asset for an army. Remains at the heart of many successful armies throughout history, and is invaluable in both

insurgencies and counter-insurgencies. Good example: in the film Gettysburg, Colonel Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain is told to hold Little Round Top at all costs. But his superior officers do not tell him how to do it so he has flexibility in the tactics he uses, such as his defensive alignment, oblique maneuver ("the gate hinge") and eventual bayonet charge. Or, as General George Patton put it in <u>War as I Knew It</u>, "There is no approved solution to any tactical situation."

<u>Battle of Encounter</u> – Battle which develops by the actions of the troops engaged rather than by orders received from the commander. For example, on the first day of Gettysburg, July 2, 1863, General Lee was quite exasperated when he heard gunfire in the distance, "Who are those people firing? I have told them not to fire until we are all up." Likewise, at the Battle of Cynoscephalae in 197 BCE, the Greek and Roman armies wandered about for three days before stumbling upon each other.

<u>Blitzkrieg</u> – Special type of coordinated offensive or "lightning war," where the aim is to disrupt, destroy, dislodge, disconnect, and break up your opponents centers of gravity. Aims to destroy the enemy's will to resist by hitting the enemy with overwhelming strength at certain important points, and just "hold the rest in place." Relies on combined arms and careful coordination. Part of a long Prussian/German tradition of *Bewegungkrieg* ("War of Movement") in contrast to that of *Stellungkrieg* ("Static War of Position").

Note: Germans in 1940 had fewer tanks, fewer planes and fewer artillery pieces then their opponents but massed them for striking, while using much smaller forces to tie down the Maginot Line presence of the French. Blitzkrieg is much closer to Clausewitz than any war of attrition. See for example, Plan *Sichelschnitt* ("Cut of the Sickle"), the German code name for offensive against France, Belgium and Holland, the old von Schlieffen plan updated by Erich von Manstein, Chief of Staff, Army Group A.

"Lightning war" had five key dimensions:

(1) Panzer spearhead, massed armor supported by motorized infantry on motorcycles and in half-tracks. Need to invest in new technologies and upgrade tanks,

(2) True motorized infantry to follow up and exploit holes in the defense,

(3) Close air support, the Germans used JU 87's (Stukas) and ME 109's for close air support,

(4) Training needed to coordinate,

(5) Technology needed to coordinate (first radios, now GPS).

Note: France prepared for World War II by mostly preparing for World War I, with its Maginot line, pill boxes and the trauma of Verdun, while Germans prepared for World War II stimulated in part by the trauma of Verdun as well but drew different conclusions. Battle of Verdun from February 1916 for the next 10 months, one of the bloodiest battles in history, tens of thousands of soldiers died for every yard gained with causalities so heavy that trenches could not be dug because the corpses lay in layers (Charles Williams, <u>The Last Great Frenchman</u>, NY: John Wiley, 1993).

<u>Brevet</u> – A military promotion without concomitant pay raise as in "After Shiloh, he was made a brevet brigadier general."

<u>Cataphracts</u> – Heavily armed cavalry in which the horse (small head, muscular body, short thick legs) and rider are both covered with mail armor. Beginning with the Assyrians, Chorasmians, Parthians, Sarmatians, Sassanians and the Chinese, this form of horseman was only extensively added to the Roman and Byzantine war array by the 3rd and

4th centuries CE, but would later become the backbone of medieval warfare known as "European heavy horse."

"<u>Cauldron" Battles</u> – Victory by encirclement, a prominent feature of World War II, especially on the Eastern Front where whole armies were surrounded as at Stalingrad, "stuck in a cauldron." In 1941 it was the Russians who were put in a cauldron, in 1943, the Germans.

<u>Center of Gravity</u> – Clausewitzian term to designate the source (or sources) from which the enemy derives his war making power and which should be the aim of any attack to destroy the enemy's will. In the American Civil War, for example, Karl Marx thought the center of gravity was Georgia. "With the loss of Georgia, the Confederacy would be cut into two sections which would have lost all connection with each other."

Note: In Desert Storm, the Republican Guards in Kuwait and Southern Iraq were regarded as the center of gravity for the Iraqis along with the person of Saddam Hussein. The multiplicity of centers of gravity among the radical Salafists represents one of their major strengths.

Note: In the American Civil War, both sides were not clear for a long time which was the other side's center of gravity with the Union in particular focusing on Richmond rather than the Army of Northern Virginia (which became the recognized center of gravity by General U. S. Grant after the Battle of Gettysburg in 1863).

"<u>C4ISR</u>" – The new doctrine since the U.S. victory in Afghanistan in 2001 indicating the importance of "network-centric warfare." Command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance are the new key words.

<u>Chevauchee</u> (*Estrada*) – French term (Spanish term) for the medieval practice of laying waste to the countryside by a hostile army as a way to force your opponent to do battle. English kings favored this method

during the Hundred Years War as did those challenging and those trying to maintain the French political center. One could argue that Sherman's march to the sea and through the Carolinas during the American Civil War was a continuation of that tradition.

"<u>Cherry/Ice</u>" – Vital designation for a "hot" or dangerous Landing Zone (LZ) or "cold" or relatively safe LZ. Ever since the first true Air Mobile battle in the Ia Drang valley of Vietnam in 1965, the judgment about whether an LZ is "cherry or ice" is a matter of critical importance. As seen in the film "Black Hawk Down," there are degrees of "cherry."

<u>Choreography</u> – Combat has movement and interaction, with choreography for various battle situations. The unit that choreographs their actions best has the best change of prevailing in a firefight. Come under fire? Fire back, one man advance, then covers the next as he moves up. Successful choreography ALWAYS requires that a soldier does what is best for the unit, not what is best for him or herself. See also OODA loop.

<u>Close Attack</u> – To hit the enemy's front line directly.

<u>Collateral Damage</u> – Euphemistic term for civilian casualties or damage to civilian targets, i.e. aim for a telecommunications bunker, hit a mosque. World War II saw collateral damage as the point of saturation bombing (i.e. Warsaw, London, Berlin, Dresden, Hamburg, Coventry, Tokyo, Hiroshima, and Nagasaki).

Note: Throughout history, collateral damage has often <u>been the point</u> of air raids. Certainly they were the point of many German, Russian, American and Japanese air raids during World War II.

Note: Increasingly in late 20th and early 21st century warfare, certain leaders (such as Saddam Hussein and Al-Qaeda) put their forces in civilian areas, hid troops, equipment, facilities in hospitals, churches, mosques, residential areas in order to promote civilian casualties.

