Location: Bowdoin / Sarah O'Brien Conly

Philosophy

Sarah O. Conly

Assistant Professor of Philosphy

Contact Information

sconly@bowdoin.edu
Telephone: 207-721-5672
Philosophy
204 Edward Pols House


Spring 2013

  • Love (PHIL 018)
  • Moral Problems (PHIL 120)


conly

Education

  • Ph.D. (Cornell)
  • M.A. (Cornell)
  • B.A. (Princeton)

I was on leave during the academic year 2010-2011, spending the fall at the Centre for Ethics, Philosophy, and Public Affairs at the University of St. Andrews, Scotland, the spring in Oaxaca, Mexico.  During that time I wrote a book, Against Autonomy:  Justifying Coercive Paternalism, which will be published by Cambridge University Press in 2012.  Against Autonomy is a defense of paternalistic laws; that is, laws that make you do things, or prevent you from doing things, for your own good.  I argue that autonomy, or the freedom to act in accordance with your own decisions, is overrated—that the common high evaluation of the importance of autonomy is based on a belief that we are much more rational than we actually are.  We now have lots of evidence from psychology and behavioral economics that we are often very bad at choosing effective means to our ends.  In such cases, we need the help of others—and in particular, of government regulation—to keep us from going wrong. 



Against Autonomy:  Justifying Coercive Paternalism, forthcoming, Cambridge University Press.

Current Projects

I’ve now started on my next book, tentatively titled One: Do We have a Right to More Children?  We tend to think of regulating the number of children people may have as morally reprehensible.  For one thing, the right to have a family is one we often think of as sacrosanct, articulated, among other places, in the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights.  And, we think that women have the right to control their bodies, and while this right is mentioned often in the context of the right to abortion, it may also be held to include the right to have as many children as one wants.   Lastly, we think of such policies as having sanctions that are unacceptable, including forced abortions of those who become pregnant with a second child.    In One, I argue that opposition to population regulation is based on a number of mistakes:  that the right to have a family doesn’t entail the right to have as many children as you may want; that the right to control one’s body is conditional on how much harm you are doing to others; and that nothing in population regulation entails that those who break the law can be forced to have abortions, or subject to any sort of punishment that is horrific.  If population growth is sufficiently dangerous, it is fair for us to impose restrictions on how many children we can give birth to.