power), yet the literature has not incorporated the same logic into its theorizing about parties.

Smith notes that studies typically focus on two sources of party influence: direct, positive influence wherein party leaders may offer some type of incentive to entice a member to act on behalf of the party, or, an indirect, negative influence wherein party leaders may use their agenda-setting powers to prevent floor consideration of proposals that would increase their members’ electoral peril. Smith argues that this classification is incomplete as it ignores the potential for direct tactics to be used for negative purposes (for example, pressuring members not to sign discharge petitions) or indirect tactics for positive purposes (for example, packaging provisions in omnibus legislation). Moreover, leaders are likely to use multiple tactics simultaneously to influence different factions as necessary to create a majority coalition. Studies rarely account for such subtleties.

Smith also devotes considerable attention to critical elements that have been missing from the party wars debate: the Senate, minority parties, and the role of the president as head of a party. His treatment makes clear how limited current party theories and evidence are. For example, he shows that many of the trends in the House that have been explained with “strong party leaders” have also occurred in the Senate, with its much weaker partisan structures. Similarly, by ignoring the minority party, we risk missing the dynamic that the fundamental goal of achieving majority status should create in our theorizing about congressional parties.

_Party Influence in Congress_ is an important book and a must-read for congressional scholars because it is likely to reorient and reinvigorate theorizing and empirical research on congressional parties. For scholars who have found the party war debates stale or tiring, Smith provides new ways to evaluate the old debate and new questions for research—regardless of the camp one calls home.

**ERIC S. HEBERLIG**

_University of North Carolina Charlotte_


The past 15 years have witnessed a steady stream of research on the effects of television campaign advertising on the American electorate. The major question has been whether such advertising, and negative or so-called attack advertising in particular, has detrimental influence on citizens, turning them off and rendering them less likely to vote. Franz et al. assess this research and, more importantly, make major new empirical contributions. Taking advantage
of data from the Wisconsin Advertising Project and various individual-level surveys from the 2000 and 2004 elections, they conclude that television advertising plays positive roles in campaigns—engaging, informing, and mobilizing voters. They reject the claim that campaign ads have negative, let alone dire, consequences for democratic citizenship.

The book summarizes and extends the research program in which the authors have been engaged for more than a decade. The institutional foundation of their efforts is the Wisconsin Advertising Project, which collects and codes comprehensive campaign ad tracking data from media markets across the United States. These data include two types of information: frequency information about when and where ads aired with precise details on the date, time, market, station, and television show; and content information, including the complete text of and images from the ads. Project coders assess and classify ads along a variety of dimensions, including tone. For those unfamiliar with these data, chapter 4 and the appendices provide an invaluable introduction. Relatedly, the authors have been on the forefront of developing an improved measure of citizen exposure to campaign advertising. As Franz et al. outline, if a survey contains information on respondents’ zip codes, counties of residence, or area codes, they can be located within their media market. Thus, detailed market-level ad data, including which ads aired on which shows and how many times, can be merged with the survey data. If the survey also provides information on the television viewing habits of respondents, the variables are in place to create the state-of-the-art advertising exposure measure that they recommend.

Franz et al. hypothesize that contrary to the conventional wisdom of the media punditry, campaign ads inform and engage the citizenry and, on balance, produce greater support for the political system. They refer to television ads as the informational multivitamins of American democracy: “attractively (and expertly) packaged, simple to comprehend, easy to digest” (p. 23). Furthermore, Franz et al. contend that, unless containing purely personal negative appeals, negative ads should be especially effective. As they relay, most negative ads actually address policy matters—they are simply ads about the other candidate. Their multivariate analyses based on data from the 2000 and 2004 congressional and presidential elections largely confirm their expectations. They also provide suggestive evidence throughout that campaign ads are especially important for the politically unsophisticated.

Franz et al. have blazed impressive trails in the study of campaign advertising and laid important foundations. Thankfully, for the rest of us, there is work left to be done. The authors themselves draw attention to (possible) unexamined conditional relationships—among these, are certain types of voters more and less responsive to negative ads? More fundamentally, they made the conscious decision not to assess whether campaign advertising influences vote choice and election outcomes—clearly subjects of major importance for students of elections. Furthermore, by confining their analyses to two presidential
election years, they do not tap noteworthy contextual variation. For example, it is quite likely that campaign advertising has greater influence on turnout behavior in midterm elections. Finally, there are important campaign dynamics yet to be explored. Relying on candidate advertising data, the authors do find that competitive campaigns are associated with more ads in general, and more negative ads specifically, but it would be informative to know whether and how strategic campaign elites respond to each other over the course of a campaign in terms of their advertising decisions.

ROBERT A. JACKSON
Florida State University


It was considered strange and a bit odd when many conservatives in Congress joined liberals to enact the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB), which most political observers argued represented an unprecedented role for the federal government in education policy. By tradition, conservatives had been more likely to prefer state, local, and private initiatives to federal laws and regulations; liberals, on the other hand, favor the federal government offering solutions to help meet needs that states and school systems are unable to meet themselves. Lee Anderson traces the evolution of federal involvement in education as a function of the narrowing ideological positions of liberals and conservatives. While conventional wisdom holds that NCLB represents a marked departure from previous federal policies, Anderson’s position is that NCLB was more of an outgrowth of (rather than as a radical departure from) previous federal education policies.

Lee Anderson’s analysis of the relationship between federal education policies and political ideologies is thoroughly researched, judiciously analyzed, and clearly presented. Anderson’s main interest lies in congressional actions (that is, new laws, reauthorizations of earlier laws) with respect to elementary and secondary education, beginning with the National Defense Education Act of 1958 through the NCLB Act. Anderson chooses to concentrate on contemporary history, although he includes a very short chapter at the start of the book that covers years prior to 1958 that offers a review of the historical precedents for federal aid to education and the context for what occurred subsequently. His primary data sources include House and Senate floor debates, congressional committee and subcommittee testimony, and documents from Congress and the executive branch.

Anderson’s historical analysis reveals that “the camel’s nose got in the tent” (p. 29) hundreds of year before Congress enacted NCLB, but federal