<u>Com</u> – Abbreviation for Command. U.S. military has divided the world into commands as follows:

NorthCom - North American region

SouthCom - South American region

EuCom – Europe

CentCom – Middle East plus Horn of Africa and Egypt, Sudan and the former Soviet "stans"

- PaCom Pacific area, plus India
- SoCom Special Operations regardless of location
- AfCom Sub-Saharan Africa.

<u>Combat Power</u> – The combination of (a) the number of one's forces and those of the enemy, (b) the relative defensive position of both, (c) the element of surprise and (d) the relative superior combat effectiveness (who is best trained for the battle beforehand). Clausewitz was the first to combine these elements so judiciously in assessing an army's overall strength.

<u>Command and Control</u> – A post World War II phrase which originated with the concerns over nuclear weapons and how to control them. Now used to refer to the process of commanding forces, i.e. telling them what to do and controlling those forces, i.e. making sure they do what you want and that they get their commands in a timely fashion.

Note: Lee's constant lament at Gettysburg was that his forces did not do what he wanted when he wanted them to. This was due in part to his leadership style and in part with the difficulties of his command and control processes.

<u>Counterterrorism Pursuit Teams</u> (CTPT) – CIA paramilitary units designed to operate beyond the jurisdiction – and SOP's – of the American military. Currently many hundreds are deployed in Syria, Iraq, Somalia and Afghanistan. <u>Crossing the T</u> – Sending one line of ships across the line of one's enemy so that the first line can use all of its guns broadside while the enemy can only use those of its guns pointing forward. Crossing the T was the goal of all admirals until the advent of the aircraft carrier, which made the tactic obsolete along with the battleship.

Note: At the battle of Jutland, the British Admiral John Jellico was able to cross the T of the German Grand Fleet, but only for a short time when his opponent, Admiral Reinhardt Scheer successfully used the best tactic for defeating the T, which is the "Battle about turn to starboard" (*Gefechtskehrtwendung nach Steuerbord*), in which each ship in the capped line simultaneously makes a 180 degree turn. His 22 ships disappeared into the murk of the North Sea and got away from the much stronger British fleet.

Note: This was magnificently done by the Japanese Admiral Togo against the Russians in the Battle of Tsushima Straits in 1905 and for the last time, most ironically, by the American Admiral Oldendorf in the 1944 Battle of Leyte Gulf against the Japanese led by Admiral Nishimura - ironically because since 1905 the Japanese had been looking forward to duplicating Togo's strategy for almost 40 years. The Battle of Leyte Gulf was the last battleship against battleship sea fight in naval history.

<u>Culminating Point</u> – The limit reached by an attacking force beyond which it is without power to continue or to defend itself in the face of determined enemy attack.

Note: Can have a culminating point for a battle, a theater of operations or a war, or all three.

Note: Examples include the Pusan perimeter during Korean War, the "Miracle of the Donets" in World War II during 1943, as well as battles between Montgomery and Rommel at El Alamein.

Damage – To hurt your opponent.

<u>Damage Assessment</u> – How to measure the damage you are doing to your opponent? How to measure the amount of damage you have done to your foe remains one of the most difficult aspects of war fighting.

Note: This remains one of the most difficult aspects to War fighting. See Kosovo, see Gulf War of 1991, and see also the U.S. war against the Taliban 2001in Afghanistan and Pakistan onward.

"<u>Dead Man Walking</u>" – A phenomenon described by many soldiers in many different wars throughout history. It features a huge rush of adrenalin which can go on for hours producing a calm center because the solider "knows" he or she is already dead so doesn't worry about dying but goes though combat in a "zone" or "trance. "Having said goodbye to the world, one is at peace in the middle of the raging battle. You are already dead so it doesn't matter if you get shot."

<u>Decimation</u> – The taking of one man out of every ten and killing him as punishment for the failure of an army unit. Practiced by various militaries, most famously by the Romans and the Mongols. Was designed to promote group solidarity. The soldiers were usually killed by the very members of their unit which had been disgraced.

<u>Decisive Point</u> or <u>Schwernpunkt</u> – Clausewitz's term for the main, potentially decisive point of attack. Failure to judge carefully where that is and when it can be accessed can be fatal.

Note: The break through the Ardennes forest in 1940 (where the Maginot line petered out) and the attack on Sedan by the XIX Panzer Corps was led by General von Kleist under General Heinz Guderian. It was a classic example of this dimension. There was also a second attack across Belgium to cross the Meuse River farther north, 7th Panzer Division of General Erwin Rommel. Panzers broke through and then came at the Maginot line from the rear, and turned north and cut off Armee Du North of the French and British Expeditionary Force. In five days fighting France was effectively finished.

<u>Deep Attack</u> – To hit the enemy hard as deep as you can get into his rear to demoralize him or her.

Note: Stonewall Jackson was very effective at making deep attacks such as at Chancellorsville.

<u>Deep Battle</u> – A term often used to describe Soviet strategy developed during the 1920's and 1930's by Vladimir Triandafillov and Mikhail Tukhachevsy which urged a deep penetration of the opponent's line and continual motion to keep the enemy off balance. Similar to blitzkrieg in some ways in that it accented combined operations, but differed in terms of its broad frontal attack zones, less tank-centric, featuring multiple *Schwernpunkts* (rather than along a narrow axis at a single *Schwerpunkt*) and "go until you stop" dimensions which often ran out of steam. See especially the initial success but then final defeat of the Soviet offensives in front of Moscow, 1941, at Krakow in 1942 and again the Donets-Dnepr area in 1943 – all of which ran out of fuel, equipment and ultimately lost whole armies and army groups. Worked better late in the war when Germans were weaker and the Stavka (Soviet Union High Command) didn't assign such outrageous goals as they did in the deep battle campaigns of Kursk, Dnieper, Bagration.

<u>Deliberate Attacks</u> – When you need time to build up your forces and there is no chance for surprise. Germans at Kursk in 1943 vs. U.S. Desert Storm with surprise thrown in terms of the attack.

