Reputational Concerns in Repeated Negotiations
I examine a model of repeated negotiations when there is uncertainty about the exact nature of preferences of the opponent. Specifically, I study how each negotiator takes his opponent's reputation and private information into account when deciding whether or not to reach an agreement. I show that a negotiator can influence his opponent's decision by means of communications, if the opponent is not too prejudiced by otherwise available information and sufficiently trusts the information provided by the negotiator.
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The value of commitment in auctions with asymmetrically informed bidders (joint with Yan shi)
This paper studies the value of commitment in common-value auctions with asymmetrically informed bidders. We consider an auction in which an informed bidder faces an uninformed one in an auction where the seller sets a reserve price. If the seller cannot commit to staging no subsequent auction should the initial auction fail, then he is confronted with a dilemma similar to the one in a durable good monopoly. Bidders may anticipate that if they abstain from bidding in the initial auction there will be another auction with a lowered reserve price.
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A simple model of reverse settlements in pharmaceutical markets with authorized generics (joint with betty tao) (work in progress) In this paper we present a simple model of price competition between two pharmaceutical firms that offer differentiated products , that captures the strategic nature of decision-making in a market with an incumbent firm and a potential entrant. We are interested in particular in the incumbent's ability to make a reverse settlement offer to the entrant and should there be no settlement, the incumbent's option of launching an authorized generic.
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Other work in progress
"Information Structures and the History Dependency of Corruption"
"Dynamic Auctions with Asymmetric Information and an Application to Outer Continental Shelf Auctions" (joint with Yan Shi)
Economic Theory Workshop, Duke University (2004)
Midwest Economic Theory Meetings, Michigan State University (2006),
Departmental Economics Seminar, Wesleyan University (2006)
4th Spain Italy Netherlands Meeting on Game Theory (SING 4), Wroclaw, Poland (2007)
Departmental Economics Seminars, University of North Carolina, Pembroke & Univ. of Richmond and Georgetown University (2009)
Midwest Economic Theory Meetings, Univ. of Iowa (2009)
Midwest Economics Association Meetings, Evanston, IL (2010)
Western Economic Association Conference, Portland, OR (2010)