<u>Divine Wind</u> – English translation of the Japanese phrase Kamikaze, used to explain the role of cosmology in warfare and spanning the period from the 13th century Mongol invasions to the 20th century attack on the United States. Paying attention to the contemporary Mongol adage "the potent power of your enemy's prayer" would have been helpful in their planning for "Operational Firecracker" in 1941. Doctrine – The intellectual framework which states how an armed force is supposed to operate. It is the formal knowledge that tells a fighting force how it is expected to act, the "glue" which keeps a force operating in a way to reduce the chaos of combat and try to impose order upon it. Laypeople often assume that armies and leaders can act independent of established doctrine. In fact, doctrine determines most of what happens, for success or failure, in combat. For example, during the Battle of Midway, American naval aviation doctrine called for individual carrier air groups to operate independent of other carrier air groups, while Japanese naval aviation doctrine insisted on coordinated actions AMONG ALL carrier air groups in any action. Or take the Tsarist army doctrine (during World War I) that forts were the key to success so that they put the lion's share of their artillery in them as opposed to in the field where mobility and tactical change counted for more. During the decisive phase of World War I, the Russians had more artillery than the Germans, but because of Tsarist doctrine, much of it was wasted.

<u>Double Envelopment</u> – Using your force to go around both ends of the enemy formation to encircle and destroy your opponent's forces.

Note: Hannibal at Cannae (216 BCE) is the premier example of this. But while the attainment of this much sought after goal has proven elusive in Western military tradition, it was the basic strategic stock in trade of the Mongols (who called the tactic "*tulghama*") in their amazing conquest of more territory and a larger population than those of the Roman or British Empires and in a much shorter period of time.

More recent examples would be the Russians at Khalkin Gol (Nomonhan) between Mongolia and Manchuria against the Japanese in 1939 and against the Germans at Stalingrad in 1942-1943.

Note: Allies almost did this to Germans after the breakout at St. Lo following the Normandy invasion (1944), but were prevented in part by 12th SS Panzer Division Hitlerjugend.

Note: This is a very difficult maneuver to pull off.

<u>Double Tap</u> – To shoot a fallen enemy you suspect of feigning death or injury and one you believe poses a threat to you or your comrades. Either seen as prudent or barbaric or even a war crime, depending upon one's distance from the perceived threat.

<u>Down Range</u> – Seal and Special Forces term for any location beyond U.S. and friendly countries. Afghanistan and Yemen are down range, Gibraltar is not.

<u>Economy of Force</u> – Using smaller forces ("economizing") where possible in order to leave larger forces for the main effort.

Note: Napoleon at Austerlitz used the smallest possible forces on his right flank to hold the Russians and Austrians long enough to set their attack in motion and then slam into their vacated, weakened center.

Note: Ironically we tend to remember Napoleon and his defeat at the Battle of Waterloo; but in fact, although he lost some battles, he actually won more battles overall than Caesar, Alexander the Great and Genghis Khan.

"Embrace the Suck" – Originally a U.S. Special Forces phrase, it has now been appropriated by the U.S. Marines, U.S. Army and some hip undergraduates. Accepts the notion that instead of whining about poor living conditions, nasty people, long hours, terrible weather and petty annoyances, one embraces them as welcome challenges and asserts ones ability to accept them is a positive character trait. During the Vietnam era, it was known less widely as "WETSU" or "We eat this shit up."

<u>En Echelon Attack</u> – A unit by unit attack along a broad front, one section at a time, one following the other. An *Ad seriatim* attack.

Note: Lee at Gettysburg, on day two tried this approach, unsuccessfully.

"<u>The Enemy Gets a Vote</u>" – Very useful concept, almost always overlooked by many military analysts when looking at the outcome of a battle or a war and by some military leaders when planning strategy and even tactics. Means that whatever one side does, it must take into account possibilities as well as probabilities of what the other side may do. For example, Saddam Hussein assumed that the United States would not invade Iraq and planned accordingly.

<u>Escalation</u> – A gradual increase in offensive pressure, failed in Vietnam because of under expectations. War of attrition is how the U.S. most often fought for 100 years until 1991. 1991 was pure blitzkrieg. Not incidentally, U.S. armed forces in the Gulf War were the best prepared, best equipped and best trained in US history at the beginning of any war.

<u>Esprit de Corps</u> – The spirit of the unit, the sense of belonging to an elite unit, a well-trained unit, one prepared to do battle to honor its history. U.S. Marines focus on their long tradition. British regiments go back hundreds of years. The Royal Scots who fought in Iraq, for example, trace their history back to the 17th century. They are thus older than the Bank of England or the House of Windsor.

<u>Fabian Strategy</u> – A strategy which seeks victory through threatening to do battle without actually resorting to decisive combat. Keep your army close to the other army, but not so close they can attack and destroy you. A classic example was the German "Fleet in being" during World War I. Germany had a huge navy (smaller than that of Great Britain but large enough to threaten). Germany fleet tied down the British fleet but only offered major battle once. But a question arises: wouldn't the Germans have been better off putting those surface ship resources into U-boat production, a weapon which almost won the war for them? Strategy named for Fabius Maximus ("The Delayer") who used it successfully against Hannibal who had a stronger army. When the Romans tired of his strategy, they confronted Hannibal at the Battle of Cannae and were annihilated. Only then did they go back to the successful strategy of Fabius. Also used by the Russian general Mikhail Kutuzov against Napoleon's drive on Moscow, although he too was eventually forced to fight Napoleon at Borodino.

<u>5S Checklist</u> – Current U.S. infantry doctrine for the handling of prisoners: seize the prisoners, secure their weapons, silence them, separate the officers from the enlisted men and search them for maps and other information.

<u>Fluidity</u> – Combat power is situational, relative, and reversible and thus there is a dynamic of change which affects battles and their outcome.

<u>FNG's (Fucking New Guys)</u> – World War II American saying which carried over to the Korean and Vietnam eras, one which captures the combat veterans' opinion that the newly arrived solider would soon be killed and was not worth getting to know until he survived a month or so.

"<u>Fog of War</u>" – Clausewitzian term for the inability to see everything clearly as it is happening. The overall commander and even local commanders don't have the entire or even most of the picture. Smoke on the battlefield is thus both real "fog" and a metaphor for it.

Note: There was real fog at Austerlitz (1805). Confusion, time-lapses, visibility, metaphor for everything which can go wrong and prevent the commander from seeing what is really happening.

More than any other theorist on war, Clausewitz emphasized the roles of uncertainty, chance, friction and luck. ("Fog" of war and the "Friction" of war) and their terrible toll on any army in any battle anywhere.

<u>Force Projection</u> – Ability to get force where the trouble is. Think of the example of the U.S. ability to project force to Panama or Grenada, not just the scale but the location and especially to the sea. Then move to

Desert Storm where 90% of all supplies and equipment came by sea; by contrast, only a single M1A1 tank could be carried by each Starlifter transport, the U.S. cargo aircraft with the greatest lift capacity.

Note: Now think of the difficulties of U.S. force projection to the KKTUT region (Kazakhstan, Kigiristan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan). Or Afghanistan. How did the U.S. get there? How long can it stay there?

Note: Since World War II, the fast carrier has been the dominant force projection instrument of one kind, strategic bombing another. Remember, though, that a carrier battle group costs at least \$1.5 billion a year to operate and a single carrier with its compliment of 75-100 planes, an amount equal to 2/3's the entire defense budget of Great Britain to produce let alone maintain.

Note: A prominent early example of force projection was the use of two wheeled (spoked) chariots, with a driver and a composite bowman, to bring military presence to distant locations. Indeed, this type of chariot (built on centuries of innovation since it required horses instead of oxen or mules, spoked wheels instead of heavy solid ones and two wheels instead of four, short composite bows of wood, horn and sinew instead of longer, more unwieldy wooden ones), enabled some steppe peoples such as the Hittites and Hurrians and others to extend their empires far from their core areas after 2000 BCE. This weapon system and the chariot nobilities it created eventually was found from the steppes to Egypt, Shang China, Aryan India and Mycenaean Greece and by 1200 BCE, it was the dominant weapons system in most of the major societies.

<u>Force to Space Ratio</u> – The amount of military force in a given location or battle space. When force to space ratios are low for opposing sides, there is a great deal of room for maneuver (World War I in the East). When force to space ratios are high for opposing sides, there is less room for maneuver (World War I in the West). Taking Clausewitzian doctrine, you would want to increase your force to at least a local space ratio over your opponent of a factor of 7-8 to 1, the ideal concentration for blitzkrieg warfare. But this, of course, is often very difficult to accomplish.

"<u>Friction of War</u>" – From Clausewitz, the concept that as a battle or campaign develops, there is a down drag caused by the motions themselves as well as the wear and tear on the army and its transport.

Note: Think of Ben Franklin: "For Want of a Nail" - "For want of a nail the shoe was lost, For want of a shoe the horse was lost, For want of a horse the rider was lost, For want of a rider the battle was lost, For want of a battle the kingdom was lost, And for all the want of a horseshoe nail." This is true friction of war.

"<u>Friendly" Fire</u> – Current term for "fratricide," the killing of your own soldiers. Quite a misnomer, that! As tragic as fratricide is in warfare, it is not that easy to avoid in the swirl of battle, especially with the rapid pace of modern warfare.

Note: But consider, "Do you fire on vehicles you can't squarely identify? If you wait, they may fire on you – because they are the enemy, or because they are friendly and believe you are the enemy, or because they are friendly and not sure about you but unwilling to take the chance that you are an enemy, that you are a friendly believing them to be enemy, or that you are a friendly unsure and unwilling to take the chance. Kill or be killed. Indeed, the very violence and speed of our Air/Land Battle tactics seemed to invite friendly fire incidents. But this same violence and speed can shock opponents into paralysis and bring the battle to a quick end, preventing the loss of even more American lives from a protracted fight against a less-dazed enemy." (Alex Vernon, <u>Eyes of Orion</u>, p. 106). <u>Frontal Attack</u> – Usually the most costly maneuver in terms of casualties for in a frontal attack you attack directly into a prepared enemy position, normally seeking to defeat it by weight of numbers and firepower.

Note: World War I was a series of frontal attacks, especially on the part of the French, British and Germans on the Western Front and led to very high causality rates. So too was WWII when waged by the Americans and British as well as the Russians who lost millions of men as they counter-attacked against the advancing Germans using this tactic.

F3EA – "Find, fix, finish, exploit and analyze," (and reload!) the mantra of the new U.S. war against terrorism stressing the need for interconnected intelligence gathering, immediate exploitation and analysis of each operation. Ironically the brainchild of General Stanley McChrystal (before he was forced to resign by President Obama) and others who, in the era following 9/11 developed a core operational method which has become standard operating procedure. For example, the first thing Seal Team Six did after killing Osama bin Laden was to seize his computers and subsequently launch over dozens of drone strikes in Pakistan and other countries utilizing that intelligence.

<u>Hasty Attacks</u> – When it is better to attack than to wait, hasty attacks are often called "spoiling" attacks, those designed to throw the enemy and his preparations off balance rather than to totally defeat them.

<u>Hunting</u> – Often seen by military people as a way to train and to keep martial arts sharp and up to date. From the Persians to the Mongols and the later kings of England and France, hunting was an intrinsic part of the military culture and remains so today, if you doubt the association, just watch episodes of the Outdoor Channel and see how prized hunts are to returning veterans.

<u>Infiltration</u> – Normally passing through small friendly units by stealth into the enemy's rear, then turning on the enemy from there.

Note: North Koreans and Chinese were masters of this in Korean War as were the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong in the Vietnam War.

<u>Interior Lines</u> – Supply and reserve lines which are shorter than the enemy's. These can be a big advantage.

Note: Lee and Confederates at Gettysburg versus the more numerous and better positioned (after first day) Union forces.

Note: Eighth Army uses them to its advantage at Pusan perimeter (August, September, 1950).

<u>JDAMS</u> – Joint Direct Attack Munitions, an inexpensive (\$20-30,000) kit which takes "dumb" iron bombs and turns them into satellite-guided smart bombs. Considerable implications for aging aircraft such as the B-52 last built in 1962 and now believed to be going to be kept in operation until 2040. In Gulf War II, the B-1 was the workhorse, flying 2% of missions but dropping 50% of JDAM's.

<u>JSOC</u> – Joint Special Operations Command, the unifying command structure developed by the United States following the failures of 9/11 in order to more efficiently acquire, process and act on intelligence gathering. Core value? The F3EA principle outlined above. Responsible for the worldwide use of military, CIA and FBI resources.

<u>JSTARs</u> – Joint Surveillance and Target Radar System, aircraft capable of targeting many different locations and guiding aircraft to those targets. 14 used during Gulf War II to provide 24 hour surveillance of the battlefield. Can pick up virtually any vehicular ground movements. All weather/sand storm capable.

<u>Just War</u> – A Roman and Christian (after Augustine of Hippo in the 5th century CE) concept that that although Christians should be pacifists, they could wage war in order to preserve the peace longer term and/or to protect the innocent. So, although there was no justification for war in

early Christian doctrine, almost four centuries later (especially after Christianity became the state religion under Roman Emperor Theodosius 380 – Emperor Constantine in 313, when the Edict of Milan had granted it official status), defensive wars were now permissible. Later, Thomas Aquinas (13 century) said war could be just if it was for a good and just purpose rather than for gain or the sheer exercise of power. But by then, the genie was long out of the bottle and the dictum of Machiavelli (late 15th century) held sway all across Christendom, "A just war is when we need to go to war."

<u>Law of the Fishes</u> – Kautilya's dictum that the strong prey on the weak and should do so as this is a law of nature and should be the guiding principle for all states and rulers. Urged using murder, poison, false accusations and subversions – indeed anything at one's disposal – to gain an advantage in war.

<u>Maneuver</u> – Ability to gain positional advantage over the enemy, to move in such a way as to maximize strength in any battle.

<u>Maneuver Battle</u> – A battle where the point is to maneuver an opponent out of position before attacking and destroying him. Lee was a master of maneuver battle, perhaps the best in the Civil War. At Chancellorsville, he violated two inflexible rules of war: (1) not to divide an army in the face of the enemy and (2) not to march an army across the face of the enemy army deployed for battle. He got away with both rule-breakings. But, since nothing fails like success, he went to the well again at the subsequent battle at Gettysburg with very disappointing results.

<u>Maskirovka</u> – Russian chess term for appearing to build up an attack on some pieces but actually preparing for an attack on others. Opponent prepares for an offensive which never comes. The Soviet STAVKA used this tactic to considerable advantage on the Eastern Front, especially during late 1943 and 1944.

Note: General Zhukov did this masterfully, pretending to be about to attack German Army Group Center in 1942 when he was about to unleash Operation Saturn against Stalingrad and German Army Group South.

Note: North Vietnamese General Nguyen Giap claimed he was doing a Maskirovka in the battle of Khe Sanh when his real target was the cities of South Vietnam during the Tet Offensive, 1968.

Note: Giap studied Clausewitz but in those day the U.S. Army did not.

Mass – Physical and firepower concentration on the decisive point.

<u>METT-T Principle</u> – Modern American military jargon for a method of analysis which involves mission, enemy, terrain, troops available to you and time: Mission Enemy Terrain

Troops available to you Time available to you

<u>Mobility</u> – The ability of an army to move more rapidly than one's opponent. Mobility is often the key to victory in battle, both in terms of initial positioning and maneuver and in the use of reserves during the battle. Sometimes, questions of mobility are less well understood. For example, during World War I, cavalry was thought to enhance mobility, but because of command and control issues and increased firepower on the part of the infantry, their value decreased, not least because of the huge demands for fodder. A horse needed 12 lbs. of grain per day and for most armies, transporting grain was the largest item in the railway supply system. In terms of tonnage, the transport of hay and other fodder accounted for the largest percentage of cross Channel freight traffic.

<u>Military Operations Other Than War</u> (MOOTW) – Current term (devised, no doubt by someone with a lot of time on his or her hands) for counter-insurgency operations such as the U.S. conducted in Iraq from 2003 until 2010. Could now include international hacking with a purpose such as Israeli and American use of viruses to disrupt the Iranian nuclear program.

"<u>Nothing Fails Like Success</u>" – Denotes the pattern of using tactics and strategy which worked for you in one or more battles but then did not succeed when used again. Lee at Gettysburg would be a good example as he based much of his strategy on his earlier successes at Second Manassas and Chancellorsville, with disastrous results this time.

<u>Offensive</u> – Gaining and maintaining the initiative over the enemy by attacking.

Objective – Focus on what is important while avoiding distractions.

<u>OODA Loop</u> – Imaginative concept of Colonel John Boyd involving the sequence of observe, orient, decide and act which immediately becomes a second loop of observe, orient, decide and act. Far more subtle and sophisticated the more you get into the interaction of your OODA loop and that of your enemy. Getting inside your opponent's OODA loop can be essential to winning a battle or war, as the US forces during Gulf War II (but not the initial stages of Gulf War III, where insurgents had much faster moving OODA loops). By the same token, the NVA constantly got inside the OODA loop of the U. S. and ARVN forces during the Vietnam War.

<u>National Counterterrorism Center</u> (NCTC) – Made up of military and civilian personnel, NCTC is the "mother node and chief command center" of the U.S. counter-terrorist operations and is responsible for keeping track of 500,000 known or suspected terrorists worldwide.

<u>Opportunity</u> – The chance to do a number of things on the battlefield and control the outcome by throwing the enemy off his or her plan. This turns out to be one of the greatest dimensions in war and the one which most generals fail to appreciate.

Note: A good example, Lee and Jackson at Chancellorsville (1863).

Note: Another good example, the German blitzkrieg against Poland (1939) and France (1940), but not against Soviet Union (1941) in World War II.

Note: Need bold leadership who create and take advantage of opportunity. Among the best at it during World War II: von Manstein, Rommel, Patton, all exploited weakness and keep driving forward whenever possible. U.S. in the Gulf War of 1991 was modeled after *blitzkrieg*. Ironically, so too were Israeli efforts in Seven Days War (1967) and the Yom Kippur War (1973).

<u>Penetration</u> – An attack on a very narrow front by a concentrated force to rupture an opening in a set enemy defense.

<u>Powell Doctrine</u> – Military action philosophy named for General Colin Powell who, as head of Joint Chiefs of Staff, articulated a doctrine to be applied before U.S. military forces were used. This doctrine includes three major elements:

1. Establish clearly defined and achievable objectives right at the outset.

2. Apply overwhelming force quickly.

3. Establish a completed exit strategy in place before the engagement begins.

As Secretary of State during the run-up to the Iraq War of 2003, Powell was unable to convince the President and Secretary of State of the wisdom of this approach. Should he have then resigned? I believe so and find it strange that he has escaped much criticism for his failure to do so.

<u>Pursuit</u> – A form of tactical offense. You conduct a pursuit when all or most enemy resistance is broken, the enemy is attempting to flee the battlefield and you want to prevent his escape. "Breakout and pursuit" provide maximum opportunity as well as danger to fall prey to the dictum "nothing fails like success." The steppe horse people employed pursuit to maximum effect, often pursuing and surrounding their defeated foes.

Note: UN forces after Inchon landing in Korea, XVIII and VII Corps attacks in Desert Storm.

<u>Recognition of Realistic Objectives</u> – The application of reason to battlefield strategy. Both tactical and strategic objectives must be attainable under normal circumstances. For example, there are positions which cannot be taken.

Note: John Bell Hood one of the most aggressive and hard- charging commanders on either side of the Civil War tells Longstreet on the second day of Gettysburg that his men cannot take the Round Tops.

This is the John Bell Hood who was to lose an arm at Gettysburg, a leg at Chickamauga, and an army at Franklin and Nashville with his reckless attacks. Longstreet knew exactly what he was talking about, having already told Lee that he should not try this direct attack. Longstreet repeated his advice on the third day of Gettysburg "General, I've been a soldier all my life and no 18,000 men could take that position."

The result was an enormous Confederate defeat and one of the true turning points of the American Civil War.

<u>Risk</u> – Taking a chance in battle. The relationship between taking chance of doing something and chance of doing nothing. Risk is different from a gamble. According to Field Marshall Erwin Rommel, "a risk is a chance which if it doesn't work, you can recover. A gamble is a chance which if it doesn't work, you can't recover."

In this context, remember, "Nothing Fails Like Success."

Note: Lee's actions at Gettysburg are only explicable if you understand that he had previously broken all the same rules (dividing his forces, attacking a dug-in enemy of superior size at Chancellorsville - which turned out to be Lee's biggest triumph of the war).

Note: Sadam Hussein used the set piece tactics which worked so well in the Iranian War again in the Gulf War of 1991 and 2003 with disastrous results.

"<u>Rules of Engagement</u>" (<u>ROE</u>) – An army leadership's attempt to set rules for its soldiers in combat and to avoid unnecessary civilian causalities. A very difficult formulation to get right, especially in insurgency situations. Summed up nicely by Lt. Nate Fick in <u>Generation</u> <u>Kill</u>, "If we kill civilians, we're going to turn the population against us and lose the war. But I don't want to lose Marines because the ROE have taken away their aggressiveness."

"<u>Script Writing</u>" – Derogatory term for making assumptions in war that if you do x, your opponent will do y. Almost never works that way, as the U.S. found out in Vietnam with its bit by bit escalation policy. (See also "The Enemy Gets a Vote").

<u>Security</u> – Protection of your own forces from the enemy and from other factors such as accident and sickness.

Note: American security during the push to the Rhine during the fall and winter of 1944-1945 was terrible, losses from trench foot alone were 46,000 men or three whole infantry divisions. This period was truly a black page in the history of American support for armies in the field.

<u>Self-Fulfilling Prophecy</u> – Taking or causing action to produce the very action you claimed to want to avoid. For example, according to David

Glantz, in the summer of 1942, Stalin feared the loyalty of the non-Russians in the Caucasus region so he sent Beria's NKVD troops who murdered or deported tens of thousands of Tartars, Volga Germans, Chechens and Ingushes. The survivors of these efforts then - not surprisingly - often welcomed the advancing Germans on their way to the oil fields of the Caucasus.

<u>Simplicity</u> – Making operations as concise and precise as possible. Always remember Clausewitz and the fog and friction of war. They are always going to be present. Only by simplicity can you hope to mitigate their impact on your forces.

<u>Single Envelopment</u> – Moving your force around one end of the enemy formation and then either attacking the enemy from the side or bypassing him to reach other objectives.

"<u>Soldier's Battle</u>" – A battle shaped by the reactions of the soldiers as they stumble into one another in the confusion of the initial stages of a battle. Both Shiloh and Gettysburg started out that way despite their commanders desire to control the battle space.

<u>Special Operations Command</u> (SOCOM) – Special Operations is a blanket term covering all the following: the U.S. Army's Special Forces, Rangers, Marine Corps Special Operations, the Air Force Special Operations, the Drug Enforcement Agency's Forward Deployed Advisory and Support Teams (FAST), the Navy Seals, the Air Force Special Operations, and the Special Operations Aviation Regiment known as the Night Stalkers. These organizations are changing the nature of contemporary warfare and indeed, dramatically altering the nature of what constitutes "war" itself in such different theatres as Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, the Horn of Africa, Latin America and the Philippines.

<u>Standard Operating Procedure</u> (SOP) – A habitual way of doing something, taught to troops. Necessary for continuity in combat,

command and control etc but can be a source of danger and defeat if not modified to fit new conditions. For example, in U.S. bombing of Hanoi in 1972, the Strategic Air Command (SAC) used its bombing run SOP's as if it were attacking nuclear targets in the Soviet Union in one off strikes. This repetition enabled the North Vietnamese to take a significant toll of B-52's. See Michel, <u>The Eleven Days of Christmas</u>.

<u>Strategy</u> – Overarching concepts involving large scale movements, across a broad plane of time and space. Should have well-defined goals.

<u>Strike the Archer</u> – "Strike the Archer, not the arrows" is military doctrine for destroying the enemy before he has a chance to destroy you by striking his launch vehicle before it can loose its "arrows." Don't wait to absorb and attack before you retaliate. For example, during the Battle of Midway, the U.S. carriers found and destroyed three of the four Japanese carriers before they found the Americans and could send their aircraft.

<u>Supply</u> – Providing the ammunition, food, clothing, shelter, replacement soldiers and replacement equipment needed by the army. We refer to the supply portion of any army as the "tail." Rough ratios tell you a lot about the ability of an army to bring decisive power to bear at local points.

Note: In Vietnam, U.S. tail was approximately 15-1 versus the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong tail which was 4-1. Of course, the U.S. troops came from much farther away, but the relative relationship of tooth to tail *in the combat area* was also disproportionate. Olympic swimming pools and bowling alleys at major U.S. bases didn't help.

<u>Tactics</u> – Small scale or local activities – a 12 person squad takes one hill rather than another would be an example of a tactic which insists on putting one's forces always on the high ground as a tactical principle. Or as MacGregor Knox puts it, "Tactics is the art of battlefield destruction of the enemy; its essence is the concentration of strength against enemy weakness in space and time." By contrast, deciding which hills to take and which to avoid is strategy.

<u>Terrain</u> – There are two principle concepts of terrain, the first is the obvious *geographic terrain*, who controls which river, hill, plateau. The second is the *human terrain* which is the social aspect of war, "winning the hearts and minds" of the people. Human terrain has its important positions and heights as well as dangerous locations to be avoided. You must always think of the consequences of each. For example, if you need a big air strike in order to capture a hill, but in doing so you alienate the people who live on that hill, you may have made progress in terms of the geographic terrain goals but damaged your progress in terms of the human terrain.

<u>Thunder Run</u> – Term used to describe armed columns moving as fast as they can and continually shooting their way from base to base. Often used by the U.S. and South Vietnamese to bring supplies to remote locations during the Vietnam War. Also used to describe 3rd Infantry Division and Marine Expeditionary Force's rush to Baghdad during the second Iraq war.

<u>Timing</u> – When you attack is very important and its corollary is even more important. As Napoleon put it "Never interrupt your enemy when he is making a mistake."

Note: Never give your opponent enough time to set up to defeat you.

Note: British in front of New Orleans in January 8, 1815, let the American General Andrew Jackson bring up reinforcements, dig in, set up artillery, draft militia men from New Orleans (men who would have otherwise remained neutral) and when the British marched across the open fields and swamps and up into fortified positions, he killed them in huge numbers. These were tough British regulars who had defeated Napoleon. They were slaughtered, losing over 2,000 killed, wounded and captured. The British generals Pakenham and Gibbs were also killed. The Americans lost 7 killed and 6 wounded on Jackson's line.

Note: Germans at the battle of Kursk (July, 1943) fought in July when they should have fought in May. Russian defense in depth was greatly strengthened by the time the battle took place. The Germans were badly defeated and with the loss of Kursk they lost any chance for victory in the East.

Note: Iraq gives the U.S. led Coalition from August to January 1991 to bring entire armies from US and Europe, enabling the Coalition to bring into the theatre the necessary personnel and equipment to accomplish their mission.

Note: Ewell in front of Cemetery Ridge the early evening of July 2, 1863, does not attempt to take position that was then fortified all night long, costing the Confederates heavy causalities the next day.

<u>Tottenritt</u> – German term for "death ride" when an individual or a unit (or in the case of Nazi Germany, an entire country) follows a hopeless, even senseless, order out of obedience. As Robert Citino puts it, "To ride the *Tottenritt*, you have to substitute faith – blind faith – for rational thought." Sometimes the death ride serves an important purpose, such as the German Sixth Army fighting on at Stalingrad when things were hopeless, but its struggle saved Army Group B which was trapped in the Caucasus Mountains and in danger of being cut off and destroyed, but the *Tottenritt* of the Sixth Army gave it time to retreat through the Crimea.

<u>Training</u> – The preparation for battle. Proper training can increase the power of a fighting unit tenfold. Discipline and following orders, learning maneuvering all are essential. Soldiers drilled until they drop, learn to trust and love their units, then fight by those units.

Note: Only intense training (and experience) can overcome the terrible toll taken by friction in war. Training and discipline continue to be the most important forms of warfare preparation. All the great generals place a premium on it. "The best form of welfare for the troops is first-class training." Train like Olympic athletes but understand that the need is to train mentally as well as physically.

Note: Wellington is supposed to have said, "Waterloo was won on the playing fields of Eton." Who was he kidding?

Note: Quote from American Marine whose unit was among the first into Baghdad. "Nothing I experienced in Afghanistan or Iraq was as tough as my training in the Californian desert."

<u>Turning Movement</u> – A movement around the end of an enemy defense designed to force the enemy to turn out of his defense to face you from a different direction.

Note: Grant pushed Lee back relentlessly from the Battle of the Wilderness (1864) until the end of the war. Although many historians fail to give Grant proper credit for this strategy, he was one of the few Union generals who figured out how to defeat Lee and hence the South, in a series of relentless battles rather than a battle and then a long respite.

<u>Unit Designations</u> – Names for military subgroups, as used in this class for small unit cohesion purposes.

Current names: Alpha, Bravo, Charlie, Delta, Echo and Fox. World War II names: Able, Baker, Charlie, Dog, Echo and Fox.

Class names: Discipline, Technology, Sustained Ruthlessness, Receptivity, Protection of Capital, Will and There Will Always Be Another War. <u>Unit Size</u> – Different countries in different eras have different absolute numbers for various units, and even within armies, different types of units (i.e. infantry, artillery, weapons, transport, intelligence, etc.). But generally speaking, the following chart should be memorized as rough gauge of approximate relative size:

An army group (200,000+) contains several armies,

An army contains (100,000+) one or more corps,

A corps contains (50,000) several divisions,

A division contains (16-18,000) several brigades,

A brigade (3,500) several regiments,

A regiment contains (2-3,000) several battalions,

A battalion contains (1,000) several companies,

A company (150-200) contains several platoons,

A platoon (45-50) contains several squads,

A squad is usually 12-15 people.

Note: during World War I, a "square" American Division had 4 regiments and 28,000 men but in 1940 General George Marshall moved the U.S. to a "triangle" division with 3 regiments.

Note: According to Edward Jean Smith, during the 1941 maneuvers in Louisiana and Texas, the United States fielded 472,000 troops, the largest concentration of U.S. troops ever deployed in a single area.

<u>Unity of Command</u> – To ensure overall coordination, have one commander in charge of each major operation.

Note: Eisenhower trying to hold sway over Generals Montgomery and Bradley during World War II. Eisenhower is often charged with being a "mere" "political general," and it is true he had very little ability or experience with field armies, but a political general is exactly what is sometimes needed to keep allies working together and Eisenhower was a master political general. Note: Unity of command greatly simplifies your own task and complicates your opponents; this is why Napoleon insisted on it in most of his battles. He loved to face potentially divided commands, saying "If I am to go to war, always make it against a coalition."

 \underline{War} – Open armed conflict between countries (international) or between factions within the same country (civil war).

Note: Many wars blur this distinction, i.e. the Vietnam War was a four level chess game of civil war with international dimensions.

Note: Can also mean "<u>any active hostility, contention or struggle,</u>" i.e. the war against cancer.

Note: Can also mean "military operations as a profession or science."

Note: What were U.S. attacks in Afghanistan during 2001?

<u>War of Attrition</u> – An attempt to destroy more of the enemy's forces than he destroys of yours. Casualty rates, men and equipment are the yardsticks. Win battles by causing heavier casualties. Uses "weight" of forces and firepower. Tries to destroy the enemy before he or she destroys your forces.

This contrasts with blitzkrieg where the aim is to disrupt, destroy, dislodge, disconnect, and break up centers of gravity. <u>Hit the enemy's will to resist</u>, *blitzkrieg* is much closer to Clausewitz than war of <u>attrition</u>. But principle of "will" is the same in both instances. "Shock and Awe," which is a phrase based on this principle was widely derided by the media while it was going on, but in fact contributed a great deal to the demoralization of the Iraqi armed forces during the 2003 war.

Note: Attrition was U.S. strategy in Civil War after Grant took over The Army of the Potomac. Also U.S. in World War I on the Western Front and in World War II in Europe under General Dwight Eisenhower. This

approach is terribly costly in terms ground troops. In the Korean War situation after MacArthur was replaced (March 1951), Eighth Army Commander Matthew Ridgeway fought another "traditional" U.S. war of attrition. For all his faults, MacArthur tried to fight strategically while he was in command and avoid excess casualties (with the exception of the unnecessary U.S. invasion of the Philippines in 1944). Carried over to Vietnam, body counts all but required the sustained "will" to succeed. In fact, this has been the US strategy in most wars except for the Gulf Wars of 1991 and 2003.

Note: The American drive to Baghdad was the fastest and most effective *blitzkrieg* in history, exceeding – by far – the previous best examples of the German push through France during 1940.

Note: Japanese strategy to meet American threat to their home islands. See their defense against "Olympic Coronet." The Japanese adoption of this approach – and the U.S. knowledge of that decision – was the primary impetus for dropping the atomic bombs on Japan. Each Japanese person, not just each soldier, was to kill as many Americans as possible in order to cause them such high causalities that they gave up the struggle. American decision makers naturally feared "dozens of Okinawas," meaning battles on the Japanese homeland involving suicidal attacks and resistance until death. In the entire Pacific campaign during World War II, fewer than 1% of Japanese troops surrendered, so this was not a far-fetched assumption for after Okinawa, the American military assumed one U.S. casualty per one Japanese defender.

<u>Weapons</u> – The instruments of war: a vast variety.

"<u>The Weapons Speak</u>" – Term indicating the role actual weapons and weapons systems play in communicating with potential enemies. For example, the Germans saw the French constructing the huge Maginot Line with its massive fortifications and defensive positions and got the message that the French were not going to attack Germany even if a war broke out and planned accordingly. Today, the U.S. Navy looks at the weapons the Chinese PLA is acquiring – the Dong Feng 21 ram jet attack missiles and anti-ship ballistic missiles and assumes they plan to use them against the American carrier battle groups – no matter what Chinese political figures say about them being "defensive" weapons.

<u>Whiskey Tango Foxtrot</u> (WTF) – Bob Woodward, writing in <u>Obama's</u> <u>War</u>, took this military expression to Main Street when describing Obama's reaction to the military's insistence on 40,000 more U.S. troops in Afghanistan – "What the fuck?" There are quite a few WTF moments in war, any war – often on a daily basis. To a large extent in the U.S. military, WTF has replaced FUBAR (Fucked Up Beyond All Recognition) which was its rough equivalent to earlier generations of American service personnel. A comparable phrase from the 19th and early 20th century was SNAFU (Situation Normal All Fucked Up).

The Costs of War

Note: In terms of its history, the <u>U.S. has been at war 47 out of 230</u> <u>years. Thus 20% of our existence</u> has been spent at war. Unfortunately, this percentage is likely to increase, not decrease, in the decades ahead, despite the hopes of many.

The U.S. Costs of War

Here's One Way to Look at Those Costs:

Dollar Amounts

Gulf Wars (Iraq) II, III	\$884 billion (and counting)
Afghan War I	\$321 billion (and counting)
Gulf War (Iraq) I	\$76 billion
Vietnam War	\$494 billion
Korean War	\$336 billion
World War II	\$2.9 trillion
World War I	\$191 billion

Here's Another Way to Look at Those Costs:

Adjusted Dollar Amounts in 2011 Dollars

(Source: New York Times, July 25, 2011—based on a CRS report that has not been updated for 2017)

Revolution	\$2.4 billion
War of 1812	\$1.6 billion
Mexican War	\$2.4 billion
Civil War	\$80 billion\$60 Union\$20 Confederate
Spanish-American	\$9 billion
World War I	\$334 billion
World War II	\$4.1 trillion
Korean War	\$341 billion
Vietnam War	\$738 billion
Gulf War I	\$110 billion
Afghan War I	\$444 billion and counting
Gulf Wars II, III	\$806 billion and counting

And Here's Yet Another Way to Look at Those Costs:

Costs as a percentage of U.S. Gross Domestic Product

Revolution	NA
War of 1812	2.2%
Mexican War	1.4%
Civil War	11.3% (Union only)
Spanish-American	1.1%
World War I	13.6%
World War II	38%
Korean War	4.2%
Vietnam War	2.3%
Gulf War I	.3%
Afghan War I	.2% (and counting)
Gulf Wars II, III	1% (and counting)

Another, Even More Important Way of Counting:

U.S. and Bowdoin Casualties:

"<u>Freedom is Not Free</u>"

War	Battle	Total	Bowdoin	%
Revolution	4,435	25,324	0	?
War of 1812	2,260	19,465	0	?
Mexican War	1,733	13,283	5	16.8*
Civil War	539,617	622,000*	42	21%
(Hatch says 290 Bow	vdoin men	fought in (Civil War)	
Spanish-American	385	2,466	0	.01%
World War I	53,402	116,516	29	2.5%
World War II	291,557	403,339	92	2.5%
Korean War	33,741	54,246	11	.01%
Vietnam War	47,414	58,220	8	.01%
Iraq I	147	338	0	.001
Kosovo	0	0	0	0
Afghanistan I and Il	[1340+	1,568+	0	.01%
Iraq II and III	3,489+	4,421+	0	


Average Length of Service for U.S. Veterans

(in months)

Civil War	20
World War I	12
World War II	33
Korean War	19
Vietnam	23
Gulf War I	12
Gulf War II	? (hard to figure due to multiple deployments)
Afghanistan	? (hard to figure due to multiple deployments)

Statistics from Robert Poole, "On Hallowed Ground: The Story of Arlington National Cemetery," <u>New York Times</u>, May 31, 2010, p. A19.

*Latest recalculations for Civil War and percentage of total casualties (including disease) put it at 750,000 (Ronald Whit, <u>American Ulysses</u> (New York: Random House, 2016), p. 412 and 96).



U.S. Federal Budget website: http://www.usfederalbudget.us/spending_chart_1940_2012USp_13s1li001lbn_30t

Length of U.S. Wars

Afghanistan	16 years and counting
Iraq (II and III and IV)	13 years and counting
Iraq (I)	8 weeks!
Vietnam	8.4
American Revolution	8
American Civil War	4
Korean War	3.1
War of 1812	1.8
Mexican War	1.8
World War I	1.6
World War II	4
Spanish-American War	1.5 months!